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Brian Sibanda
143
 9 THE UNDERSIDE OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE: AN EPISTEMIC BREAK FROM WESTERN SCIENCE 
Nokuthula Hlabangane
164
 10 THE FICTION OF THE JURISTIC PERSON: REASSESSING PERSONHOOD IN RELATION TO PEOPLE 
C.D. Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara
186
 11 THE CULTURAL VILLAGE AND ITS IDEA OF THE ‘HUMAN’ 
Morgan Ndlovu
209
 12 A FRAGMENTED HUMANITY AND MONOLOGUES: TOWARDS  A DIVERSAL HUMANISM 
Siphamandla Zondi
224
  CONTRIBUTORS 
243
  INDEX 
247
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Aids acquired immune deficiency syndrome
AMCU  Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
DEIC Dutch East India Company
EEIC English East India Company
EIC East India Company
HIV human immunodeficiency virus
IDP Integrated Development Plan
LGBT lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
LGBTIQ+ lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex or questioning
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NUM National Union of Mineworkers




USA United States of America

THE TROUBLE WITH THE HUMAN
WILLIAM MPOFU AND MELISSA STEYN
1
A
ll communities create notions of their place within the array of sentient 
and non-sentient beings with whom they share their worlds. The princi-
pal trouble with the grand construction of the human of Euro-modernity, 
however, is that it was founded on unhappy circumstances and for tragic 
purposes. Man, as a performative idea, created inequalities and hierarchies 
usable for the exclusion and oppression of the other. The status of the human 
was self-attributed to dominant people powerful enough to name themselves 
and define others. That which was categorised as non-human became things, 
reduced to resources, usable and disposable by the unapologetic humans. 
The attribute human, in other words, is not self-evident or assured. It can be 
wielded; given and taken away. The threat of its withdrawal from, or perma-
nent denial to, weaker peoples in peripheralised spaces continues to define 
life within a climate of fear that makes being human a fragile condition and 
an uncertain reality (Soyinka 2004). These dispensable others and objects of 
power are found everywhere as black people, women, the poor and homeless, 
refugees and foreigners, gay, lesbian, queer and trans people, the old and vul-
nerable, people living with disabilities and other others.
The prevailing constructs of ‘man’ and ‘human’ began with the durable 
handiwork of (male) European humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies who needed convenient and powerful tools for classifying themselves 
and categorising others (Mignolo 2015, 158). The male Westerner, as the 
Christian and paradigmatic human, entered into relationships on grossly une-
qual terms. Conquerors in the shape of patriarchs, empire builders, merchants 
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and missionaries employed different approaches in disciplining the bodies of 
the conquered through violence, arresting the appetites and desires of the 
natives with goods and services, and dominating the minds and hearts of the 
subjects with gospels and hymns. Conquest was designed to make the con-
quered docile and obedient, subject to exploitation and ownership.
Mahmood Mamdani (2013) elucidates this political principle as ‘define 
and rule’, where power is able to name and by so doing dominate its subjects 
as inadequate people with deficits and lacks, whose oppression may there-
fore not be so morally wrong. Power has distributive privilege and enjoys 
the resources of classifying and categorising the objects and subjects around 
itself. Human differences, in that scheme of constructions, classifications and 
hierarchisations, are not expressions of human diversity, but excuses for the 
oppression and exploitation of the other. Power, without naming itself, is 
able to name, define, judge and place others as weaker. It enjoys the privilege 
of presenting itself in salvationist, protective, developmentalist, democratic 
and humanitarian terms that hide the domination it exercises and the often 
deadly consequences of this for those who have lost their equality and full 
membership of the human category.
The paradox of Western modernity, therefore, is that its grand rhetoric 
which announces freedom, happiness, progress and development has marched 
hand in hand with the logic of coloniality. The coloniality of Western moder-
nity has participated in the appropriation of natural resources, exploitation of 
labour, legal control of ‘undesirables’, imposition of the interests and world 
view inherent in a capitalist economy, and denial of the full humanity of the 
disempowered and the impoverished (Mignolo 2015, 164). The condition 
of the oppressed is not a condition resulting from natural causes. Gendered 
violence and inequality are not the inevitable consequence of biology. 
Peripheralised countries are not undeveloped, their people are not powerless 
and poor; the countries have been underdeveloped, the people impoverished 
and also disempowered through displacement and dispossession.
The enslavement and colonisation of Africans was based on their removal 
from the category of the human. Those who were to be enslaved and colonised 
first had to lose their human equality and be characterised as inferior and 
incomplete beings. The work of decoloniality in Africa, therefore, becomes 
a search for completeness through the recovery, restoration and recognition 
of the equal belonging of black people to the world. Dani Wadada Nabudere 
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(2011, 1) correctly notes that ‘Afrikology’ as a philosophy is the search for 
human wholeness in a world that has been defined by loss of equality and 
denial of the full humanity of the conquered and oppressed. The fight for 
liberation as a form of social justice is also a struggle for the recovery of denied 
and lost humanity. Our book is positioned within this decolonial struggle.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA OF THE 
HUMAN IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
‘Where and when exactly did the rain begin to beat us?’ is a philosophical 
question that is posed by Chinua Achebe (1989, 43) in his meditation on the 
African political and social condition. Achebe is one of the African thinkers 
who have demanded a return to historical sources and political genealogies 
and provenances in search of the time and place in which Africans lost their 
equality within the human family. Achebe ponders the ‘hopes and impedi-
ments’ that have defined attempts at understanding between the North and 
the South, and amongst people positioned differently within intersecting 
power relations.
Achebe’s demand to know what happened to the common humanity of 
human beings reminds us of the unstable link between the human and the 
humane. How some humans use power to monopolise being human and expel 
others from the human family remains a haunting philosophical dilemma 
of inhumanity that has a long historical trajectory in the South and in the 
North. Socrates, a questioning mind, left the fourth century BCE with the 
haunting question of why everyone on earth seemed to believe in humanity 
‘but not in the existence of humans’ (Plato 2010, 24). He was perplexed by 
the fact that everywhere, from religious pulpits to political podiums, beauti-
ful things were being said about the love of humanity, and yet the majority 
of human beings were being oppressed everywhere. Multitudes were being 
thingified right in the centre of Athens, the city state celebrated as the cradle 
of reason and democracy, much as coloniality was born and bred right at the 
centre of what has been celebrated as liberty and progress.
In the same vein as Achebe (1989) pondering the beginnings of the dehu-
manisation of Africans, Jean-Jacques Rousseau ([1755] 2004, 1) in the 
eighteenth century agonised over the ‘origins of inequality’ among human 
beings, to the extent that he wished humans could have remained at the 
level of animals that show respect for life and mercy for the weak among 
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themselves. Yearning for the ways of the animal kingdom was Rousseau’s way 
of condemning the evil done by humans to other humans. To compare the 
human to the animal, and to favour the animal, becomes an expression of the 
deepest philosophical indictment of the evil perpetrated by humans. Human 
success in the arts and the sciences, Rousseau opined, only served to conceal 
the truth that humans were worse than beasts in their cruel and evil practices.
Friedrich Nietzsche ([1906] 1968, 1) called ‘the will to power’ an insatia-
ble and unreasonable appetite for profit, power and domination. Oppression 
begins with an appetite and a passion. What allows war to be celebrated as 
necessary and natural (Machiavelli [1532] 2009) is the desire to, by any means 
necessary, conquer and dominate the other. The era of the Enlightenment 
itself, storied as the death of God and the birth of reason that would lib-
erate humans and brighten the world with progress, became an era of the 
false promise. Steve Martinot (2011), for instance, notes that the epoch of 
the same Enlightenment that set alight development and advancement in 
the West darkened the South with human suffering, disasters and pain. The 
year in which the conquest of the Americas was consolidated, 1492, when 
modernity is supposed to have begun to infiltrate the Global South, when the 
idea of the nation state was born, is the year that Enrique Dussel (1996, 1) 
describes as the beginning of ‘the invention’ and also ‘eclipse’ of the ‘infe-
rior’ other by the conquering and ‘superior’ big Other on the planet. The 
conquered peoples of the New World were judged to have no souls and no 
religion, and they therefore became legitimate subjects of conquest, dom-
ination, enslavement and expulsion from their lands, from the world and 
from life itself. God and religion became political capital, a resource that was 
used to include some and exclude others from the human family. People were 
divided into the categories of the godly and the godless, and thus were they 
separated, and the weaker amongst them condemned.
The always already gendered (Kitch 2009; Oyěwùmí 1997; Trinh 1989) 
classification of human beings according to race began, and was spread as 
an accompaniment of modernity and coloniality to the regions of Latin 
America, Asia and Africa (Quijano 2000). From slavery in the Americas 
through colonialism in Africa to apartheid in South Africa, ‘race’ was used 
in political systems where darker-skinned people across the globe found 
themselves dehumanised (Magubane 2007). Defiantly defending ‘the souls 
of black folk’ in reaction to the gravity of the removal of black slaves from 
5
The Trouble with the Human
the human family on American plantations, and the enduring domination 
and marginalisation of African Americans, W.E.B. Du Bois ([1859] 1969, xi) 
identified ‘the problem of the Twentieth Century’ as ‘the problem of the col-
our line’, where humanity was tragically torn asunder between the black- and 
the white-skinned peoples. Some philosophers have noted that the ‘social 
contract’ governing and organising the present world system is in fact a ‘racial 
contract’ (Mills 1997, 1–3). According to Charles Mills, white supremacy 
is ‘the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is 
today’, where ‘racism is itself a political system, a particular power structure of 
informal or formal rule, socioeconomic privilege, and norms for the differen-
tial distribution of material wealth and opportunities, benefits and burdens, 
rights and duties’ (1997, 3). In other words, racism is the powerful but largely 
concealed governing system and logic of the present Euro-North American 
world system. Racist maps, borders, fences and boundaries that were con-
structed in the course of conquest still exist physically and metaphysically, 
governing imaginaries and political practices. Upsurges of xenophobia and 
attacks on refugees, immigrants, women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgen-
der, intersex or questioning (LGBTIQ+) people are connected to colonial 
demarcations of who is human and who is not. The contract that governs the 
world is not the social contract of the bond, implicit in the all-encompassing 
expression ‘we the people’, that is imagined to have moved humans from their 
state of nature to become members of civil society and subjects of modern 
government. It is, instead, the bond of the humans who count and matter, the 
humans of consequence: ‘we the white people’, in Mills’s telling observation 
(1997, 30).
Sufferings and calamities that humans have encountered in the world have 
not come along expected and linear paths. The religious and racially defined 
human inequalities that eventually became political and economic inequal-
ities led to a worldwide human struggle for power and domination. What 
Hannah Arendt (1968) called ‘the origins of totalitarianism’ privileged dom-
ination and hegemony in absolutist terms. Violent and absolutist forms of 
power and the appetite for domination produced both the Nazism that led 
to the Holocaust – the mass persecution and slaughter of Jews and others 
in Hitler’s Germany – and the Zionism that has seen Israel develop policies 
of apartheid enacted against Palestinians. The victims of anti-Semitism and 
the Holocaust, within a few decades of the formation of the State of Israel in 
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1948, had morphed into the oppressors and managers of the debility (Puar 
2017) of the Arabs and Muslims in Palestine, in a historical and political 
paradox that Mamdani (2001) has described as the scenario in which victims 
of power and domination systematically become oppressors and killers of oth-
ers. There are, it seems, no permanent oppressors and permanent oppressed. 
Frantz Fanon (1963) noted how the ambition of the oppressed, the colonised 
and dominated may become the spirited drive to be an oppressor and a col-
oniser. Liberation movements of the Global South, after the decolonisation 
of their countries, became the new colonisers and oppressors of the people. 
The difference between a Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and an Ian Smith 
in Rhodesia became a difference of skin colour only, because of the way in 
which the supposed liberator reproduced the uses of power of the coloniser. 
At its most successful and powerful, coloniality, as an assault on the human, 
reproduces itself through the victims and turns them into its practitioners, 
defenders and multipliers.
The crooked, unstable and uncertain line of persecution of the human can 
be concealed even under the many representations and discourses of decolo-
nisation, the struggle for human rights and liberation. Much in the same ways 
that slavery, colonialism, apartheid and imperialism came enveloped in prom-
ises of civilisation, modernisation, development and democratisation, forms 
of human domination, violence and oppression may be dressed in the lan-
guages of human rights, decolonisation and liberation. The very vocabularies 
and grammars of the fight for human rights may conceal assaults and nega-
tions of human rights. Those that have claimed God and championship of 
the human have betrayed humanity to the extent that Carl Schmitt (1996, 3), 
himself a Nazi ideologue, could warn that ‘whoever speaks for the human 
wants to cheat’, by using a grand narrative and ideal to conceal criminal ten-
dencies such as the love of power and tyranny. Many years after Schmitt wrote 
in 1932, the observation can be made that inside the very institutions and 
organisations that claim to represent the human and human rights, human 
beings are negated and violated. In spite of the bold Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948 (UN 1948), the human itself has not been uni-
versalised, and rights and freedoms have not been equally distributed. The 
historical paradox is that this declaration took place at a time when the rights 
of the colonised and of those who were to live under apartheid in Africa were 
still being trampled upon by these same champions of the rights of Man. This 
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has compelled Walter Mignolo (2009, 7) to ask the question ‘who speaks for 
the human in human rights?’ Speaking from what is often constructed as the 
world’s most mature democracy, the USA, Donald Trump frequently scares 
the world with expressions of bigotry towards and hate for those who have 
been produced as foreigners, refugees, migrants and blacks from Africa, a 
continent of countries that he has referred to as ‘shitholes’. The metaphor of 
shit signifies how the weakened are easily made abject, contemptible, waste 
matter.
White supremacism and heteropatriachy have contributed to a scramble 
for belonging to the human race that has excluded people on more grounds 
of difference than skin colour alone. Giorgio Agamben (2005, 26) describes 
a powerful ‘anthropological machine’ by means of which those in powerful 
and dominant social and political positions process, give and take humanness 
from others. It is a hierarchising social technology that distributes humanness 
by classifying and declassifying people according to markers such as race, cul-
ture, sexuality, religion, age, ability of body and even geographic location and 
origins. In her concept of the ‘Kyriarchy’, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (2001) 
has helpfully coined a word for the interacting, interlocking systems of dom-
ination and subordination that inform the modern world. As a pyramidal 
system, the Kyriarchy includes not only sexism, racism and heteronorma-
tivity, but also, among other things, militarism and anthropocentrism. The 
vaunted human has endangered the climate and sparked an ecological crisis 
that threatens the very existence of the human species, the animal kingdom, 
plant life, water and air. The trouble of the human is therefore not only an 
internal human ‘family’ matter, but also an external ecological crisis that has 
disturbed and provoked nature, making the world a dangerous place for the 
human and for other life forms.
THE HUMAN AND WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
Threats and implementation of violence are principal factors in disciplining 
humans and human subjectivities into dominant and oppressed groups. In 
the present world order, war and violence have given time and place their 
identity. At the end of the twentieth century, Mamdani (2004, 3) could argue 
that ‘we have just ended a century of violence, one possibly more violent than 
any other in recorded history’ for its ‘civil wars, revolutions and counter-
revolutions’. Staggering violence should not surprise us in a modernity where 
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‘violence has become the midwife of history’ (Mamdani 2004, 3). Perhaps 
the normalisation of violence in the modern colonial world has not found a 
more perfect expression than in the representation of war as a natural accom-
paniment of the human condition. For instance, it was with the force of 
argument and refined erudition that Nietzsche preached of war as part of life 
in the modern world: ‘Life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to 
war’ ([1906] 1968, 33).
For Nietzsche, and an entire tradition of other philosophers and influential 
thinkers, peace was something to be dismissed as decadence, and a disturbance 
of the normal and natural state of war. For a philosopher who boasted of his rare 
intelligence, it was a canonical observation of the epoch to note that humanity 
‘should love peace as a means to new wars – and the short peace more than 
the long’ (Nietzsche [1885] 1969, 74–75). Nietzsche’s celebrations of war 
could be dismissed as the musings of a bored philosopher ranting from his 
closet and meaning no harm to the world, if such leaders of the world as for-
mer US President George Bush had not waged wars in Nietzschean ways. Wars 
have given meaning to nihilism and relevance to brute force, in that claims of 
democracy and freedom have been accompanied by new wars and productions 
of unfreedom. More recently Azar Gat (2008, xi) has stated that ‘[with] war 
being connected to everything else and everything else being connected to war, 
explaining war and tracing its development in relation to human development 
in general almost amount to a theory and history of everything’.
War, in spite of its punishments and costs to humans, has become accepted 
as part of the very identity of life. For the Global North, the political power 
of states and their economic prosperity, the wealth of nations, has been con-
nected to wars and genocides of conquest that led to the exploitation of 
slave labour and the extraction of resources from the colonies in the Global 
South. Fanon (1963) and Eric Williams (1964) differently but with equal 
force describe how the power and opulence of the West was founded on the 
proceeds of slave-based, imperial and colonial crimes against the humanity of 
Latin Americans, Asians and Africans. In this sense, ‘to understand war is thus 
to understand ourselves’ (Gelven 1994, 8). Writing as a Westerner, Daniel 
Hallin (2008) could say ‘you have to understand war in order to under-
stand our culture’. A hegemonic culture of war (Maldonado-Torres 2008) 
pervades world political thinking amongst the ruling regimes of powerful 
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nations, failing and failed states, and so-called terrorist and dissident organ-
isations. Albert Camus (1953, 1) understood the war and violence of the 
present world as that which has been not only naturalised and normalised, 
but philosophised and decorated. As far as war is concerned, Camus notes 
that criminals have been elevated to the position of judges. Powerful states 
that claim to be peacemakers of the world occupy the front seat in propelling 
wars. For leaders of superpowers who declare war on their enemies and those 
of dissident organisations that valorise violence and war, war is no longer 
‘unique like a cry; now it is universal like science, yesterday it was put on trial, 
today it is the law’ (Camus 1953, 1). The powerful use their power to give 
permission and respectability to violence.
Based on a reading of the human as ‘Economic Man’, economics, a privi-
leged social science whose claim is that it has the duty to calculate, measure 
and help in the creation of wealth and happiness, has also been weaponised. 
World economics, through such international financial organisations as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, has itself not just failed 
to escape but has participated in causing and promoting violence and wars. 
In the same way that the genocides of conquest and their fruits of slavery, 
colonialism, imperialism and apartheid had both hidden and overt economic 
objectives of dispossessing and displacing the other, and of exploiting labour 
and other resources, world economics from Adam Smith to the present has 
been implicated in violence and war. Yash Tandon (2015) describes the pres-
ent systems of world economics, trade and accounting as the ‘West’s war’ 
against the rest in the way asymmetrical power and economic relations are 
sustained and promoted, poverty is globalised and the poor are kept fixed in 
their poverty. Capitalist economics ensures the production of poverty and 
misery as much as it guarantees the wealth of a minority of states, and of 
global corporations that have become richer and more powerful than some 
countries of the Global South.
In political and economic relations with ‘the rest’, the West has presented its 
political power and economic leadership as violent, warlike impositions and 
forms of domination. Refusal and resistance are met with cruel punishments. 
In observing this, Ramón Grosfoguel (2007, 217) notes that as the Global 
South we have received ‘[no] respect and no recognition for Indigenous, 
African, Islamic or other non-European forms of democracy. The liberal form 
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of democracy is the only one accepted and legitimated. Forms of democratic 
alterity are rejected.’
On pain of war the Euro-American Empire has forced itself upon the 
world. For the reason that the paradigm of clashes and war rules the world 
in theory and in practice, Samuel Huntington (1996) advances a political 
proposal to the USA, disguised as an intellectual observation, that civilisa-
tions of the world, mainly the Islamic and the Western ones, are inevitably 
headed for a ‘clash of civilisations’: a cultural, political and military war that 
the USA and the West at large must win. Huntington does not condemn or 
discourage war, but uses his powerful position as a trusted political advisor 
to the world’s most powerful and warlike nation to implicitly encourage it. 
Achille Mbembe (2001, 25) is correct in his argument that conquest, with 
its enforced rules and regulations, founds itself, legitimates itself and eventu-
ally maintains itself through physical and symbolic rituals and ceremonies of 
violence that remain fixed in the imaginary of the conquered, who are domes-
ticated through fear and guilt. The brutality of the event of conquest, and the 
actions that accompany domination, remain silently but forcefully lodged, 
like any other trauma, in the psyche of the conquered, creating a ‘past that is 
not past’ (Sharpe 2016, 23).
What has effectively been put paid to is Francis Fukuyama’s optimistic 
but violently Euro-North American-centric prediction of the end of history 
and the total victory of neoliberal democracy and capitalism in the world, 
where the ‘end of history’ would mean the end of wars and bloody revolu-
tions. In Fukuyama’s thesis, given their agreement on goals and intentions 
men would no longer have any large causes for which to fight in the neo-
liberal paradise. They would satisfy their needs through economic activity, 
and would no longer have to risk their lives in battle (Fukuyama 1992, 311). 
Contra-Fukuyama, the West’s own wars of invasion of such countries as Iraq 
in 2003, Libya in 2011, the present stalemate in Syria, and such events as 
the attacks of 9/11 on New York and Washington DC and other so-called 
terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, have created conditions in 
which human beings, especially the poor and the weak, endure rather than 
enjoy life. In sum, modern politics has indeed been corrupted by a ‘fetishism 
of power’ (Dussel 2008, 3) that is violently opposed to the ‘will to live’ (2008, 
13) espoused by the decolonial philosophy of liberation, which holds power 
to be peace and liberation itself.
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VIOLENCE AND KNOWING THE HUMAN
Huntington and Fukuyama are two spokespersons of empire, that is, of the 
present world system led by the Euro-North American regime: one celebrat-
ing illusory peace based on the neoliberal triumphalism of the West, and 
the other implicitly advocating for a war of civilisations based on the rapa-
cious expansionism of empire. The two also exemplify the uses and abuses of 
knowledge in defence of the violence that has become an organising idea of 
the present world system. In the world academy that includes the Westernised 
university in Africa and Asia, privileged academics and intellectuals use their 
professorial and expert authority to defend and promote empire. It is in that, 
and other ways, that empire has co-opted, usurped and colonised knowledge 
and the academy.
Knowledge, in the shape of science and philosophy, has been constructed 
and mobilised to lend respectability, acceptability and normality to war, 
social inequalities and dehumanisation of the lesser other. The colonisation 
of the Global South and the enslavement of black people were scientifically 
planned and defended. Celebrated Western rationality and enlightenment 
became complicit in the irrational and dark oppression of black people, 
whose humanity was carefully doubted and opportunistically dismissed. It 
was with some of the finest scientific and philosophical erudition that Carl 
von Clausewitz published a treatise in 1812 on ‘principles of war’ that charac-
terised violence and war as midwives of history, as the other form of politics 
that should be the rule rather than the exception (Von Clausewitz [1812] 
1942). It was, too, with some political and intellectual triumphalism that, 
on the eve of American independence in 1776, Adam Smith presented his 
thesis holding that through the exploitation of the labour of the defeated, 
the wealth of nations would be created (Smith [1776] 2001). The wealth and 
prosperity of nations that Smith described were to be based on the colonisa-
tion and enslavement of others.
Biological sciences were deployed in overdrive in attempts to provide a sci-
entific justification for the perceived inferiority and animal nature of black 
people (Magubane 2007). Trusted scientists of empire such as Charles Darwin 
([1859] 2011), who investigated the ‘origin of species’, had their works used 
to deduce that some human beings were naturally unfit, and therefore less 
human, in a world whose logic of life was the survival of the fittest. Theology, 
too, was mobilised to project the enslaved and the colonised as people without 
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souls who must be grateful to their conquerors for bringing them closer to 
God. Science and religion were married, and deployed together in separating 
human beings into those who were normatively human and those who were 
expelled from the privileged human family.
The production of knowledge that circulated ideas about the lesser human-
ity of the colonised and enslaved was accompanied by epistemicides, the 
systematic destruction of the sciences, philosophies and histories of the con-
quered (Grosfoguel 2013). That the colonised and the enslaved were humans 
who had sciences, religions and histories of their own was a truth that empire 
could not and cannot live with. It is for this reason that Boaventura De Sousa 
Santos (2014), in his forceful philosophical plea for ‘justice against epistemi-
cide’ in the world, advances an argument that the Western understanding of 
life, the human and the world is not the only understanding. Santos pleads 
for the fight for social justice in the world to be necessarily accompanied by 
the struggle for ‘cognitive justice’ (Santos 2014: 42). One may add hermeneu-
tic justice, such that other interpretations of the human, life and the world 
besides the Western one can also be taken seriously. The first freedom, in the 
observation of Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018), is epistemic freedom, which 
is the freedom of people to think and to know who they are and where they 
are, without fear and encumbrance of the Eurocentric standard. Without the 
guilt of being second-comers or even visitors to thought and knowledge, he 
argues, marginal peoples should dare to invent and recover life and the world 
from the abyss of hegemonic constructions.
The question ‘can non-Europeans think?’ is asked satirically by Iranian 
scholar Hamid Dabashi (2015). The question is asked because of the prev-
alent assumption in Western thought that non-Europeans are naturally not 
gifted with thought and rationality. In effectively and violently imposing 
its model of power, the Euro-North American empire became a pretender 
to universalism, and used force and persuasion to make its culture a world 
culture (Mazrui 2001). In the attempt to homogenise global culture and to 
hegemonise its power and control of the world, the patriarchal West crushed 
human diversity and narrowed the world according to its imaginary.
Enslaved and colonised peoples have been rendered through a distorted 
mirror, forcing them to see and understand themselves in a way that gives 
their conquest and domination some sense, if not justification: ‘In this way, 
we continue being what we are not. And as a result we can never identify 
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our true problems, much less resolve them, except in a partial and distorted 
way’ (Quijano 2000, 556). The victims of empire are given a false and dis-
torted sense of themselves and their condition. The experiences of coloniality 
and domination are mirrored and reflected in falsified and misleading terms 
that favour the coloniser. The reflected image ‘occupies an important place 
in dialectics exalting the coloniser and humbling the colonised. Further it is 
economically fruitful’ (Memmi 1974, 123). This is government through ste-
reotyping. Images of the oppressed are produced that justify their oppression 
and present it as salvation. In more and more emphatic ways, the oppressed 
are given understandings of themselves as deserving of their dehumanisation. 
Du Bois ([1859] 1969) captured well the way in which the oppressed are 
refused their positionality as people who have a problem, and are fraudu-
lently treated as people who are a problem. Oppression and domination are 
presented as a consequence, rather than a cause, of the dehumanisation of the 
marginalised and inferiorised other.
Critical humanists, among them decolonial thinkers, critical diver-
sity scholars and activists of both the Global South and the Global North 
in search of the liberation of the human from coloniality, are increasingly 
unmasking and resisting the coloniality of knowledge that stereotypes and 
simplifies the oppressed. Achebe (1989, 40), as noted above, is one of the 
African novelists who have written in critical ways that lament how African 
thinkers and writers have reproduced coloniality by looking, thinking and 
writing on Africa and African peoples in frames and terms that are defined 
in the Eurocentric paradigm of knowledge. Achebe exhorts African thinkers 
and writers, including himself, to resist the Eurocentric colonial sensibility. 
In other words, the march of the coloniality of power and the coloniality 
of knowledge in the Global South should not, Achebe argues, go unchal-
lenged. The project of critical diversity literacy (Steyn 2015), specifically, and 
decoloniality more generally, should not only be to unmask and describe the 
coloniality of power and the coloniality of knowledge, but also to cultivate 
among the oppressed and dominated a critical consciousness and resistance to 
colonial ways of understanding the human and its condition. Power, and the 
multiple privileges that it produces and protects, should, in intellectual and 
social justice terms, be rendered vulnerable and open. To Dabashi’s satirical 
question ‘can non-Europeans think?’ Mignolo (2015) replies, ‘yes we can!’, 
insisting that non-Europeans and all other inferiorised, marginalised and 
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oppressed peoples of the world can think and produce knowledge, among the 
full range of human attributes. That there is no one model of the human, and 
that others, all marginalised people, are humans too, and have the capacity to 
know, is a truth to be defended. Coloniality of knowledge must be met with 
decoloniality of thinking and knowing. Being human, rational and knowl-
edgeable should be liberated from being hostage to the Eurocentric world 
view, and established as a quality of all people, with all our differences. One 
of the baptismal statements of the decolonial moment is that all people are 
produced by, and come from, legitimate histories and knowledges.
BEING HUMAN IN THE MODERN 
COLONIAL WORLD ORDER
The modern world that Jean-Paul Sartre encounters and describes phenom-
enologically (Sartre ([1943] 2003) is a world where the powerful and the 
privileged have ‘being’, and the powerless and oppressed have ‘nothingness’ 
and emptiness. For the racialised former slaves in the Americas, blacks in 
apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, and the poor at large, the combi-
nation of the coloniality of power and the coloniality of knowledge produced 
in them senses of deficit and inadequacy as human beings. The lack of the 
wholeness that Fanon describes (Fanon 2008, 3) refers to the emptiness that 
is created in the oppressed by dehumanising oppression and exploitation 
such as they encountered in the experience of slavery and its aftermaths. 
The oppressed develop a ‘double consciousness’ (Du Bois [1859] 1969, 45) 
whereby they judge themselves by the standards of their oppressors. Those 
whose full humanity has been doubted may develop self-doubt and self-hate. 
A veil of invisibility masks the oppressed by silencing and erasing their human 
agency, rendering their lives, as Judith Butler (2009, xix) argues, ‘ungrievable’, 
disposable and dispensable.
The formal end of slavery, colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, 
however, did not evaporate coloniality: its oppressions and exploitations 
remain stubbornly durable and haunting to its victims. Power and privilege 
are at their most forceful when they are concealed and invisible. It is in its 
invisibility and its power that Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2008) notes colo-
niality to be a metaphysical catastrophe that overwhelms former slaves and 
the former colonised of the Global South. Oppression, in the arguments of 
Maldonado-Torres and Dussel (1985), is a kind of war upon the being of all 
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the dominated and oppressed. What Maldonado-Torres (2007) defines as 
the coloniality of being refers to the forms of slavish and colonial power rela-
tions that remain and are reproduced even after administrative slavery and 
juridical colonialism have been abolished. Slavery and colonisation in their 
full application became systems that gave birth to other, more toxic forms 
of power relations and orders of the distribution of privilege and division 
of labour. Aimé Césaire (1972) describes colonisation as an all-enveloping 
system that left no relations unaffected and uninfected by its violence. For 
that reason, in talking about the colonised and former colonised, Césaire 
is talking about metaphysically compromised communities and beings. 
Colonialism, as he describes it, did not end with the physical dispossession 
and displacement of the colonised but extended into psychological, socio-
logical and theological punishment of all its victims, who were left emptied 
of all the content of being. Such victims became so enmeshed in coloniality 
itself that they began to reproduce and magnify it in a multiplicity of ways, 
including becoming oppressors in their own right. Once the oppressed assim-
ilate oppressor consciousness, Paulo Freire (1993) argues, they begin to be 
accessories and functionaries of oppression, which they begin to imagine as 
normal and natural; they begin to fear the prospects of freedom and resist 
their own liberation.
Struggles for liberation from oppression and for rehumanisation of the 
dehumanised, therefore, have to reckon with the resistance that comes 
even from among the oppressed, who would have navigated and negotiated 
oppressive positions of their own within the system of domination and do not 
imagine a world outside forms of dominance and oppression. Oppression is 
in its fullest flight when the oppressed seek out their own pockets of privilege 
within the system of dominance, and cannot imagine inclusive liberation. 
The human, as an idea and an experience in the world, has become so trou-
bled within the contestations that pit power against justice, that the storied 
debate between Noam Chomsky and Michael Foucault in 1972 (Elders 
1974) dwelt on whether there are any qualities and values any more that can 
be called properties of the human, in a world where humans themselves seem 
so passionately invested in the negation of liberation and of the human. In the 
paradigm of war, of nihilist political and economic competition, the human 
is assailed by forms of physical and metaphysical violence that have rendered 
being itself scarce and to be distributed in troublingly asymmetrical terms.
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In complex and interlocking ways, these constructions and reconstructions 
have taken being human away from some and given others the monopoly of 
it. Maldonado-Torres (2007, 245) notes that at play is an ‘imperial attitude’ 
that he calls ‘racist/imperial Manichean misanthropic scepticism’. Conquered 
and marginalised people become dehumanised through the characterisation 
and definition of certain deficits and lacks. Those whose histories and lan-
guages are denied importance and remain native and indigenous are, as of 
old, peripheralised as uncivilised rustics, bereft of reason and rationality. In 
such circumstances the task of liberation becomes an intellectual and political 
project of rehumanising the dehumanised. For Fanon (1963, 251), ‘Europe 
undertook the leadership of the world with ardour, cynicism and violence’ 
of power and knowledge that left the weak and dominated of the world 
‘wretched’ and ‘damned’, in spite of the talk about man and humanity that 
European philosophy professes. A new model of the human is wanted. Fanon’s 
decolonial resolution is not a simple one, but rather a proposition for creat-
ing another world in the same world where Europe made itself hegemonic 
and turned its values into common sense. Fanon proposes a radical depar-
ture from the Eurocentric paradigm of the human that loudly celebrated the 
human and human rights, but participated in genocides of conquest, enslave-
ment and colonisation which killed human beings in their millions.
Power loses its legitimacy by indulging in the privilege of dehumanising the 
powerless. Oppression dehumanises both the oppressor and the oppressed, 
and one cannot ignore or suspend the humanity of the other without com-
promising one’s own (Freire 1993). A need has arisen for humanity to depart 
from the European and Western colonial example of power and knowledge, to 
champion other human directions in pursuit of liberated futures. Liberation 
from oppression, therefore, demands the rehumanisation of both the oppres-
sor and the oppressed.
ORGANISATION OF THE BOOK
This volume begins with the present chapter that demonstrates how, through 
social and political constructions, some human beings were disqualified and 
removed from the human family. Power and the privilege that accompanies 
it have worked to instrumentalise knowledge, including the scientific and 
the theological, to construct and produce the oppressed and the exploited. 
Their struggles for social justice and liberation start with defending their 
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basic belonging to the human family. Life is experienced daily as a social and 
political war waged upon those who have lost their human equality. This 
chapter unfolds the canvas of a multivocal conversation that will take place 
in this book, one that is troubled by imaginations and constructions of the 
other while seeking to trouble dominant and hegemonic inventions of this 
oppressed and exploited other. William Mpofu and Melissa Steyn, in this 
chapter, provide a vocabulary, critical accent and tone that initiate an engaged 
exploration of the human in a dehumanising world.
In chapter two, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Patricia Pinky Ndlovu treat 
the issue of ‘blackness’ − which, just like that of ‘whiteness’, is a sociogenic 
question – as that which emerges from the invented modern Euro-North 
American-centric world system and its ever shifting global orders. This exam-
ination of blackness at a world scale makes possible the revelation of how 
blackness was constructed as the social, ideological and political inferiorisa-
tion and infantilisation of enslaved and colonised Africans. The authors use 
Maldonado-Torres’s (2007) concept of the coloniality of being to unmask the 
dismemberment of the human at a world scale, and to gesture towards decolo-
nial technologies of rehumanisation and re-membering as forms of liberation. 
In as much as blackness and whiteness are constructions of the modern colo-
nial world system, this chapter argues for a decolonial re-membering and 
reconstruction of the human at a world scale, and suggests that decoloniality, 
as a deconstruction of the toxic constructions of coloniality, is a move towards 
human liberation.
Writing from a critical perspective that is sensitive to human bodies that 
have been disqualified from the human family because of their sexual orien-
tation, and indeed their non-gender conformity, Olayinka Akanle, Gbenga 
S. Adejare and Jojolola Fasuyi ask the troubling question, ‘to what extent are 
we all humans?’ in chapter three. The case study of the chapter is Nigeria, 
where through expressions of hatred and violence, backed by state power 
and machinery, some human beings are discriminated against and perse-
cuted, and thus expelled from the category of the human because of their 
sexual orientation. The ways in which the dehumanising structure of system-
atic heteronormativity in the Nigerian setting uses the cover of religion, law 
and morality to minimise the humanity of those that do not conform to its 
dictates are highlighted. Same-sex intimate relationships in Nigeria and in 
many other countries are banned by law, and penalties that range from social 
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ostracisation to imprisonment are levied against offenders. Like the black-
ness examined in chapter two, homosexuality is used to exclude, marginalise 
and dehumanise the other, who is rendered punishable and dispensable. This 
chapter highlights exactly how social and mental constructions such as gender 
are weaponised against the human, especially against those people who have 
been constructed and produced as inferior, in the world.
In chapter four, Sibonokuhle Ndlovu delves into the important, but often 
neglected, question of how disability is socially constructed, and with criti-
cal insight illuminates how it can be deconstructed. This chapter forcefully 
insists on the humanity of people who live with disabilities in a world that 
erects prejudices and hatred against them, and uses bodily functions to deny 
dignity and human recognition to the differently abled. Normalcy itself is a 
construction and confabulation, used by those whom it empowers and priv-
ileges to suppress and exclude their others from mainstream and dignified 
life. This chapter contributes to the growing number of scholarly and critical 
voices that seek to dismantle hierarchies of ableism and to recover the denied 
humanity of people living with disabilities of the body and the mind. In its 
intellectually rigorous critical approach, the chapter contributes to a social 
justice vision for the recovery of the lost common humanity of all human 
beings.
Cary Burnett, in chapter five, engages with ageism as an othering tool. She 
artistically and critically explores the important question of what it means to 
be old, female, alone and out of step with the technological world around 
one. Using the narrative of her screenplay, When Granny Went on the Internet, 
Burnett seeks to creatively subvert hegemonic and normative expectations 
around age and the different phases of life in the world of rapidly changing 
knowledge and technology. The chapter critically recovers life stages as aspects 
of being human, and restores ageing as part of the normal journey of life. This 
chapter is novel not only in the way it weaves the analytical and the artistic 
together, but also in how it restores the long time people spend on earth to 
the sphere of opportunities for liberation.
Arguing from the point of view of black mineworkers in post-apartheid 
South Africa, in chapter six Robert Maseko examines how conditions of 
poverty and the endurance of racism beyond decolonisation infantilise these 
workers, who retain the status of ‘minors’ in spite of their experience and matu-
rity, and the hard and exploitative labour they perform. Black mineworkers 
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still bear a bleeding colonial wound, long after administrative colonialism 
and apartheid have been abolished in South Africa. Using a case study of the 
South African Platinum Belt, Maseko exposes the existential experiences of 
black South African labourers who continue to live out apartheid-era rela-
tions and conditions well after the political independence of the country was 
achieved, and well into what is supposed to be a democratic era. Through his 
study, Maseko demonstrates that democratic dispensations in Africa seem to 
have failed to evaporate the durable realities of coloniality.
In chapter seven, Tendayi Sithole addresses the gendered nature of exploita-
tion, using the experiences detailed in a slave narrative. At stake here is the 
politics of the slave, the figure who is denied any form of being. The life and 
death of Aunt Hester, Frederick Douglass’s aunt immortalised in his Narrative 
of the Life of Frederick Douglass ([1845] 1995), is dependent on the will of her 
master, Captain Anthony, who is human, after all, and has the prerogative to 
lord it over her existence because she is the slave, his possession, his property, 
his thing – that is, nothing human. In many ways, in its form and its content, 
this chapter performs the violence suffered by the dehumanised in a world 
where being human is not guaranteed.
Much like human cultures, customs and traditions at large, human lan-
guages do not walk on their own legs, separate from the human bodies that 
bear them. Brian Sibanda, in chapter eight, argues the case for language under-
stood as part of being human. Using the literature of Ngũg ı̃  wa Thiong’o 
(1981), Sibanda presents a critical vindication of language as being, and as 
a central part of the human. The political activism of Wa Thiong’o, who in 
protest against the cultural imperialism of the English language resorted to 
writing in his Gikuyu mother tongue, is understood to be a gesture towards 
the recovery and restoration of pride and dignity in being a human being. 
Like Morgan Ndlovu in chapter eleven, Sibanda contributes to and expands 
the thinking on the decolonisation of knowledge and decolonisation of being. 
The linguicides (killing of languages) and linguifams (famines of language) 
that colonialism perpetrated in Africa are not all that removed from the gen-
ocides of conquest that systematically and en masse eliminated the bodies of 
the natives. Decolonisation of language is presented as another principal way 
of restoring being to the human, in Africa and elsewhere.
Nokuthula Hlabangane, in chapter nine, contributes to the exploding of 
the myth of the superiority, objectivity and neutrality of Western science. 
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The pretence of universality and rationality in Western knowledge and 
knowledge-making are not removed from the rhetoric of civilisation and 
modernisation that accompanied the enslaving and colonial missions in the 
Global South. In a powerful argument, Hlabangane, like many decolonial 
thinkers, insists on the provincialism and situatedness of Western thought. 
The gesture of this chapter is towards a decolonial delinking from Western 
thought for purposes of re-linking with it as one aspect of the thought that 
human beings have produced in the world, and not as the totality of world 
knowledge.
Paradoxically, some non-human entities such as commercial com-
panies are increasingly being humanised and given personhood. In a 
modern capitalist world order corporations and non-human business enti-
ties have achieved the status of legal persons and corporate citizens. C.D. 
Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara contributes, in chapter ten, to a reassessment 
of the personhood of the juristic person in relation to ‘other’ people. Without 
either physical body or soul, the company in the modern world has hegem-
onically achieved a life and a kind of personhood of its own that frequently 
eclipses that of humans as we know them. This chapter explores the his-
tory and relationship of the company as a juristic person in a world where 
humanity and humanness are contested and cannot be taken for granted. The 
intersection of the power of money and that of law and politics in distributing 
humanness is a subject of interest in this important chapter.
Morgan Ndlovu, in chapter eleven, deploys a decolonial perspective to 
unmask the usurpation of traditional knowledges through the exoticisation 
and commercialisation of cultural villages. Ndlovu shows how the business 
of cultural tourism naturally depends on the idea of cultural differences, and 
how, in the non-Western world, it also serves as a ritual of denialism of the 
idea of co-humanness. In the tourism business of cultural villages, Ndlovu 
finds that the humanness and cultural being of poor, indigenous peoples are 
suppressed, and cultural differences manipulated, for purposes of profit by 
global corporations, in a form of theft and exploitation of indigenous knowl-
edges that pits the powerful against the powerless. This chapter expands our 
understanding of coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being, and con-
tributes to the unmasking of invisible structures of power and privilege.
Fittingly, this volume concludes with a critical search for a decolonial 
humanism and a diversal global dialogue. In chapter twelve, Siphamandla 
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Zondi provides a critique of the ways in which humanity has been frag-
mented, and human communication reduced to a monologue in which 
power talks down to the powerless. The chapter philosophically bemoans the 
classification of human beings according to race that has impeded symmetri-
cal dialogue between peoples with different access to power and privilege, in a 
world where human difference has been criminalised. The chapter is a critical 
plea for the decolonisation of being and restoration of communication, as a 
means of political and cultural translation aimed at achieving human under-
standing in human difference.
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THE INVENTION OF BLACKNESS ON A 
WORLD SCALE
SABELO J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI AND PATRICIA PINKY NDLOVU
2
The medieval European world knew the Blackman chiefly as a legend or occa-
sional curiosity, but still as fellow man – an Othello, a Prester John, or an 
Antar. The modern world, in contrast, knows the Negro chiefly as a bond slave 
in the West Indies and America … and we face today throughout the domi-
nant world [the belief ] that colour is a mark of inferiority. – W.E.B. Du Bois,  
The Negro
Modern hierarchies of race appear to have emerged in the contradictions between 
humanism’s aspirations to universality and the needs of modern colonial regimes 
to manage work, reproduction, and social organization of the colonized; the 
intimacies of four continents formed the political unconscious of modern racial 
classification. – Lisa Lowe, ‘The Intimacies of Four Continents’
Wole Soyinka’s widely cited injunction against Négritude, ‘a tiger does not 
proclaim its tigritude, it pounces’ (Ischinger 1974, 23), suffers miserably 
from ahistoricity. If the tiger’s essence or being as a tiger was questioned and 
renamed derogatively as an ant or something similar, it would definitely be 
forced to proclaim its tigritude (its essence or being) as part of its resistance 
and defensive self-constitution. At the very centre of ‘doing human’ is the pol-
itics of self-constitution and self-definition, particularly for a people whose 
humanity has been denied or degraded. Soyinka misses this point in his quick 
critique of Négritude, which emerged within a context of French colonial-
ism, called ‘assimilation’, that was very aggressive towards and destructive 
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of African culture, and indeed attacked the colonised people’s essence, their 
being. At least he later corrected himself, and admitted that his earlier critique 
of Négritude had been mistaken. In May 2016, he delivered a lecture entitled 
‘Repositioning Négritude: The Dialogue Resumes’ at the Department of Arts 
and Culture Africa Month Colloquia in South Africa, where he reappraised 
Négritude as an embodiment of relevant humanism. He posited that ‘it is 
possible that the last service of Négritude to humanity will be to assist us 
in redefining humanity’ (Soyinka 2016, 3). He concluded that ‘Négritude 
therefore suffers from no negative baggage and should thus be unafraid to 
pronounce upon what others shy from’ (2016, 4).
This chapter underscores the legitimacy and logics of all the African or 
black initiatives aimed at decolonial self-definition and self-reconstitution, 
such as Négritude, Ethiopianism, Garveyism, the Harlem Renaissance, 
African Personality, the Black Consciousness Movement, Afrocentricity, 
Pan-Africanism, the African Renaissance, Decoloniality and many others. 
These are discourses and initiatives of self-definition and self-reconstitution 
produced by people resisting and fighting racism, enslavement, colonialism 
and neocolonialism. Inevitably, these discourses will be problematic, lim-
ited and imperfect, as they have emerged from the battlefield of history and 
human struggles. The ambivalences, ambiguities and even contradictions of 
these discourses and initiatives are well covered in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s 
In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (1992). However, 
their inevitable ambivalences and imperfections do not justify the dismissal of 
African struggles for self-definition and self-reconstitution, otherwise known 
as self-determination. At the core of these discourses and initiatives has been 
the problem of dismemberment and dehumanisation.
Blackness emerges within the history of racism, enslavement and colonisation 
as a badge of sub-humanity and inferiority. Two concepts – dismemberment 
and re-membering – enable this chapter to empathetically make sense of the 
technologies of invention of ‘blackness’ as a marker of sub-human, if not defi-
cient, identity, as well as to appreciate African and black people’s struggles for 
self-reconstitution and resistance to dehumanising Eurocentrism. In Critique 
of Black Reason (2017), Achille Mbembe posits and examines the thesis of a 
modern, troubled world that was ‘becoming black’. Blackness, in Mbembe’s 
analysis, is a product of the racism that reduced human bodies and living 
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beings ‘to matters of appearance, skin and colour’ (Mbembe 2017, 2). This 
is how he puts it:
Across early capitalism, the term ‘Black’ referred only to the condition imposed 
on peoples of African origin (different forms of depredation, dispossession of 
all power of self-determination, and, most of all, dispossession of the future 
and of time, the two matrices of the possible). Now, for the first time in 
human history, the term ‘Black’ has been generalized. The new fungibility, 
this solubility, institutionalised as a new norm of existence and expanded to 
the entire planet, is what I call the Becoming Black of the world. (2017, 5–6)
However, in an earlier publication Mbembe (2001) was very critical of what 
he referred to as ‘African modes of self-writing’, which he associated with the 
politics of Afro-radicalism, nativism and narcissism of minor difference. The 
truth of the matter is that African modes of self-writing are part of the poli-
tics of and struggles for self-reconstitution. These modes of writing emerged 
within an anti-black white world. It was the anti-black white world that pro-
voked Aimé Césaire to pose what he termed three ‘tormenting questions’: 
‘Who am I? Who are we? What are we in this white world?’ (Césaire quoted 
in Thiam 2014, 2). This is how the complex theme of black subjectivity came 
to haunt history and philosophy. The question of ‘blackism on a world scale’ 
is at the very centre of what Lewis R. Gordon (2000, 2008) terms ‘Africana 
philosophy’ and ‘Africana existential thought’. According to Gordon,
Africana philosophy is a species of thought, which involves theoretical ques-
tions raised by critical engagements with ideas in Africana cultures and their 
hybrid, mixed, or creolized forms worldwide. Since there was no reason for 
the people of the African continent to have considered themselves African 
until that identity was imposed upon them through conquest and coloniza-
tion in the modern era (the 16th Century onwards), this area of thought also 
refers to the unique set of questions raised by the emergence of ‘Africans’ and 
their diaspora here designated by the term ‘Africana’. Such concerns include 
the convergence of most Africans with the racial term ‘black’ and its many 
connotations. Africana philosophy refers to the philosophical dimensions of 
this area of thought. (Gordon 2008, 1)
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Somehow it is these legitimate concerns that Mbembe (2001, 6–7) seems to 
ridicule, caricature and dismiss as informed by three tragic acts (slavery, colo-
nialism and apartheid), ‘three spectres and their masks (race, geography, and 
tradition)’, and ‘three rituals so constantly repeated as to become inaudible’ – 
refutation of Western definitions of Africa, denunciation of what the West has 
done and continues to do to Africa, and disqualification of the West’s claims 
to monopoly of what it means to be human. This critique sounds like an apo-
logia for what Euro-North American-centric modernity, enslavement and 
colonialism have done to Africa. With the coming of resurgent and insurgent 
decolonisation and decoloniality, spearheaded by student and youth move-
ments under such banners as Rhodes Must Fall, Fees Must Fall and Black Lives 
Matter, the quest for African self-writing is once more being forcefully inserted 
into the public arena. However, in his return to the same subject of ‘blackness’ 
in Critique of Black Reason, Mbembe is somewhat more measured in his analy-
sis of African struggles for self-reconstitution through self-writing, though still 
critical of what he terms ‘black reason’: ‘Black reason consists of a collection 
of voices, pronouncements, discourses, forms of knowledge, commentary, and 
nonsense, whose object is things or people of “African origin”. It is affirmed as 
their name and their truth (their attributes and qualities, their destiny and its 
significance as an empirical portion of the world) ... From the beginning, its 
primary activity was fantasizing’ (Mbembe 2017, 27).
The reality is that the resurgent and insurgent decolonisation of the 
twenty-first century, as a planetary movement, has brought into the pub-
lic arena what one of the authors of the present chapter (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2018b) terms ‘epistemic freedom’ (the right to think, write, communicate, 
theorise, view the world and produce knowledge from an African locus of 
enunciation). The current resurgent and insurgent demands for decolonisa-
tion point to the structural, systemic and institutional reality of coloniality 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a, 2013b; Quijano 2000). Grace Khunou and her 
colleagues, in Black Academic Voices: The South African Experience (2019), 
capture the personal accounts given by black academics of their lived expe-
riences at South African universities in the context of the ongoing resurgent 
and insurgent decolonisation of higher education. The questions of black 
subjectivity and the paradigm of difference emerge poignantly as haunting 
products of apartheid colonialism, as well as making a strong case for African 
self-writing as a decolonial move.
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In the rich decolonial scholarship, the planetary issue of ‘blackness’, just 
like that of ‘whiteness’, is approached as a sociogenic question rather than as 
an ontogenic question – that is, rooted in the paradigm of difference consti-
tutive of an invented modern Euro-North American-centric world system 
whose ever shifting global orders are mediated by the paradigm of differ-
ence. Sociogenesis here names the racial materiality of Euromodernity which 
enabled the social classification of the human population and its racial hierar-
chisation. This is a different rendition from that offered by Mbembe (2001, 8), 
in which the problem of blackness on a world scale is viewed as propelled 
by ‘constant repetition, a set of pious dogmas and empty dreams’. As a con-
cept, ‘blackism’ enables a sociodiagnostic approach to both technologies 
of dehumanisation (dismemberment) and struggles for rehumanisation 
(re-membering). It speaks to an invented problematic human condition, and 
embodies the complex politics of invention of ‘personhood’ within the con-
text of Euro-North American-centric bourgeois modernity. Since the time of 
colonial encounters, blackness has emerged and unfolded as an identitarian 
phenomenon and a form of consciousness (as can be seen in black power 
movements and black consciousness movements).
However, in the first epigraph to this chapter, W.E.B. Du Bois articulates 
two senses of blackness (Du Bois 2001, 6). The first is that of legendary curi-
osity among medieval Europeans about blackness as a state of being. That 
curiosity was not yet contaminated by the poison of race. The second is the 
sense of dismemberment, infantilisation, inferiorisation and enslavement that 
was constitutive of the unfolding of Euro-North American modernity. What 
emerges poignantly from this context is blackism on a world scale, as the 
outcome of ‘coloniality of being’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007). Coloniality of 
being names ‘a certain skepticism regarding the humanity of the enslaved and 
colonised sub-others’ (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 256). At the very centre of 
this coloniality of being are technologies such as dismemberment, dehuman-
isation and inferiorisation of some human species by other human species. 
Pigmentation is effectively used to render the lives of those deemed to be 
black as the dispensable other. This is why Mbembe (2017, 47) posits that 
‘the history of slavery and colonialism constituted the term “Black” as the 
name “of the slave: man-of-metal, man-merchandise, man-money”’.
Thus, the concept of dismemberment, which contributes to the fram-
ing of this chapter, speaks to how those who were ‘othered’ as black people 
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were pushed out of the human family, and underscores the very denial of 
their humanity (their thingification) (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu- 
Gatsheni 2015). Dismemberment is part of the unfolding and expansion of 
Euro-North American-centric modernity, which in practice involved sub-
mission of the modern world to European memory (Mudimbe 1994, xii). 
Exploration, surveying, ‘discovering’, mapping, conquest, colonisation, nam-
ing, dispossession and claims of ownership of everything in the modern world 
formed the core of dismemberment. Thus we posit that blackism on a world 
scale emerged at a time when the continents were being invented, not only 
through cartography but through the spread of the capitalist economic sys-
tem across the human world, and through the nascent unfolding of a global 
division of labour.
C.L.R. James (1982) highlights the political economy within which black-
ness emerged. To him, the unfolding of modernity from the eighteenth 
century onwards not only resulted in the creation of slave societies like San 
Domingo (Haiti), but also established an exploitative set of connections 
whereby Europe, Africa and the Americas were linked through nexuses of 
mercantile and capitalist accumulation of wealth by Europe, laying the foun-
dations of globalisation. For instance, the proceeds of slavery in the Americas 
contributed immensely to the rise of the capitalist bourgeoisie in Europe, 
as well as to the emergence of a new Euromodern civilisation underpinned 
by the capitalist world economy. The drive for cheap labour in this econ-
omy meant that even the abolition of the slave trade had to be succeeded 
by another exploitative economic arrangement that was equally slave-like in 
the conditions it imposed on working people. This reality explains the rise of 
the indentured labour system of recruiting and exploiting labour − this time 
bringing the labour of Indians and Chinese to the exploitative economy that 
arose on the basis of African slave labour. Mbembe is therefore correct in 
arguing that ‘the transnationalization of the Black condition was therefore a 
constitutive moment for modernity, with the Atlantic serving as its incubator. 
The Black condition incorporated a range of contrasting states and statuses: 
those sold through the transatlantic slave trade, convict labourers, subsistence 
slaves (whose lives were spent as domestics), feudal slaves, house slaves, those 
who were emancipated, and those who were born slaves’ (Mbembe 2017, 15).
When we take into account the resistance that coalesced around the identity 
of blackness, we can therefore confidently refer to the dynamics of blackism on 
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a world scale in the second sense of ‘re-membering’. Re-membering encapsulates 
the consistent attempts of black people at counter-self-creation, self-definition, 
recovery, restoration of their denied humanity, but also systematic self-re- 
writing of themselves back into human history. These struggles and initiatives 
embraced the cultural-cum-intellectual-cum-political-cum-identitarian forma-
tions that included Garveyism, Ethiopianism and many other such movements 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018a, 2018b). Thus, those who were designated as black 
people were essentially thrown into the deep end of a problematic liminal state 
of being that was perpetually transitional in nature – caught between denied 
humanity and the seductive promise of eventually attaining ontological density 
so as to return to the human family. It was perhaps this state of limbo that 
provoked W.E.B. Du Bois ([1903] 2008) to write about ‘the souls of black folk’ 
and Lewis R. Gordon to push for ‘existentia Africana’ thought (2008).
THE INVENTION OF BLACKNESS ON A WORLD SCALE
In a chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Postcolonial Politics (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2018a), one of the present authors makes effective use of Enrique Dussel’s 
important book entitled Politics of Liberation: A Critical World History to 
underscore six interrelated discursive and instrumental technologies of dis-
memberment: Hellenocentrism, Westernisation, Eurocentrism, secularism, 
periodisation and colonialism (Dussel 2011, xv−xviii). These epic colonial and 
imperial processes framed what David Marriott (2012) correctly articulates as 
colonial ‘inventions of existence’ for whiteness. Decoloniality underscores the 
struggles for (re-)existence of blackness.
It was within this colonial context that Europe defined itself as the cen-
tre of the earth, the birthplace of reason, the spring of universal life, the 
abode of universal truth, the paragon of civilisation and the inventor of the 
rights of people (Mbembe 2017, 11). Further to this, the European ‘Man’ 
self-defined itself as the ‘discoverer’ of other human species. In the process, 
this European Man elevated himself to the category of the ‘Creator’/God – 
the superior human being. It is, therefore, not surprising that historians like 
John M. Headley have been so enchanted by Eurocentric thought, to the 
extent of believing the nefarious claims of Hellenocentrism, Westernisation, 
secularism, Eurocentrism and colonialism. Headley’s book entitled The 
Europeanization of the World: On the Origins of Human Rights and Democracy 
(2008) valorises Europe as the progenitor of values of humanism, democracy 
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and human rights. The consequence of this conviction is clearly exemplified 
in Headley’s unproblematic acceptance of the imperial and colonial ‘paradigm 
of discovery’ as the basis for common humanity. Listen to him:
This sudden exposure to a fully inhabited (or so it seemed) yet extra-Christian 
world, this abruptly expanded ecumene with its variety of peoples, in time 
created an increasingly secular, religiously neutral lens that gradually revealed 
humankind’s common biological and moral unity. In the terrible shock that 
Europeans inflicted upon hitherto unknown peoples, the contacts between 
the peoples posited the fact of humanity as an ideal to be realised in some 
distant future. Beyond the brutal impact and the immense problem of Adam’s 
newfound children, the intellectual instruments afforded by the decisive 
re-emergence of Stoicism and natural law, the traditional means of promoting 
such community, faltered in achieving the universal commitment implicit in 
the ideal of a single humanity. (Headley 2008, 27–28)
But to argue along the lines of Headley is to reject the undeniable fact that 
there were other human civilisations and human struggles outside Europe 
which contributed to the emergence of positive human values such as human 
rights and democracy. What Headley and other Eurocentric scholars ignore 
is that the unfolding of Euro-North American-centric modernity not only 
inaugurated ‘rupture’ (colonisation of time into pre-modern and modern 
temporalities) and ‘difference’ (see Bhambra 2007, 1) but also entailed a con-
sistent stealing of history and denial of the humanity of others. Eurocentric 
secularism became predicated on what Gordon (1999) articulates as ‘bad 
faith’. Bad faith entails endless proclamations of tenets of humanity at the 
rhetorical level while practically killing humanity itself everywhere (see also 
Fanon 1963). Bad faith is claiming humanity for a particular ‘race’ and deny-
ing all other human species of humanity.
Gordon, in Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism (1999, 1), poses the question: 
‘What is the being or ontological limitation of human reality in an antiblack 
world?’ His response is: ‘Antiblack racism may embody the extreme poles of 
the possibility of a universal humankind; it wrenches human beings into the 
most extreme visual metaphors of difference: from the most light to the most 
dark, from the fullness of colour (something) to its complete absence (noth-
ing), from “white,” that is, to “black”.’
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In pursuit of bad faith, European secularism invented a science of death 
that was mobilised to justify coloniality of being. Using bad faith and 
pseudo-racial science, European secularism consistently pushed God out of 
the human imagination. Belief in God was only used instrumentally, in Africa 
and other sites of colonialism, to blind the colonised to the hypocrisy and 
negative features of the Western civilisational colonial project. Dussel (2011, 
xvi) emphasises that a new ‘periodization’, in which human history was cut 
into a linear chronology of ‘Ancient, Middle and Modern Ages’, emerged as 
Europe propelled itself into the future and all others into the past. No won-
der, in this periodisation informed by bad faith and pseudo-racial science, 
that all other civilisations were dismembered and pushed into the category 
‘Ancient’. The ‘modern’ was monopolised by Europe.
Thus, the foundational dismemberment of black people took the form of 
denial of their very humanity. This commenced with Christopher Columbus’s 
questioning of the natives of Latin America about whether they had ‘souls’ − 
remember the historic Valladolid Debates (1550–51) in which Bartolome de 
La Casas and Gines De Sepulveda engaged in intense debates over the onto-
logical question of the humanity of the natives (Castro 2007). This, according 
to Castro, marked the genesis of the ‘colonial death project’ that eventually 
engulfed Asia, Africa and the rest of the world that experienced modern colo-
nisation. The ‘death project’ was and is a reference to ‘the exercise of violence 
in coloniality, which targets the actual processes of life and the conditions 
for existence: in short, polarity’ (Suárez-Krabbe 2016, 3). ‘Necropolitics’ 
(Mbembe 2003, 11) and the ‘ethics of war’ (Maldonado-Torres 2008, 4) are 
leitmotifs of the colonial death project; they distinguished those who were to 
‘live’ from those who had to ‘die’. Ramón Grosfoguel gives empirical fram-
ing to this project when he articulates the ‘four genocides/epistemicides of 
the long 16th century’ that were foundational to the politics of dismember-
ment and the modern colonial death project. These were the conquest of 
Al-Andalus, the enslavement of Africans in the Americas, the killing of mil-
lions of women accused of being witches by burning them alive in Europe, 
and the extermination of natives of Latin America (Grosfoguel 2013, 74). 
The conquest of Al-Andalus in 1492 targeted Muslims and Jews, and was pro-
pelled by the logic of ‘purity of blood’ as a form of dismemberment. At that 
time colour was not yet used as a criterion of exclusion; purity of blood and 
religion were the key technologies of dismemberment. Here lies the origin of 
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the fundamentalist concept of ‘one identity, one political authority, and one 
religion’ (Suárez-Krabbe 2016, 54).
The policies of physical extermination (genocide/ethnocide) targeting the 
indigenous peoples of the Americas, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa consti-
tuted the second technology of coloniality. The black people of Africa did 
not only experience genocides but also enslavement, through what became 
known as the ‘transatlantic slave trade’. Enslavement naturalised ‘the colonial 
criteria of inferiority, linking racism and capitalism’ (Suárez-Krabbe 2016, 
56). All of this history is important for an understanding of the genealogies 
of the invention of blackness on a world scale. For example, the terms ‘Negro’ 
and ‘black’, as racial inferiorising categories, emerged in the context of this 
inimical colonial/imperial/capitalist history. The time of the enslavement 
of black people and their transportation across the Atlantic Ocean into the 
Americas contributed immensely to the birth of ‘blackness’ as a state of being 
and an identity (Du Bois 1965, 20).
What has to be emphasised is that even though European discourses of the 
human were shifting across time and space, what remained constant was the 
invented inferiority of those deemed to be black. The Caribbean decolonial 
theorist Sylvia Wynter (2003, 297) correctly captures the historical fact that the 
enslavement of black people created ‘a model for the invention of a by-nature 
difference between “natural masters” and “natural slaves”’. With specific refer-
ence to Africa, Ngũgı̃  wa Thiong’o (2009b) argues that the ‘dismemberment’ 
of Africa unfolded in two stages. The first stage is traceable to the enslave-
ment of black people and their shipment as ‘cargo’ across the Atlantic into 
the Americas and the Caribbean. This is how Wa Thiong’o describes what he 
considers to be the first phase of this dismemberment: ‘During the first of 
these, the African personhood was divided into two halves: the continent and 
its diaspora. African slaves, the central commodity in the mercantile phase of 
capitalism, formed the basis of the sugar, cotton, and tobacco plantations in 
the Caribbean and American mainland’ (Wa Thiong’o 2009b, 5).
The second stage of dismemberment of Africa identified by Wa Thiong’o 
took place at the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. This second level of ‘dis-
memberment’ took the literal form of the fragmentation and reconstitution of 
‘Africa into British, French, Portuguese, German, Belgian, and Spanish Africa’ 
(Wa Thiong’o 2009b, 5). Wa Thiong’o further argues that those black people 
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who were physically removed from the continent experienced ‘an additional 
dismemberment’ in the form of separation ‘not only from his[/her] continent 
and his[/her] labour but also from his[/her] very sovereign being’ (2009b, 6). 
Those who remained on the continent but experienced the ‘scramble’ for and 
‘partition’ of Africa, were subjected to further dismemberment in the form of 
dispossession of land: ‘The land is taken away from its owner, and the owner 
is turned into a worker on the same land, thus losing control of his[/her] 
natural and human resources’ (Wa Thiong’o 2009b, 6).
What must be underscored is that the modern school, the Christian church 
and the ‘Westernised’ university play an active role in the colonial and even 
post-colonial process of dismemberment (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018a, 2018b). 
This is so because ‘cultural subjugation was a necessary condition for eco-
nomic and political mastery’ (Wa Thiong’o 1997, 9). Colonial education is 
identified by Wa Thiong’o as the most important force for dismemberment 
and alienation, because it invades and takes control of the mental universe 
in order to produce a distorted consciousness among the colonised (Wa 
Thiong’o 2012, 28).
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2018a, 2018b) distils six ‘dimensions of dismember-
ment’. The first is the ‘foundational dismemberment’ involving the questioning 
of the very humanity of black people, as well as the invention of blackness itself 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015; Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Zondi 2016, 5). The second is 
enslavement, which resulted not only in the reduction of black African people 
to a commodity but also in the fragmentation of African personhood into 
continental and diasporic divisions. The third is the scramble for and par-
tition of Africa that took place in Berlin, resulting in the fragmentation of 
the continent not only into various colonies but also into various invented 
and contending ethnicities, enclosed within colonially crafted boundaries. The 
fourth dimension is the theft/usurpation/erasure/silencing of African history 
so as to deny its very existence, in order to establish the Hegelian notion of 
a people without history and a continent of darkness and emptiness (Tibebu 
2011, xiv). The fifth is the production and reproduction of dismemberment 
by the ‘post-colonial’ state, under the leadership of a colonially produced black 
bourgeoisie who are trapped in a paradigm of neocolonialism/coloniality. The 
final dimension is the continued reproduction of patriarchy so as to dismem-
ber women from power, knowledge and being itself.
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Since Euro-North American-centric modernity unfolded as a combination 
of enslavement, genocides, conquest, colonisation, epistemicides, conversion 
and linguicides, the major challenge facing ‘ex-colonized’ people is how to 
‘recuperate’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018a, 78). This difficult and complex process 
of recuperation is at the heart of the process of re-membering.
BLACKNESS: FROM DISMEMBERMENT 
TO RE-MEMBERING
Re-membering is fundamentally a process of recovery and restoration of history. 
It entails the painstaking processes of re-humanising and humaning. Archie 
Mafeje (2011, 31–32) captures the centrality of this process when he posits 
that ‘we would not proclaim Africanity, if it had not been denied or degraded; 
and we would not insist on Afrocentrism, if it had not been for Eurocentric 
negations’. One can safely state that such re-membering initiatives, ideologies 
and movements as Garveyism, Ethiopianism, Négritude, African Personality, 
African Socialism, African Humanism, African Renaissance and many others 
emerged within a context of realities of dismemberment, and existed as props 
developed by the dismembered across time to help in the re-membering pro-
cess. With specific reference to the Négritude movement as a re-membering 
initiative, Léopold Sédar Senghor explicitly stated that theirs was a form of 
‘return’ to black humanism after centuries of being taken through the French 
assimilationist colonial project (Senghor quoted in Bâ 1973, 12).
The Négritude movement was part of the broader search for identity within 
a context of dismemberment. Thus, we are now in a better position to state 
categorically that Wole Soyinka’s critique of Négritude quoted at the start of 
this chapter, namely that a tiger does not articulate its ‘tigritude’, was mis-
placed, as it ignored the context of dislocation and alienation in which the 
movement had arisen. Négritude was one of the earliest re-membering ini-
tiatives. Cheikh Thiam (2014) correctly understands Négritude as an early 
expression of an ‘Afri-centred’ conception of the human, one that was consist-
ently critical of a Western universalisation of the human that excluded those 
with black pigmentation. Négritude was propelled by Césaire’s ‘tormenting 
questions’ referred to at the start of this chapter: ‘Who am I? Who are we? 
What are we in this world?’ (Césaire quoted in Thiam 2014, 2).
But at a global scale, and in black people’s struggles for re-membering, the 
epic Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804 has to occupy a place of pride. In the 
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first instance, this earliest black revolution defied the Eurocentric, colonial and 
imperial idea, evident in so much Western philosophy, of denial of the human-
ity of black people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018b). It turned upside down the racist 
myths of a people who were naturally slaves, and who were said to be unable to 
develop any notions of fighting for freedom simply because they were not con-
sidered to be rational human beings (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018a). When enslaved 
blacks revolted on a large scale in the form of the Haitian Revolution, it became 
one of those events that were ‘unthinkable’ for those who had convinced them-
selves that black, enslaved people were naturally slaves and had no capacity to 
rebel. The second significance of the Haitian Revolution is that it was not only 
part of the unfolding modern history of slavery, racism and colonisation, but 
that this revolt of the enslaved challenged ‘the iron bonds of the philosophical 
milieu in which it was born’ (Trouillot 1995, 74).
Any acceptance of the fact that enslaved black people were up in arms 
against the system of slavery amounted in Western thought to acknowledge-
ment of the humanity of black people. Europeans in general, and speculative 
plantation owners in particular, were not prepared to concede that they were 
faced with a people claiming their denied humanity. The Haitian Revolution 
indeed posed a difficult philosophical and intellectual problem for Western 
thought: how to think about and conceptualise black revolution in a world in 
which black people were not considered to be rational and human in the first 
place? This is why ‘international recognition of Haitian independence was 
even more difficult to gain than military victory over the forces of Napoleon’ 
(Trouillot 1995, 95). The most important but silenced significance of the 
Haitian Revolution is that it led to the collapse of the entire system of slav-
ery, and constituted a major chapter in the history of re-membering of black 
people. It was truly an anti-systemic revolution, one that occupies a place of 
pride in the anti-systemic revolution marked by the definitive entry of the 
enslaved and colonised into modern history, as human beings opposed to all 
forms of dismemberment.
The Haitian Revolution forms an important base from which to artic-
ulate what Wa Thiong’o (2009a, 35−36) underscores as ‘re-membering 
visions’. It laid the foundation for such other formations as Ethiopianism and 
Garveyism. Wa Thiong’o (2009a, 35) notes that at the centre of Ethiopianism 
and Garveyism lay ‘the quest for wholeness, a quest that has underlain African 
struggles since the Atlantic slave trade’.
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Since the time of the Haitian Revolution and later that of Marcus Garvey’s 
International Negro Improvement Association, those human beings who have 
been designated as black have continued to fight for their freedom and for 
the recovery of their denied humanity. Pan-Africanism emerged as one broad 
re-membering initiative that developed from the time of William Sylvester, who 
planned and hosted the first Pan-African Congress in 1900, to W.E.B. Du Bois’s 
series of Pan-African Congresses, to Kwame Nkrumah’s struggle to unify Africa 
into a Pan-African Nation. In the USA, black people launched the civil rights 
movement as part of these initiatives. Re-membering initiatives have taken intel-
lectual and political forms. At their centre has germinated ‘the African idea’, as 
opposed to the idea of Africa: ‘the African idea as the quest for freedom on a 
Pan-African scale extended from the diaspora to the continent and back again’ 
(Wa Thiong’o 2009a, 75). The African idea captures the efforts of Africans 
to define themselves, as opposed to the idea of Africa invoked by Valentin Y. 
Mudimbe (1994) that speaks to external definition of Africa and Africans.
Linking the question of blackism on a world scale to specific re-membering 
activities on the African continent, the period from the 1950s to the late 1960s 
was dominated by struggles for political decolonisation and the emergence of 
‘post-colonial’ states. The major challenge to re-membering initiatives contin-
ues to be the active global imperial designs (Mignolo 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2013a, 2013b). As noted by Grosfoguel (2007, 219), political decolonisation 
amounted to what he terms ‘the most powerful myths of the twentieth cen-
tury’ because the withdrawal of direct colonial administrations and juridical 
apartheid did not ‘amount to the decolonization of the world’.
The admission of the so-called newly independent states into the United 
Nations simply symbolised their accommodation in an existing and un- 
decolonised Euro-North American-centric world system and un-deimperialised 
global order. This was not what re-membering entailed. These so-called newly 
independent states occupied the lowest echelons in an asymmetrical world 
system. The new world economic order that was demanded by those who had 
fought against colonialism did not materialise. As noted by Nkrumah (1965), 
neocolonialism emerged as a form of coloniality, in which the so-called inde-
pendent states became entrapped in global coloniality.
At the internal level, the African leaders who had spearheaded the 
anti-colonial struggle displayed deep-seated ‘pitfalls of national conscious-
ness’, to borrow a term from Fanon (1963, 98), and the consequences were 
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what Basil Davidson (1992) terms the ‘black man’s burden’ of simply repro-
ducing what had been invented by colonialism and imposing it on Africa. The 
nation-building project as a re-membering initiative was problematic, and it 
failed. It failed partly because the leadership that took over the state at the end 
of direct colonial rule were products of the same colonialism they claimed to 
be fighting against, and partly because of forms of mimicry involving impo-
sition of external templates as policy on Africa. For example, these leaders 
imposed the Westphalian template of a tight correspondence between the 
nation and the state, whereby each modern sovereign state was understood 
to be a nation state comprised of a people who shared a common language, 
culture and identity, on Africa (Laakso and Olukoshi 1996, 11–13) − a con-
tinent characterised by multiculturalism, multilingualism, multiple identities 
and multiple religions − revealing how entrapped they were in the thinking 
of global coloniality. And it was not only the project of nation-building that 
failed. The Pan-African project itself failed, as territorial sovereignty informed 
by narrow nationalism was privileged over pan-African unity. The inherited 
economies of the newly independent states had collapsed by the beginning 
of the 1970s, because neocolonialism actively reinstated relations marked by 
coloniality in which the agents were local bourgeois classes in charge of the 
state. Taking advantage of this desperate situation, agents of coloniality such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund presented them-
selves as the cure for African problems, and they literally took over the policy 
space in each country as they prescribed Structural Adjustment Programmes 
to be adhered to by the national governments (Cheru 2009).
To confront this economic colonialism, which took the concrete form of 
dependency and debt-slavery, organisations representing African people, 
including the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), later renamed the African Union 
(AU), and the United Nations General Assembly (UN) produced a num-
ber of nationalist, Pan-Africanist inspired economic frameworks, ranging 
from the Revised Framework for the Implementation of the New International 
Economic Order in Africa (UNECA 1976), the Lagos Plan of Action For the 
Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000 (OAU 1980), Africa’s Priority 
Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986–1990 (OAU 1986), the Alternative 
Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery 
and Transformation (UNECA 1989), the African Charter for Popular 
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Participation in Development and Transformation (UNECA 1990), and the 
United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN 1991) to the 
New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD, AU 2002). These eco-
nomic initiatives ‘were opposed, undermined, and jettisoned by the Bretton 
Woods institutions and Africans were impeded from exercising the basic and 
fundamental right to make decisions about their future’ (Adedeji 2002, 4). 
Adebayo Adedeji (2002), who worked as the Executive Secretary General of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, described the colonial 
matrices of power at play in imposing exogenous ideas and policies on Africa 
in the 1980s and 1990s as a ‘development merchant system’.
Thus, in this chapter we posit that Africa entered the 2000s limping and still 
dismembered (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018b). The African Renaissance, which 
was spearheaded by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, was meant to pro-
vide a discursive framework for the post-2000 re-membering Africa initiatives, 
but suffered when Mbeki was removed from the presidency in South Africa by 
his own party, the African National Congress. Among the other re-membering 
initiatives was the conversion of the Organisation of African Unity, formed in 
1963, into the African Union, on 9 July 2002, as part of the galvanisation of 
the African Renaissance. NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism, 
as well as the opening of the Pan-African Parliament in South Africa on 18 
March 2004, constituted the other concrete initiatives formulated under the 
aegis of the African Renaissance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a).
However, after Mbeki left the political scene, the African Renaissance 
lost one of its most committed advocates. At the continental level, it would 
seem that the optimism which accompanied these initiatives was based on 
an incorrect diagnosis and a misunderstanding of how the Euro-North 
American-centric modern world worked. The developed and industrialised 
Euro-North American states were never prepared to be genuine partners 
of Africa. They are beneficiaries of the asymmetrical structure of the mod-
ern world system and its global order. We posit that coloniality, as an active 
global power structure sustaining the dominance of the Global North over 
the Global South, was somehow forgotten by African leaders.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented the history, discursive terrain, ideological produc-
tions and resistance initiatives that were meant to enable the re-membering 
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of Africa, while at the same time highlighting how global imperial designs 
actively worked to undercut these struggles. Today the African Union speaks 
of a prosperous, united, self-defining and peaceful Africa in 2063 (AU 2015). 
One wonders whether by 2063 the global imperial designs, including their 
racist and patriarchal technologies, will have been broken and defeated. 
Reading David Theo Goldberg’s Are We all Postracial Yet? Debating Race 
reminded us that ‘Blackness has always been basic to racist definition, and 
remains so with postraciality’ (Goldberg 2015, 123). Goldberg elaborates on 
the problem of the constitution of blackism on a world scale:
Roughly, and in broad strokes, the earliest formulation and formation of racial 
subjects in the making of modern Europe included the Black, the Moor, and 
the Jew as non-Catholic and heathen interior aliens to be eliminated through 
conversion, expulsion, or extermination. New World Indians were estab-
lished as exterior inferiors, savages of the state of nature. The Enlightenment 
largely produced Negroids, Mongoloids, Asiatics, and Caucasoids. The nine-
teenth century saw the identification of Negroes in more pernicious terms, 
and the state classification of Indians or Natives, with whites or Europeans 
as the driving category of domination. The twentieth century witnessed a 
proliferation of racial naming, and the hardening of demeaning, and deadly 
characterizations. As modes of racism came increasingly into question and 
societies grew more heterogeneous still, blackness stiffened into a variety of 
name-calling in different societies, each bearing comparable disparagement. 
(2015, 124–25)
It is within the context described by Goldberg that the question of blackism 
on a world scale becomes prominent and highly relevant today. At one level, 
the concept of blackism on a world scale challenges the claims of a post-racial 
world; at another level it reveals the failure of decolonisation and deimperi-
alisation, as well as of the core claims of modern humanism and the human 
rights discourse that falsely assert a common humanity while obscuring the 
resilient forces of dismemberment. The key challenge, as noted by Goldberg 
(2015, 172), is how to ‘un-think racial configuration’ so as to enable a new 
humanism to emerge. Blackism on a world scale is less of an inherent identity 
than an invented condition created by racism. It will not come to an end until 
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TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WE ALL 
HUMANS? OF CULTURE, POLITICS,  
LAW AND LGBT RIGHTS IN NIGERIA
OLAYINKA AKANLE, GBENGA S. ADEJARE AND JOJOLOLA FASUYI
3
L
esbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) issues are very controversial 
in Africa as they are seen as exceptions to the rule that people are either 
male or female and sexual relations and marriages are expected to take 
place only between men and women. While global attitudes to LGBT rights 
are shifting, African countries generally remain lethargic in regard to LGBT 
rights, and Nigeria is among the most lethargic of them.1 What we want to 
achieve in this chapter is to interrogate whether or not the human identity, 
and the rights that come with it, are attainable for the LGBT community 
within cultural, political and economic spaces in Nigeria. Nigeria is cur-
rently listed as one of the countries whose harsh social, political, cultural and 
economic spaces stifle the rights and privileges of non-heterosexual people 
(Noble 2015; NOI Polls 2015); however issues relating to sexuality and gen-
der remain critical and sensitive globally (Akanle 2011; Akanle and Adejare 
2016a; Akanle and Olutayo 2012).
Identity formation relating to the definition of ‘who I am’ largely concerns 
the social realities that define our being human. George Herbert Mead (1901) 
did extensive work on the concept of the social self. Mead appealed to the 
principles of social psychology to explain that we are only who we are because 
we accept the definition that society gives of us – the concept of ‘I’ is the 
unsocialised self while the concept of ‘me’ emanates from a series of socialisa-
tion processes (see Ritzer and Stepnisky 2014).
Helen Lyndon (1958) reifies the intangibility of identity or personality 
struggles amidst various nuclei of institutional and cultural ambiguities 
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that cloud being human; this is of special concern to the same-sex people’s 
 liberation struggle in Nigeria, in Africa more broadly, and by extension in the 
whole world. The mantra ‘jail the gays’ has become popular in recent times 
in Nigeria, especially in the period since the former president, Goodluck 
Ebele Jonathan, signed a bill into law that criminalised amorous relationships 
between persons of the same sex on 14 January 2014. This bill did not just 
attract a lot of international attention; it aroused political debate and height-
ened intellectual agitations aimed at constellating various sociopolitical, 
cultural and psychoclinical differences of opinion with regard to homosexu-
ality, as well as differences in religious and legal standpoints on the issues of 
homosexuality, bisexuality and even heterosexuality, with a general conver-
gence of opinions towards disapproval of homosexuality. While the liberal 
school of thought continues to argue for equality and expressive human-
ity, conservative minds frown on perceived innovations that negate certain 
traditional values held by the people. Legal statutes are often deployed to 
affirm or reaffirm the position of any people or nation; in the case of Nigeria, 
the enacted law makes it crystal clear that homosexuality goes beyond the 
perceived and constructed sociocultural anathemas of society, and beyond 
being a prohibited legal act. The direct implication of this situation is that 
homosexual and/or transgender people are considered less than fully human 
and can no longer live freely or enjoy the same benefits that their fellow cit-
izens enjoy relative to their sexual orientations, same-sex activities or gender 
identities.
Against this background, LGBT people have migrated to places like South 
Africa, Europe and other developed countries that allow them to be human 
(Batisai 2015). In fact, many LGBT people have emigrated on account of 
victimisation due to their sexual orientation or gender identity, and they 
have successfully secured asylum and integration into more permissive con-
texts abroad. In this they exemplify the view held by the critical school of 
thought that the history of human existence has been one of constant struggle 
(Idyorough 2002). This struggle cuts across geographical boundaries, peoples, 
cultures, races, classes, genders, economies, entities, identities and, of course, 
virtually all spheres of life. The apparent consequences of this struggle include 
emotional crises, political imbalances, economic woes, and sociopsycholog-
ical eventualities that continue to bedevil human symbiotic co-existence on 
a daily basis. It is, however, important to recognise that inequality and the 
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struggle for self-assertion assume more intractable dimensions with increases 
in the level of complexity that defines the human habitat, and the corre-
sponding responses of humans to their social realities which are not the same 
across societies and groups. Thus, it is pertinent to constantly engage with 
and re-investigate historical social trajectories that define the past, present and 
future of a people, in order to foster mutual understanding of ‘who/what we 
are’, ‘why we are what we are’ and ‘who/what we ought or want to be’. The 
main remit of this chapter is to examine the ramifications of culture, legal 
frameworks, politics and existentialities relating to LGBT people in Nigeria – 
Africa’s most populous country, and one of the most institutionally repressive 
countries in terms of LGBT rights in Africa.
Hence, this chapter engages with the taken-for-granted question of the 
humanity of human beings. We do this through an appreciation and exami-
nation of the theoretical, philosophical and decolonial issues raised by Maria 
Lugones and others (Lugones 2003, 2007, 2010), particularly in regard to 
discourses concerning the relationship between homophobia and coloniality, 
and the question of the colonial, modern, structural and social institutional 
production of the human. Our aim here is to present interesting and factually 
contextualised case study accounts of issues relating to being human within 
the framework of LGBT rights in Africa, through the example of Nigeria. 
This is an area that has remained, hitherto, poorly covered in the literature.
THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF THE 
HUMANITY OF HUMAN BEINGS: THE LGBT CORRIDOR
Our explanations of contested humanity in this reading are aimed at two 
things: the first is to reveal the theoretical framework within which we have 
interrogated the humanity of LGBT people in Nigeria, and the second is to 
offer a critical lens through which the survival or suppression of the ‘being’ 
of LGBT people can be better understood and analysed within the Nigerian 
context. It is to this end that we have attempted a meta-narration of precolo-
nial, colonial and post-colonial experiences of sexuality.
The work of Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist 
Revolution, first published in 1970, takes a significant radical and histori-
cal approach to theorising sexuality. Gleaning from the works of Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels, Firestone establishes a link between dominated sex-
uality and the evolution of capitalism in human society (Firestone 2003). 
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Capitalism, according to this view, transcends mere economic domination: 
the oldest form of domination, for Firestone, is sexual domination. For her, 
sexism in society gives expansive latitude to the subjugation of the weaker 
sexes (women especially), thereby promoting oppression of these categories of 
people. By implication, therefore, it requires conscious effort directed at the 
elimination of sexual diversity to achieve gender balance in human society.
Within the traditional Marxist explanation of sexuality from which Firestone 
borrows, capitalism is entrenched further in the institution of the family. The 
family is depicted as structured in such a way that exploitation of the weak 
is possible during the course of familial relationships; the power relations 
that exist between husband and wife, parent and children, or even between 
children themselves, for instance, are evident. One way in which Firestone 
believes the marginalisation of the female sex can be overcome is through 
revolution; adopting celibacy as a counter-existential narrative to normative 
feminine gender oppression is an example of this kind of revolution. Seeing 
this theoretical position within the traditional and institutional contexts of 
sexuality in Nigeria, it might be impossible to disconnect the age-old insti-
tutionalised gender gaps from the reality of the kind of (deprived) humanity 
accorded LGBT individuals. Traditional values in Nigeria see to the preserva-
tion of cultural barriers and dichotomous perceptions of who is human and 
who is not, in regard to genders, ages and system of interactions (Akanle and 
Adejare 2015). The work of Lugones on coloniality and modernity, and that 
of Gurminder Bhambra (2014) on post-coloniality, are important reference 
points for theorising the humanity of LGBT people in the past, present and 
future of Nigeria.
Among other things, Lugones (2010) posits that uncivility or barbarism is 
a hallmark of those categories of gender relationship that run in opposition to 
the accepted (or rather imposed) sexuality of colonial modernity. More to the 
point is the belief that colonialism came with a bifurcation of the sacredness 
and profanity of sexuality of various kinds: if it was not considered civil by the 
colonisers, it was uncivil, savage, profane and repulsive; if it was approved by 
the colonial powers, then it was modern, civil, morally good and sacred. As 
can be established within the contexts of the dominant religions in Nigeria, 
within which civility, modernity and sacredness of sexuality are often encap-
sulated, there seems to be an already drawn line of hierarchical dichotomy 
between who is human and who is not. A person is human when their sexual 
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orientation conforms to the collective rules of sexuality. Although the work 
of Lugones focuses on deconstructing colonial strings attached to feminism, 
it is very important in its analysis of how the colonial experience shaped, and 
continues to shape, social relationships and the legitimacy of such relation-
ships. This is also true regarding the contestation of the rights, humanity and 
lived experiences of LGBT people in Nigeria: some schools of thought have 
attributed the prohibition of homosexuality in the country to the impacts of 
the colonial experience and inherited legal frameworks.
The theoretical position of Bhambra is the last that we shall consider in 
this chapter. With roots in an attempt to deconstruct modernity and rein-
state the evolution of a post-colonial movement, Bhambra (2014) brings 
to the fore the argument that the demarcation of human behaviour on the 
bases of modernity and Western civilisation is fast becoming redundant in 
the face of post-colonial and decolonial negotiations. What this implies, at 
least theoretically, is that the post-colonial phase of human existence blurs the 
gaps in identity discrimination and cultural incompatibility, and promotes 
convergence of human identities. The post-colonial narrative presented by 
Bhambra covers a wide range of contexts and themes, among which LGBT 
falls. Extending the work of Lugones, Bhambra envisages a more sophisticated 
negotiation of human identity that is entirely decolonised. This development 
to some extent also furthers the strides being made against the rejection of 
‘some humans’ – like LGBT people. However, it must be noted that in reality, 
the lived experiences of LGBT people in countries like Nigeria where hom-
ophobia exists show that the impact of colonialism continues to be present, 
side by side with multiple social and historical diversities.
THE TRAJECTORY OF LGBT ISSUES IN NIGERIA
A critical examination of the panoply of perceptual issues associated with the 
human identity of LGBT people reveals the dynamism of the phenomenon 
over time. This dynamism is useful for an analysis of the current situation, 
and of the cross-cutting trajectories and diversity of psychological, cultural, 
biological and, recently, political explanations of sexualities that differ from 
heterosexual behaviour. The history of queer sexuality in Nigeria is to a very 
large extent amorphous. Emmanuel Obidimma and Angela Obidimma 
(2013) reveal that even though there is no particular date marking the first 
case of same-sex relations in Nigeria, the phenomenon might have a long 
51
To What Extent Are We All Humans? Of Culture, Politics, Law and LGBT Rights in Nigeria 
clandestine history. While it is often argued that LGBT sexualities and iden-
tities are pathological, an anathema and a gross anomaly within the ambit of 
culture and social symbiosis of Nigerians, there are counter-positions which 
hold that the question of sexual orientation and gender identity cannot be 
narrowed down to racial or cultural debates alone. Although it has been docu-
mented that the wave of contemporary homophobic movements did not have 
its roots in Nigeria or elsewhere in Africa, there seem to be a greater number 
of anti-LGBT measures taken in Africa than in more developed settings like 
Europe and the USA, perhaps informed by the claim that LGBT practices are 
un-African (Ibrahim 2015).
In contrast to the definition given by the Institute of Medicine (2011), 
which depicts ‘LGBT’ as a phrase that describes an aggregate of groups that 
are unique in terms of their social, gender and economic means of survival, 
the collective history of Nigerians as a people subverts the distinction of 
LGBT as a people of unique history in the country. The category LGBT has 
been conceived from different angles, including social construction theory 
and feminist approaches, indicating variation in the practice and appreciation 
of sexual orientation and how such orientation translates into identity forma-
tion. Global recognition of the rights of LGBT people is on the increase by 
the day (Marks 2006). Different treaties have been signed across climes and 
continents to accommodate the rights and privileges of LGBT people as part 
of the fundamental human rights agenda. The cultural and political texture 
of Nigeria is inadvertently impermissible in the context of this global wave of 
tolerance for the supposedly ‘new’ sexuality. That Nigeria is an example of a 
country with a stern rejection of LGBT rights in Africa and the world is thus 
no exaggeration. This was clearly expressed in the ‘jail the gays’ laws promul-
gated in the country, referred to above.
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF LGBT RIGHTS IN NIGERIA
The place of traditional, social and cultural constructions of humanity must 
be properly contextualised in order to unravel the dynamics of how individu-
als with same-sex sexual orientation are perceived and treated. Africa at large 
still prides itself on having strong cultural ligaments. Nigeria is not exempt 
from this claim (Akanle 2012). There is no gainsaying that while some attrib-
ute the immutability of the cultural nexus in Nigeria to backwardness, the 
seeming reality required for the survival of peoples in developing countries, 
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including Nigeria, is based on the need to galvanise their positive cultural 
traits for collective development and social stability.
Similarly, Lachenmann (2008) avers that tradition and culture (knowledge) 
are permanently subject to reinterpretation and they must be located within 
structural and situational contexts. In other words, there are variations, sub-
ject to an individual’s world view, in what a culture or tradition means to 
any people at any particular point in time. Different types of LGBT identity 
are perceived as anathema, fatalistic, eccentric, debasing and punitive within 
the ambit of cultural networks in Nigeria, and hence result in the subjuga-
tion of the interests or rights of LGBT people (Akanle and Adejare 2016b). 
Another, cultural dimension of of large-scale discountenancing of LGBT 
is the pro-natality of Nigerian society. Oka Obono (2003) explains that 
Nigerians, and by extension Africans, favour procreation, a means by which 
they believe a society can be reproduced while sustaining traditional ideals. 
Hence, marriages without offspring tend to suffer from attempts to frustrate 
them by kinspeople and the society at large. Heterosexuality, as against homo-
sexuality, is thus taken as an ideal form of sexual behaviour for preserving this 
value. This value system inadvertently debases the chances of LGBT rights 
being asserted, while promoting homophobic reactions from the generality 
of the people.
In the same vein, it is much easier to view religion as an integral part of a 
society’s culture than to argue otherwise. In the Nigerian context, the intersec-
tion of religion and sexuality cannot be ignored, because religion is a crucial 
force shaping the realities of existence in the country. And the plural nature of 
religious orientations in Nigeria makes for more complex interrogation of the 
interplay of these two aspects of social being (Akanle and Adejare 2016a). The 
religious dimension of sexuality tends to continue to have an overarching neg-
ative influence on how LGBT identity is perceived in the country. All religions 
in Nigeria − including both the major and the not so popular religions − 
are inclined to be disapproving of LGBT identities, at least in public. The 
implication of religious attitudes towards LGBT identity is particularly 
important given the fact that most Nigerians interpret social issues through a 
religious lens. Across all institutions, religious sentiments play a central role 
in determining the directions, processes and outcomes of policies and actions. 
All religions in Nigeria define LGBT sexuality as a sin, and condemn the act 
and the people in the strictest terms (Global Legal Research Centre 2014). 
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Within widespread religious belief systems in Nigeria, LGBT rights do not 
exist, should not be heard of, and LGBT people and their advocates should 
be summarily rejected. These are popular sentiments across the country, and 
they are effective in suppressing the rights of LGBT people in Nigeria.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF 
LGBT RIGHTS IN NIGERIA
The politics of sexuality in Nigeria is largely unidirectional, non-discursive 
and simply about playing to the gallery of the electorate, most of whom dis-
approve of LGBT identities. The political dimension of LGBT rights in the 
country is concerned with the exclusion or inclusion of these rights. Efforts 
at protecting LGBT rights in Nigeria have proved difficult due to a lack of 
political will by past and present governments of the country, which continue 
to churn out repressive legislation targeted against the LGBT community. 
The introduction of the anti-gay law referred to earlier in this chapter served 
as the straw that broke the camel’s back. The law heightened homophobia 
in Nigeria, and made the survival of LGBT people and their rights more 
intractable and precarious, thereby forcing many to emigrate to more permis-
sive countries (Batisai 2015).
The political space in Nigeria works in opposition to the process described 
by Ronald Holzhacker (2014), who explicates how the promotion of LGBT 
rights, which are projected as human rights, will further strengthen the move-
ment for the enhancement of democracy and freedom for all and sundry in 
the world at large. According to him, there is an emerging perspective arguing 
on behalf of the equality of LGBT rights with other human rights, which is 
allowing for legal and political gains to be made. Thus, denying LGBT people 
their rights is perceived to be tantamount to denying them humanity − a posi-
tion not encouraged within the ambit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Marks 2006). Similarly, the United Nations’ stance against discrim-
ination on the basis of a person’s racial or sexual orientation can be pointed 
to as a positive, in terms of the identity of the LGBT human. Conversely, 
these ‘humans’ can only be referred to as such outside the legal and socio-
cultural spaces of Nigeria. The sharp refusal of Nigeria to embrace LGBT 
rights as worthy human rights portends, and of course has accounted for, 
observable strains between Nigeria and other countries of the world where 
such rights are being upheld. This perhaps explains the diplomatic tensions 
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in the relationship between Nigeria and the USA in recent times (Olanrewaju 
et al. 2015). The position of Nigerian political leaders is similar to that of the 
former president of Ghana, John Evans Atta Mills, who declared his country’s 
sovereign stand on the same-sex issue as follows:
No one can deny Prime Minister Cameron his right to make policies, take 
initiatives, or make statements that reflect his societal norms and ideals but 
he does not have the right to direct other sovereign nations as to what they 
should do especially where their societal norms and ideals are different from 
those which exist in Prime Minister [Cameron’s] society … I as president of 
this nation will never initiate or support any attempt to legalise homosexuality 
in Ghana … Ghana will continue to operate within its constitution regardless 
of any threats from any country … (Solace Brothers Foundation 2016, 9)
A very important point in regard to politics and LGBT rights in Africa is that 
many political actors and governments of African countries merely maintain 
positions with which they can score political points. They implement policies 
and laws that resonate with public anti-LGBT sentiments. Politicians thus 
apply the anti-LGBT instruments to score political points, uphold traditional 
cultural values and norms, and maintain deep-seated religious dictates. They 
do this also because they know full well that their constituents will frown 
upon their approval of pro-LGBT legislation, and they may be voted out 
of power and ostracised if they do otherwise. This perhaps explains why the 
anti-LGBT law in Nigeria was approved at a time when major electoral pro-
cesses were under way, regardless of pressures from the West, especially from 
the USA.
THE LAW AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
OF LGBT RIGHTS IN NIGERIA
In reality, the legitimacy of an act or behaviour can best be concretised within 
the context of the laws (the Constitution, edicts, codes of conduct and other 
legal statutes) of any nation. Thus, many of the issues related to LBGT iden-
tities, as in any other country in the world, are embedded in legal contexts. 
In some cases, international treaties influence the local content of legisla-
tions. Conversely, national sovereignty often pre-empts the overriding effects 
of these treaties. This is no different in regard to how Nigeria and Nigerians 
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have treated people who exhibited passive or active amorous same-sex behav-
iour in recent times. Even though the rage against men who have sex with 
men, women who have sex with women and the transgender community 
in Nigeria became pronounced in the enactment of the Same-Sex Marriage 
(Prohibition) Act of 2014, it is pertinent to note that a plethora of attempts 
had been made in the past to proscribe such acts. This is despite the fact that 
the stand of the United Nations (UN), as a typical international body, is 
clear in regard to LGBT rights: ‘sexual orientation and gender identity are 
included among prohibited grounds of discrimination under international 
human rights law’ (United Nations, n.d). LGBT rights are thus presented by 
the UN as inalienable human rights, expressed in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 that all governments at different levels and in dif-
ferent regions of the world must promote and protect.
The flurry of homophobic and transphobic judicial activities in Nigeria 
has recently placed the country at number five in the top five countries in 
the world where LGBT rights are impossible to implement, given existing 
belief systems and social realities (Noble 2015). The plethora of pacts on 
LGBT rights signed around the world has not translated into liberation of 
same-sex and transgender people from discriminatory treatment in Nigeria, 
especially when the contemporary perception of LGBT identity in the 
country is taken into consideration. LGBT Nigerians practising same-sex 
relations, as in several other African countries, do so covertly and are liable to 
punishment under the law. The most stringent legal constraint against such 
practices is found in the 12 Northern states of Nigeria that have adopted 
Sharia law: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, 
Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. Certain homosexual activities carry the 
death penalty in these states, while the criminal and penal codes in the 
country as a whole uphold a 14-year prison term for those found guilty 
of an attempt at ‘carnal knowledge’ or ‘carnal intercourse’ with any per-
son ‘against the order of nature’ (Human Rights Watch 2014). As Human 
Rights Watch documented in a 2008 report, these laws are colonial laws 
that were retained after the end of British colonial rule. Thus, one sees the 
reverberation of Lugones’s view of the coloniality of gender and sexuality, 
as earlier discussed.
In the 12 Nigerian states where there is strict adherence to Sharia law, men 
convicted of homosexuality are liable to receive a death sentence, while female 
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‘queer’ sexual acts are punishable by flogging or six months’ imprisonment. 
It was a former minister of justice, Bayo Ojo, who initially presented the 
Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill to the national assembly in January 
2006, but it did not pass beyond its first reading. A year later, the bill was 
approved by the Federal Executive Council and sent again to the national 
assembly for processing. The suggested bill proposed five years’ incarceration 
for individuals who conduct, observe or support same-sex marriage. It also 
banned public displays of homosexual relations and adoption of children by 
homosexuals, and proposed a five-year prison term for participation in civic 
advocacy or groups promoting the rights of LGBT individuals. The inten-
tion of the bill was to completely ban homosexuality in the country. It was 
opposed and criticised, especially by international bodies and human rights 
organisations, for perceived violations of the rights to freedom of association 
and assembly as established by international laws and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (OAU 1981).
In January 2008 another bill to prohibit same-sex marriage was presented to the 
national assembly. The Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill 2008 defined ‘Same 
Gender Marriage’ as ‘the coming together of persons of the same sex with the pur-
pose of living together as husband and wife or for other purposes of same sexual 
relationship’ (Human Rights Watch 2014). It proposed a three-year jail term for 
defaulters. It also did not acknowledge homosexual marriages certified interna-
tionally. Like the 2006 Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill, it went beyond the 
outlawing of same-sex marriage, and included regulations prohibiting consensual 
sex between adults, which carries a two-year prison term. The main difference 
between the 2006 and 2008 bills was the measure in the latter bill which imposed 
more stringent punishment on individuals who participate in aiding and abet-
ting or witnessing the sanctification of the union between homosexuals, with the 
intention of further alienating LGBT individuals and denying them access to 
support and services.
Eventually, in 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law the 
Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Bill (commonly referred to by Nigerians as 
the ‘jail the gays law’), which further institutionalises discrimination against 
the LGBT community as well as threatening the fundamental human rights 
of all Nigerians. The law bans same-sex unions and the public display of 
affection by people involved in same-sex relationships, and imposes 14 years’ 
imprisonment for same-sex marriage and a 10-year jail term for individuals 
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who ‘aid and abet’ or witness same-sex weddings, as well as individuals who 
operate or participate in homosexual clubs, associations and groups, directly or 
indirectly, across Nigeria. The law, which forbids any ‘public show of same-sex 
amorous relationship’, is designed to inhibit the fundamental human rights 
and freedom of expression of LGBT individuals and their allies in Nigeria, 
and promotes persecution and violence against this minority group (Global 
Legal Research Centre 2014).
The recent focus on LGBT rights under international law has major implica-
tions for the legality of Nigeria’s anti-LGBT laws because Nigeria is a member 
of the UN and a state signatory to these laws. The Charter of the UN and its 
founding treaty clearly establish its functions and objectives, and the binding 
mandates that its Member States must follow. One of their obligations is to 
‘reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women’ (Human Rights 
Campaign Foundation 2014). To that end, Member States are required to 
grant fundamental human rights and equality to all individuals.
The UN established the Human Rights Council in 2006 to identify human 
rights violations and suggest ways to tackle them effectively. The Council was 
designed to promote and safeguard human rights globally. In June 2011 it 
released a report in which it communicated its grave concern at acts of violence 
and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against individ-
uals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity (Human Rights 
Council 2011). The report notes that the application of international human 
rights law is directed by the values of universality and non-discrimination as 
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It then emphasises 
the statement in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted 
by the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 (OHCHR n.d.) that, 
though cultural disparities must be valued, all nations have an obligation to 
defend the fundamental rights and freedoms of all humans, and argues that 
therefore cultural values concerning same-sex relationships do not undermine 
its members’ duties to guarantee that individuals are not victims of discrimi-
nation based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.
EXISTENTIALITIES OF LGBT RIGHTS IN NIGERIA
With the exception of South Africa, with its more positive legal framework for 
LGBT rights, African countries generally demonstrate very little sociopolitical 
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and legal tolerance for LGBT acts and people, with homophobia being a 
common occurrence (UN n.d.). LGBT people are more likely to encoun-
ter prejudice, marginalisation, harassment and the threat of violence than 
heterosexuals (Human Rights Watch 2014). Greatly ingrained homophobic 
outlooks, often together with restrictions on legal protection on grounds of 
sexual orientation or gender identity, mean that LGBT individuals in Nigeria 
are viewed as less human than heterosexuals. The restrictions are experienced 
at all levels of society and in all spheres – they face discrimination at work, in 
schools and hospitals, and within the family circle. They are singled out for 
physical attack, emotional violence, sexual assault and torture (Reid 2013). 
A poll conducted by NOI Polls (2015) revealed that 87 per cent of Nigerians 
supported the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act.
The major factors that strengthen homophobia across Nigerian society are 
the moral, religious, traditional and political values of the majority popula-
tion (UN n.d.). Thus, existing in a homophobic setting forces most LGBT 
people to conceal their sexual orientation, through fear of the unpleasant 
reactions and consequences of coming out that they could encounter. There 
is no unified definition of homophobia; it includes varying standpoints and 
attitudes. It is most often described as hostility to or fear of gay people, but 
also includes stigmatisation arising from societal beliefs about homosexuality 
(Finerty 2012). Negative values or attitudes towards non-heterosexual traits, 
identity, relationships and communities can lead to homophobic behaviour 
(Finerty 2012). Homophobia is displayed in different ways, for example 
through homophobic jokes, emotional violence, physical attacks, discrimi-
nation at work and negative media depiction. In February 2006, the national 
defence school in Nigeria expelled 15 trainees suspected of homosexual acts 
after anal examinations (Human Dignity Trust 2015). Again, in August 
2007, police in Bauchi State arrested 18 men suspected of being homosexuals 
and charged them with belonging to an illegal society, committing indecent 
acts and engaging in criminal conspiracy (Human Dignity Trust 2015). In 
the same year, two civilians and two military men were arrested in Kano for 
allegedly engaging in same-sex sexual activities, and were only released after 
the intervention of the Coalition for the Defence of Sexual Rights (Human 
Dignity Trust 2015).
Within homophobic reactions to different sexualities lie certain tenden-
cies, among others the inability to suppress organised sentimentality and 
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resentment of those considered sexually abnormal, which becomes a dom-
inant trait. On this basis, hatred and rejection of LGBT individuals can be 
considered inherent in the Africanity of sexual orientation that is, of course, 
conservative. It is in this respect, also, that the silencing of LGBT individu-
als in Nigeria as an isolated minority, who explore their sexual orientation 
or gender identity without any support, should be interpreted (Akanle and 
Adejare 2016b).
Again, it must be understood that Nigerian social values, as is also observ-
able in other African countries, are predominantly conservative and generally 
socially exclude the LGBT community. Traditional and institutional sup-
port for heterosexuality continually reinforces the illegitimacy of unpopular 
forms of sexuality as practised by LGBT people. Similarly, there has been 
an observable lack of official records of any group of Nigerians who have 
come together to represent LGBT affairs, let alone conduct public advoca-
cies on their behalf. However, there are some structured organisations that 
do advocate for the rights of the Nigerian LGBT community and seek their 
social inclusion. These are mostly non-governmental organisations that have 
publicly affirmed the protection and representation of LGBT rights as one 
of their areas of focus. They include Alliance Rights Nigeria, the Centre 
for Youth Policy Research and Advocacy (CYPRAD), the Support Project 
in Nigeria (SPIN), The Initiative for Equal Rights (TIER), Queer Alliance, 
Global Rights Nigeria, and the International Centre for Reproductive Health 
and Sexual Rights (INCRESE).
While the outlawing of LGBT-related activities represents institutionalised 
or formal constraint inhibiting the diversification of sexuality or gender var-
iability, it must be noted that more often than not, discrimination against 
LGBT individuals starts within the families into which the individuals are 
born. As earlier posited, primordial African attitudes towards sexual orien-
tation tend to favour heterosexuality. Since Africans are inclined to family 
life, the fear of (possible) rejection and severe negative reactions suppresses 
the instinctive need to express different sexual orientations, as in the case 
of LGBT identities (Akanle and Adejare 2016b). This narrative has been 
further strengthened in a study that shows that 89 per cent of individuals 
who disclosed their ‘new’ sexual or gender identities to their family members 
were disowned, while others were forced to undergo therapy or deliverance to 
‘cure’ their ‘confusion’ (Global Legal Research Centre, 2014).
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Corruption is a problem for the police in Nigeria, and the ‘jail the gays’ Act 
provides corrupt officers with additional leverage for their profiling and extor-
tion activities, and the blackmailing of individuals with threats of arrest and 
imprisonment, if they do not pay the requested bribe. The ‘jail the gays’ Act 
has definitely increased the vulnerability of LGBT Nigerians to blackmail and 
abuse. The law instils a fear of imprisonment that discourages LGBT people 
from reporting violations of their fundamental rights to relevant authorities 
and, certainly, provides authorities and other individuals with a justification 
for discrimination (Akanle and Adejare 2016b). This link is very clear in the 
targeted police abuse against LGBT individuals, because officers can legally 
arrest people for consensual sex with members of the same sex; therefore the 
law legitimises homophobia, creating a sense of impunity for those who com-
mit acts of violence.
The outlawing of LGBT acts was not only orchestrated by the interplay 
of culture, history, politics, law and, to some extent, religious values. These 
factors are also responsible for upholding the stalled status of negotiations 
for recognition and protection of LGBT rights in the country. In spite of 
the plethora of international conventions that constantly forge positive 
representations of LGBT identity, and work to eliminate all forms of discrim-
ination against them, homophobia and rejection of people living with ‘other 
kinds’ of gender and sexuality persist in Nigeria. What is noteworthy in this 
development is that the current experience of LGBT people in Nigeria has 
not only been shaped by social factors but is also sustained by them.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the human identity of LGBT 
people is compromised by the existing social, political and legal milieus in 
Nigeria. At the level of social relationships, the history of the people who 
make up the country does not favour innovative individualism of the kind 
typified by LGBT identity; collective values regulate the contexts of relation-
ships, and it is these dominant contexts within which acceptance or rejection 
of an individual’s identity can be negotiated. The historical experience of the 
country is also sewn with the thread of colonial influences. Colonialism espe-
cially influenced the development of legal frameworks and religious views 
on human sexuality. The existing anti-LGBT law lends further credence to 
public rejection of the humanity of LGBT people, especially through the 
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outlawing of homosexuality. Given the existing situation, it is very unlikely 
that the human identity of the LGBT population will be accepted by other 
Nigerians in the near future.
To the extent that both human sexuality and identity are constructed 
socially – through collective negotiation of ideal relationships, family life, 
shared historic and cultural experience, aggregated sentiment, and collective 
definition of humanity – it can be deduced that since Nigerian social, politi-
cal and legal spaces are averse to same-sex or innovative gender relationships, 
LGBT people are considered less than fully human in the country.2 To what 
extent, then, are they human? To the extent that they can exist and cope 
with the existing subjugation of their human identity within the dominant 
cultural, political, legal and religious contexts in the country. Issues around 
LGBT identity explored in this chapter are relevant to discourses, policies and 
programmes on citizenship and belonging. They address questions such as: 
‘who belongs in or to Nigeria?’ and ‘to what extent do they enjoy their rights 
in this context, compared to other Nigerians?’
NOTES
 1 Uganda, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, for instance, share identical experiences relative to 
LGBT rights on the continent, as they have equally prohibitive legal frameworks.
 2 See Batisai (2016) for parallels that can also be drawn with arguments that emerged 
from South Africa and other social systems on citizenship, nationality and sexuality.
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ithout denial of difference and diversity, all people are human and 
equal. However, dominant powers in society categorise people using 
the concept ‘normalcy’ as the standard, leading to the emergence of 
‘human’ and ‘subhuman’ as categories for labelling people. One such group 
of people that have continued to emerge from this categorisation, in which 
the ‘normal body’ and the ‘normal mind’ are used as a measure of ability and 
the ‘abled’, are persons with impairments. ‘Disabled’ is thus an identity label, 
a social construct used to define and describe those who do not meet the 
criteria of body and mind that are used to construct a ‘normal’ human being. 
There has been a realisation, however, that being ‘disabled’ is a by-product of 
this process of categorisation and labelling, and critical voices are emerging 
to claim humanness for people in all their diversity, including those with 
impairments.
Drawing from secondary data on disability, impairment issues and critical 
disability theory, as well as decolonial theory, this chapter makes use of the 
conceptual toolkit offered by these theories for understanding the deconstruc-
tion of disability. It demonstrates how disability has been socially constructed 
from the past to the present, and how this identity is being deconstructed to 
reclaim the humanness of persons with impairments. The concept of coloni-
ality, drawn from decolonial theory, is used to illuminate an understanding 
of how disability is socially constructed, resulting in those with impair-
ments losing their humanness. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2001) argues that 
it is the categorisation process implemented by the dominant powers which 
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culminates in other social groups losing their humanness. From a decolo-
nial perspective, humanness considers and accepts all human beings as fully 
human, in all their diversity. Decoloniality is also used in this chapter as the 
theory with the most traction for explaining the deconstruction of disability 
in terms of emancipation through consciousness, awareness of oppression, 
and agency, all with the over-arching aim of reclaiming humanness.
The concepts of ableism and body corporeality are drawn from critical dis-
ability theory, and enable a deeper analysis of how disability is constructed. 
Ableism involves preference of ability over disability (Hehir 2002), and an 
‘able body’ is preferred over an impaired one (Goodley 2014). Thus, society 
places value on those identified as ‘able’ and dehumanises those with impaired 
bodies. The concept of body corporeality specifically explains the dichotomy 
abled/disabled as constructed categories, and shows how the concept of an 
impaired body is now being deconstructed to enable a more positive under-
standing of impairment. Deconstruction of disability and reclamation of 
humanness are therefore understood in the light of work towards dismantling 
oppression, so as to restore the dignity to persons with impairments which 
has been lost through their dehumanisation.
Barriers confronted in the deconstruction process are also discussed in 
this chapter, because reclaiming humanness is not without its challenges 
and it should be understood as a struggle. I will argue that while persons 
with impairments have been dehumanised, and struggle under the banner 
imposed on them by the dominant society, an understanding of body cor-
poreality, emancipation through consciousness and awareness of oppression 
and agency could be useful ways to reclaim their humanness. However, doing 
so would not be without challenges, as there are issues involved that need to 
be addressed such as structure, context, inertia and intersectionality, among 
many others.
MAKING THE INVISIBLE VISIBLE
Making the invisible visible means using theory to unveil and reveal the 
deeper meaning of what might not be seen at face value, which in this chapter 
is the construction of disability, and its deconstruction to reclaim the human-
ness of persons with impairment. The hidden is brought to light, through the 
illumination offered by the specific theoretical concepts highlighted in the 
introduction.
67
Humanness and Ableism: Construction and Deconstruction of Disability
Critical disability theory has been developed by post-conventionalists, 
post-structuralists and post-colonial scholars who draw most of their ideas 
from Michel Foucault, Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida. These scholars 
acknowledge the achievements of the conventional scholars as pioneers in 
their disability work, for example Oliver (1990), who proposed the tradi-
tional social model in which disability is located in the social environment 
and not in an individual. However, they also constructively problematise and 
critique specific disability- and impairment-related issues, with the aim of 
bringing to light different ways of understanding them, in order to improve 
the life conditions of all persons, including persons with impairments, 
whom they all agree are dehumanised, undervalued and discriminated against. 
The theory critiques the established discourse on disability and impairment in 
conventional disability studies, with the aim of constructing new meanings 
for these terms and a new understanding in which the humanness of persons 
with impairments can be reclaimed (Meekosha and Shuttleworth 2009).
Critical disability scholars such as Dan Goodley (2013, 2014) contest the 
essentialising of disability, ableism and disablism, arguing for a different under-
standing of them in the light of, among other things, intra/intersectionality, 
acknowledgement of difference, and allowing the voices of persons with impair-
ments to be heard. These theorists critique the social model of disability, and 
propose resistance theories in its place. Shelley Tremain (2002, 2005) draws on 
the Foucauldian concept of modern power repressively regulating political lives; 
she sees disability and impairment as constituting each other and not as separate 
entities. She critiques the paradoxical reasoning of those who see the two as sep-
arate, and seem not to consider other categories of people who are also excluded 
and stigmatised (on grounds of their skin colour or queer bodies, for example) 
as ‘disabled’, only those with impairments (Tremain 2005). For her, disability 
is a social construct, as is impairment, because being categorised as impaired 
involves meeting specific requirements that are defined socially and politically. 
As such, she argues that there is a causal relationship between disability and 
impairment. I do not agree with Tremain’s assertion, because disability exists in 
a social context while impairment is experienced in the individual realm and 
can limit one’s functionality. It does not automatically follow that when one has 
an impairment one is disabled.
The post-colonialists Shaun Grech (2015) and Karen Soldatic (2015) seek 
to shift the understanding of disability and impairment from ethnocentric 
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Global North perspectives, to include the voices from the South. Within 
critical disability theory there are efforts to introduce change and influence 
thinking in ways that depart from the long-established and dominant dis-
course of disability and impairment, so as to include all persons, including 
those with impairments, in a space where everyone has a dignified life as a 
human being. Intersectionality is used as a key lens to guard against generali-
sations about the oppression of persons with impairments; it should always be 
at the back of one’s mind if disability is not to be overgeneralised. Disability 
should be thought of as intersecting with multiple identities such as sexuality, 
race, gender, ethnicity and class, and should be placed at the centre of them 
(Sherry 2009), so as to heighten awareness of the social dynamics and power 
relations that shape lived realities.
Decolonial theory extensively explains coloniality in ways that provide use-
ful insights for understanding how the other is socially constructed in the 
context of coloniality of being, and how the humanness of this other can be 
reclaimed. The theory is described as different from other theories of colo-
niality, and based on a different logic (Mignolo 2007), in that it not only 
exposes the ills of coloniality but also offers a method of fighting it, namely 
decoloniality. It provides a different understanding of the long-established 
hegemonic structures and practices of oppression, in terms of their under-
lying causes, that can lead to enlightenment, awareness, consciousness and 
agency on the part of the other. It not only unveils coloniality in its various 
guises but proposes ways of overcoming the oppression and related prejudices 
that coloniality imposed (Rose 2004). Decolonial theory hinges primarily on 
unmasking and exposing the ills of coloniality and Western modernity, and 
offers decoloniality as a way of self-liberation. The theory starts from the fail-
ures of post-modernism, which sought to address the problems of modernity 
without unmasking it as a power structure. I argue that it is only when the 
invisible underlying cause of dehumanisation is exposed that humanness can 
be reclaimed.
The key proponents of decolonial theory include Anibal Quijano 
(2000), Nelson Maldonaldo-Torres (2007), Ramón Grosfoguel (2011) and 
Walter D. Mignolo (2007). Other scholars from the Global South such as 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni have used decolonial theory to contribute to debates on 
transformation, poverty and oppression in specific African contexts, includ-
ing xenophobia in South Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). The theory can 
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be useful in stimulating positive change in and emancipation of those cat-
egorised as the other. The concepts of coloniality of being and ableism are 
therefore used to explain the construction of disability, which underlies dehu-
manisation of persons with impairment.
TRACING DISABILITY CONSTRUCTION
Disability was, and has continued to be, constructed differently at different 
times. During the pre-colonial era, African societies’ construction of disa-
bilities was informed by religious and cultural beliefs. Religion influenced 
positive or negative conceptions of disability in traditional communities. 
Robert Murphy (1990) explains that where Christian beliefs in God or 
African traditional beliefs in gods dominated, disability was understood by 
parents either as a punishment or a curse, seen as the result of having been 
bewitched for wrongdoing, or considered as something that befell innocent 
victims of fate. When reactions to their presence were informed by traditional 
beliefs, persons with impairments and their families were feared, ostracised, 
discriminated against, treated with cruelty and even killed because of fear that 
they could bring the curse onto the whole community. When the reactions 
were informed by Christianity, these individuals were accepted as a gift from 
the supernatural, and as a result they were over-protected, patronised and 
exempted from doing ordinary daily chores. Mike Oliver and Colin Barnes 
(2012) argue that only small-scale studies of these reactions were conducted 
in a few rural communities, and it cannot be concluded that all African socie-
ties’ view of disability was informed by religion. But the overarching factor is 
that persons with impairments in traditional communities were dehumanised 
in one way or another.
In the West, some forms of impairments were conceived in a positive way 
during feudal times (Stone 1999). People were able to participate in the prim-
itive collective activities in their communities as members of society, and as 
such not all persons with impairments were seen as disabled (Oliver 1990). 
The view changed during the period of the Industrial Revolution, when atti-
tudes towards disability were informed by historical materialism (Finkelstein 
1980). During this period, all people were expected to contribute to eco-
nomic production. Members of a society had to work in the factories, and 
those who could not participate because of their physical impairments were 
viewed as disabled. They were seen as unproductive economically, and were 
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excluded from the labour force because of their impairments. Such exclusion 
was a form of dehumanisation. When the social context is transformed and 
becomes inclusive of all forms of diversity, even those with impairments will 
be able to contribute to economic development.
Disability continued to be constructed negatively during the colonial and 
post-colonial periods. It was viewed as a limitation of the individual, being 
based on an individual model of understanding disability. In that view, dis-
ability was understood to be a tragedy, a misfortune that befalls individuals 
and renders them malfunctional within a ‘normal’ society; hence persons with 
impairments are viewed as victims who are to be pitied. Conceived in this 
way, there was and still is an attitude of patronisation towards people with 
impairments, one characterised by professional interventions such as reha-
bilitation, medical correction and institutionalisation, with charity, care and 
special education being used as ways to ‘normalise’ such people (Barnes and 
Mercer 2010).
The limitations of the individual view of disability weigh heavily on the 
humanity of persons with impairments. Depending on the severity of their 
impairments, individuals can be isolated and removed from the mainstream 
and from their families, and placed in institutions intended only for them. 
Separation of this kind can be understood as implying that those who are 
different from the norm in some way should be taken out of society, and 
be grouped together according to their impairments. When their limitations 
have been identified, they are removed from society and placed in specialised 
institutions, where professionals make decisions on their behalf and dictate 
how they should be normalised − resulting in discrimination and patronisa-
tion. Grech (2015) argues that these professionals also experiment on their 
bodies. This suggests that they are deprived of their own voices in regard to 
the lived experience of their impairments, how they are disabled by the social 
contexts, and what they want and need as individuals. This is the reason why 
intervention is directed at individuals, rather than at transforming their social 
contexts. Such interventions thus perpetuate dehumanisation.
With specific reference to the South African context, Collen Howell (2006) 
argues that the previous system of apartheid-era education was divided into 
mainstream and special education. Learners with impairments were educated 
in special schools. This system of education could be viewed as segregationist, 
discriminatory and dehumanising on grounds of impairments. However, the 
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positive elements in this kind of education must not be glossed over. On the 
one hand the system could be viewed as segregationist; but on the other hand 
it recognised the humanness of learners with impairments. In segregated spe-
cial schools, these learners accessed learning through specialised equipment 
designed specifically to cater for their different impairments. The teachers were 
trained to teach different learners with specific impairments. The built environ-
ment in these institutions was accessible, because it was specifically designed 
from the outset for learners with different types of impairment. Though the 
overarching consequence of such a system is dehumanisation embedded in seg-
regationist education, the provisions made for learners with impairments that 
can potentially lead to humanness should not be understated, because being 
separated enabled learning to take place in special and unique ways suited to 
learners with impairments. It should therefore be acknowledged that though 
the individual model dehumanises persons with impairments, it also has a pos-
itive influence on the provision of facilities and support for them. Their unique 
needs are met, more specifically in terms of education.
As the struggle for independence and liberation of the disabled continues, 
there has been a shift from the individual to the social model. The limitations 
of the individual model have been widely contested in conventional (main-
stream) disability studies by scholars such as Oliver (1990), Barnes and Mercer 
(2010) and Oliver and Barnes (2012). The social model locates disability in 
the environment; that is, it argues that it is the social and the physical envi-
ronments that disable. Oliver (1990) argues that while it is understood that 
impairments in themselves might ‘disable’ persons with these impairments, 
this should not be over-emphasised as that could result in the responsible 
government stakeholders in society − that is, those responsible for creating 
an inclusive social environment for all the people of the country, including 
those with disabilities − not taking on the task of constructing an inclusive 
environment that caters for all. The social model also led to positive changes 
being made for persons with physical impairments in the 1970s (UPIAS, 
1976) in terms of society meeting their needs, because it transformed the 
thinking on how to overcome the restrictions that were imposed on people 
with physical impairments. The shift to the social model could thus be viewed 
as a way in which society could empower persons with impairments, so that 




The social model is, however, also critiqued in both the conventional and 
the critical disability scholarship. The main criticism of it is that it separates 
disability and impairment, defining them as different entities (Tremain 2005). 
In the social model of disability there is denial that an individual could be dis-
abled because they have an impairment. The critics of this model argue that 
separating disability and impairments overlooks the effects of impairments, 
and limits those with impairments from sharing their lived experiences of 
how the impairments restrict them (Shakespeare and Watson 2001). They 
further argue that the social model emphasises the simple material benefits 
of access to infrastructure, amenities and education, rather than also consid-
ering the psychological being of persons with impairments (Shildrick 2012). 
Justifying the present criticisms, Grech (2015) argues that the realities of dis-
ability, the experiences of persons with impairment, and their voices, concepts 
and knowledge, more specifically in the Global South, are over-simplified 
and over-generalised as homogeneous and decontextualised. There has been 
further argument by critical disability scholars such as Goodley (2013, 2014) 
for a different way of looking into disability in a broader context. It needs 
to be reiterated that disability and impairment are separate things. I am in 
agreement with Tom Shakespeare and Nick Watson (2001) that the two are 
not mutually exclusive and should be treated separately.
CONSTRUCTION OF DISABILITY: THE NOTION  
OF DEHUMANISATION
It is important to understand how disability has been and continues to be 
constructed in day-to-day life. From the decolonial perspective, the categori-
sation and labelling of humanity in terms of normative standards by dominant 
powers constructs certain humans as the other. Disability is also socially con-
structed in the process, and persons with impairments emerge as disabled 
because of the different ways in which their identities are constructed.
In a society based on hierachisation, the group labelled as ‘normal’ is placed 
higher in the hierarchy and any other group diverting from the ‘normal’ is 
placed lower down. Those placed in lower positions are inferiorised, because 
they are viewed as of low status. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2001) explains the pro-
cess of categorisation and naming in which persons with impairments are 
dehumanised. He reiterates that the standard measure of ‘normal body and 
mind’ is used as the yardstick. All those with a body and mind that meet the 
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specific criteria for ‘normalcy’ are labelled as the ‘abled’, while those who fall 
outside the margins of this category and do not meet the specific criteria for 
normalcy are named the ‘disabled’. Multiplicity, diversity and difference are 
denied in the process (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2001). The idea of normalcy in itself 
is subject to contestation because it is also a social construct, constructed by 
the powerful and imposed on the powerless. The process and the criteria used 
in the categorisation and naming of individuals and groups are a form of 
dehumanisation, because normalcy is a concept that cannot be universalised: 
it is a subjective and contextual phenomenon.
In critical disability scholarship, the construction of disability and conse-
quent dehumanising of those with impairments is understood in the light of 
ableism. In ableism, ‘normal’ ways of doing things are preferred to ways that 
depart from what is understood as the norm. For example, a child who walks 
is preferred to one who rolls. A person who reads print is viewed as better 
than one who reads Braille. Hearing is prioritised over signing (Hehir 2002). 
In the modern world, Goodley (2014) explains this way of thinking as one 
informed by the capitalist system and the ethos of entrepreneurship, whereby 
all people are expected to contribute to economic production in society and 
to be independent individuals. It is the able-bodied who, it is assumed by 
society, can meet the demands of production, hence the need for normalcy 
to take this form (Goodley 2014). It does not end there; society then views 
itself as responsible for making those who have impaired bodies ‘normal’, 
‘normalising’ them to fit in and function in sociocultural contexts in which all 
the structures and practices have been designed for the ‘normal’. The process 
of normalisation is, however, heavily critiqued, because it implies an assump-
tion on the part of the ‘able’ that the ‘disabled’ want to be ‘normal’ like them. 
It could be argued that normalisation is tantamount to dehumanisation, 
because according to Rod Milchako (2002), persons with impairments have 
not said they want to be anything that they are not. However, what they have 
said, and continue to say, is that they want accessible social contexts in which 
they are also able to participate, succeed, achieve and lead independent lives, 
different as they are (Oliver 1990). Persons with impairments do not want to 
be changed, but want both the social and physical contexts to be transformed 
so that they are also included in mainstream society. They argue in this way 
because they understand themselves to be like all other beings, only disabled 
by restrictions imposed on them. Milchako (2002) argues that society should 
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be barrier-free, so that all people can genuinely belong to it, even the easy 
and hard-core cases of persons with impairments. It is therefore the society 
and the environment that should be transformed, rather than persons with 
impairments.
BARRIERS CONFRONTED BY PERSONS 
WITH IMPAIRMENTS
By constructing the ‘normal’ and the ‘able’, society is designed for the 
 functioning of such categories. Its social and physical structures and practices 
have been designed for the ‘normal’ person. Persons with impairments are 
then ‘disabled’, and find themselves excluded. They confront a number of 
barriers and disabling conditions in different social contexts, although the 
infrastructural barriers and low expectations placed on them are viewed as 
the most disabling. These barriers dehumanise and limit persons with impair-
ments in both physical and psychological ways, and society sees them as 
indeed disabled. Lack of accessibility and being understood in negative terms 
are core in making persons with impairments less human, leading them to 
live a life of dependence. Limited mobility has numerous consequences that 
lead to entrenched limitations. Society’s low expectations of an individual 
lead to withdrawal and waste of potential and capabilities. In this chapter 
these barriers are discussed in the context of South Africa, which has the most 
comprehensive policies of inclusion of any country in Africa. If persons with 
impairments are confronted with so many barriers that dehumanise them in 
the South African context, the situation could be worse for such people in 
less advanced countries that do not even have comprehensive policies of 
inclusion.
The physical infrastructure in South Africa does not cater for diversity, and 
the issue of inaccessibility affects mainly those with physical impairments. 
Public transport is one major barrier: buses, cars and trains are still inaccessi-
ble, specifically to those who use wheelchairs and those with visual limitations 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group 2013). The transport system was designed 
for a ‘normal’ being and not for people in all their diversity. Khuzwayo (2011) 
argues that the problem of inaccessible transport is more pronounced in rural 
areas. However, even in urban areas there are still very few accessible modes 
of transport. Given such transport barriers, persons with impairments who 
are working might find it difficult to get to their workplace, or could always 
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arrive late. This could result in them losing their jobs and becoming depend-
ent, and then being viewed as unproductive. It is a form of dehumanisation 
of persons with impairments, when their mobility is limited while they need 
to be mobile like all other human beings.
The built environment is also a barrier to persons with impairments, 
because of its inaccessibility. Most buildings still do not have rails, ramps 
and lifts. Some have lifts, but there is no voice mechanism to alert those with 
total visual loss of their destination. Leslie Swartz and Marguerite Schneider 
(2006) explain that for persons with impairments in South Africa, accessi-
bility is still a pipe dream because of the costs involved in renovating and 
retrofitting old buildings, which were originally built without consideration 
for the accessibility needs of persons with impairments. Even though there 
has been a start in the retrofitting and renovation of the built environment to 
also cater for persons with impairments, the National Building Regulations 
impose restrictions in terms of the extent to which the specific alterations 
can be made (SANS 2011). When physical spaces are inaccessible, persons 
with impairments, more specifically those using wheelchairs and those who 
have visual challenges, encounter mobility problems in general, including 
manoeuvring in their workplaces. Of interest in regard to such dehumanisa-
tion is what happens when architectural design and heritage are valued over 
humanness. Clive Chipkin (1993) reveals that in one institution of higher 
education in South Africa there are buildings which cannot be renovated 
or retrofitted because they are being preserved for their architectural design 
and heritage value. Students with mobility and visual limitations can be con-
fronted with barriers to access when they are expected to use such buildings 
for learning; they might have to spend time negotiating access and lose out 
on learning, and this can affect them negatively. It could be argued that it is 
typical of dehumanisation for the design of a building to be valued over the 
mobility, access and learning needs of persons with impairments.
Negative perceptions of the intellectual capabilities and abilities of persons 
with disabilities are another dehumanising tendency that is prevalent in soci-
ety. There are assumptions that those people are incapable of intellectual work, 
and might not meet the academic demands of higher learning programmes. 
In this regard Sheila Riddel (1998), in agreement with Howell (2006), argues 
that academic staff at university level have negative perceptions of the capa-
bilities and potential for learning of students with impairments. Those with 
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impairments are pre-judged as being intellectually incapable even before they 
have the opportunity to prove themselves capable or not. When having an 
impairment is reduced to incapability, capable students with impairments 
could be denied equal opportunities for access to higher education. The few 
who make it into higher education courses of study, and can make positive 
contributions socially and economically, are further confronted with infra-
structural obstacles to accessing employment, as discussed above. This is 
common in the South African context (Swartz and Schneider 2006). Without 
employment, they are stripped of their independent lives and framed as disa-
bled, when it is society that disables them.
EVERYONE IS HUMAN: DECONSTRUCTION 
OF DISABILITY
Critical voices have emerged and debates are fierce in regard to the social con-
struction of the identity of disability. Critical disability scholars problematise 
the narrow understanding of impairment as equal to disability, and the way 
in which persons with impairments are, as a collective group, categorised and 
labelled as the disabled. They argue that this view is reductionist, because 
it simplifies and reduces disability to a product of impairment, neglecting 
its broader, complex and deeper meanings that go beyond being impaired. 
Diane Pothier and Richard Devlin’s (2006) reflections suggest that disability 
should be understood in terms of, among other things, social values, and also 
in terms of power and how it is used at the institutional and broader politi-
cal levels. The concept of disability should not be reduced to meaning only 
impairments, but should also be located in social contexts so as to be better 
understood.
The binary able/disabled is viewed as oppressive in critical disability schol-
arship. There has been a proposition to deconstruct this binary (Shildrick 
2012), in order to place all people of diverse types on the same plane. This 
is because binaries are viewed as creating hierarchical differences, and privi-
leging one category over the other. The argument is that such binaries yield 
differential power relations, as those placed in the lower category as disabled 
are assigned lower status than those said to be abled. Pothier and Devlin 
(2006) argue that binaries are othering − hence the social constructs in which 
there are ‘them’ and ‘us’, with ‘them’ being labelled as ‘disabled’ and ‘us’ being 
the ‘able’. It could be argued that these binaries dehumanise those in the lower 
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rank. Goodley (2011) argues that this is done for political reasons so that one 
group dominates the other. Thus, when binaries have been deconstructed, 
all people are placed on a continuum. In this way they become equal, and as 
such there are no distinct boundaries where ability ends and disability begins. 
When that is put into practice, persons with impairments can be empowered 
and they can genuinely belong with others to mainstream society.
BRINGING BACK THE BODY: THE 
CORPOREALITY OF DISABILITY
There is widespread agreement among scholars that an impaired body is 
the reason for the dehumanisation of persons with impairments. But plac-
ing emphasis on the impaired body has not gone far enough in unmasking 
the reasons for this dehumanisation, and moving away from understanding 
the body as simply biological (Meekosha 1998). Goodley (2013) critiques the 
essentialist understanding that an impaired body is deficient. He argues that 
instead the emphasis should be on the corporeality of disability, as ‘bodies 
are lived in but in the social setting that they inhabit’ (Goodley 2013, 635). 
The body is brought back into its social context; as social entities all bodies, 
including those with impairments, need to be recast in terms of value in 
this context. All bodies should be understood as important for their unique-
ness. The understanding is that all bodies matter and should be considered 
valuable. Goodley argues further that an impaired body should not only be 
understood in the context of oppression, because persons with impairments 
are intersectional subjects – they embody other positions which are valued in 
the ableist cultures (Goodley 2013).
Assistive devices and technology can be useful to support impaired bodies. 
Helen Meekosha and Russel Shuttleworth (2009) propose technologies and 
mechanical devices to be used to enhance bodies with impairments. Through 
the use of such technologies positive self-images are developed to overcome 
feelings of inadequacy. This might seem to contradict earlier intimations that 
persons with impairment do not want to be transformed but instead want the 
social contexts to be transformed to suit their unique needs; but analytical 
attention is invited to address the necessity of providing support in the form 
of assistive devices and technology, as they could be useful for their aesthetic 
value and for restoring confidence and self-value to bodies with impairments. 
However, as Shakespeare (2010) explains, no amount of environmental 
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transformation can totally overcome all impairments, and it is important that 
the realities of impairments are brought to the fore so that when rethink-
ing disability, genuine and feasible ways of bringing back humanness are 
considered.
EMANCIPATION THROUGH DECOLONIALITY
From the decolonial perspective, the voices of the oppressed could also be sti-
fled by different epistemic locations. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007, 45) 
explains that the zones of these locations are the spaces into which humanity 
is categorised and placed through Western ‘abyssal thinking’. This is the social 
reality in which the world is divided into two realms by an invisible line and 
by the creation of the West and the South. On one side of the line is the zone 
of being where the metropolitan is located, and on the other side of the line 
is the zone of non-being which constitutes the other (Santos 2007). Persons 
with impairments, by virtue of their different bodies, are othered and located 
in the zone of non-being. However, although these persons are located in 
the zone of non-being, some epistemically think and speak from the dom-
inant side (Ndlovu 2014). In other words, some persons with impairments 
epistemically locate themselves in the zone of being, because of their way of 
thinking. Those who do so find their conditions of dehumanisation exacer-
bated, because on top of society dehumanising them, they also dehumanise 
themselves. Viewing internalised dehumanisation as the worst form of mental 
colonisation, Stuart Hall (1990, 225) argues that ‘it is one thing to position 
subjects as the other in a dominant discourse, it is quite another to subject 
them to that knowledge’. Hall’s argument is that when the oppressed have 
internalised oppression they might not even be aware that they are oppressed. 
Liberation therefore starts from being conscious, and aware of oppression. 
It might be difficult for persons with impairments who are not aware that 
they are oppressed to use their agency to bring about change. However, as 
Grosfoguel (2011) argues, the two zones are not fixed, and not permanent 
categories. The epistemic location of such persons could also transform as 
they are conscientised.
Consciousness of oppression could be viewed as the starting point for eman-
cipation for persons with impairments. Proceeding from the argument that 
disability is constructed through coloniality of being and placement in the 
zone of non-being, Grech’s (2015) argument of an ‘alternative way of being’ 
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could be emancipatory. Those with impairments should resist and dismantle 
a normative conceptualisation of being prescribed and imposed on them by 
the dominant society. Self-value, self-love and embracing the reality that they 
are different and diverse can be the starting point for those with impairments. 
A positive self-concept and identity can enable persons with impairments to 
offer an alternative to coloniality, one which can be appreciated as plurality 
by other people such as those without impairments. Persons with impair-
ments can reclaim their humanness through awareness of their oppression as 
a key point of departure. But while consciousness and awareness of oppres-
sion are pivotal in reclaiming humanness, casting the net wider to consider 
context and structure illuminates ways of thinking about the production of 
power and the attendant oppression of persons with impairment. The social 
structure and context might not be conducive to persons with impairments 
liberating themselves, thus rendering consciousness and awareness of oppres-
sion inadequate for reclaiming humanness.
Persons with impairments could also emancipate themselves through resist-
ing practices and structures that are oppressive, as it has been emphasised 
that limitations are imposed by social contexts. Grech (2015) observes that 
historically the colonisers and colonised had a dialectical relationship, which 
included resistance. Gayatri Spivak (1988) understands resistance and speak-
ing against oppression as aspects of agency. In most societies, both in the 
South and the West, the able-bodied have been speaking and continue to 
speak for persons with impairments. This trend has resulted in the construc-
tion of those with impairments as powerless and voiceless. The experience of 
being impaired has been and continues to be understood from the able-bodied 
perspective (Hosking 2008); hence it is reported that the voices of persons 
with impairments are suppressed and silenced by the mainstream. When per-
sons with impairments say things that the mainstream society wants to hear 
they are listened to, but when they speak of what society does not want to 
hear, that is considered as an inappropriate response to their impairments 
(Titchkosky 2003).
The critical voices contest this, and are fighting to change it by calling for the 
privileging of the voices of lived experience from persons with impairments 
(Hosking 2008). Essentially, there should be a shift from understanding the 
experience of impairment on terms set by those without impairments, to 
understanding it from the perspective of those with lived experience of it. 
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To allow these stifled voices to emerge, there has been a proposal to adopt 
bottom-up approaches (Pothier and Devlin 2006). In ongoing struggles to 
overcome the limitations associated with impairments, the focus should be 
on proposals made by people who have lived experiences of impairment. 
Through their agency to resist, fight and speak against oppression, persons 
with impairments can push back against the circumstances imposed by 
oppressive structures. This can be done through a collective voice, which 
can attract more attention than individual voices. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) 
argues that coloniality must be unmasked, resisted and destroyed. Those with 
disabilities should not normalise coloniality, but instead should collaborate 
with other oppressed groups such as women and blacks in the struggle to 
regain humanness. Through such efforts an ‘alternative way of being’ can be 
conceived in their minds and in those of the dominant society. It is, however, 
important to highlight that the struggles for reclaiming humanness need to 
take into consideration questions of whether or not actions are being taken 
on the basis of proposals from persons with impairment. This is important, 
because it is not always the case that when someone speaks they are listened 
to and what they say is implemented.
INTERSECTIONALITY
It is important to understand that disability does not always equal oppres-
sion. Critical disability scholars engage with the intersectionality of disabled 
identity to nuance the debates on disability (Goodley 2013, 2014). Their 
proposition is that an impairment should be understood in the context of 
multiple identities, because it intersects with other identities such as race, 
gender and class which might bring some privileges. Sherry (2009) argues 
that impairments should be thought of as intersecting with multiple identi-
ties, and as a result should be placed at the centre of them. It should be viewed 
as a fluid and ever-changing entity shared by people with and without impair-
ments, and not a specific absolute category that is stable. Furthermore, an 
impairment should be viewed as occupying a position of possibility, because 
it is an aspect of a multi-layered position in which it converges with gender, 
race, class, ethnicity or sexuality (Goodley 2013), which are considered nor-
mative within the ableist context. The result of this convergence is subversion, 
connection and a reappraisal of identities (Goodley 2013). Thus persons with 
impairments should not always be viewed as oppressed and dehumanised.
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What bears emphasising is that impairments centre other positions of power. 
Goodley (2011) argues that impairments should be understood in terms of a 
springboard, a space from which to think through a host of political and the-
oretical issues that apply to all identities. Engaging with intersectionality as a 
key aspect has enabled critical disability scholarship to bring to light the view 
that impairments should not always be understood in terms of disadvantage 
and double oppression (Crenshaw 1989), with impairments always seen as the 
intersection of one axis of oppression with another. The ‘disabled’ body is not 
only understood in the context of oppression, because persons with impair-
ments are intersectional subjects, and they therefore embody other positions 
which can be powerful and valued in an ableist culture (Goodley 2013, 2014). 
For example, an impaired body from a middle-class family might have better 
opportunities for access to education and employment that constitute a set 
of privileges than an able-bodied person from a lower socio-economic class. 
Also, an impaired body of a white female student from a high socio-economic 
class could be privileged over a black able-bodied student from a lower class.
It bears noting that when impairment intersects with other axes of oppres-
sion, it yields double oppression (Crenshaw 1989). For example, blackness is 
not an impairment, a medical condition or a lack of operational efficiency. 
However, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2016), making reference to Ngũgı̃  wa Thiongo’s 
discussion of ‘dismemberment’, argues that black people’s humanness is ques-
tioned, resulting in their exclusion from the human family. In the same way, 
those with impairments are dismembered from society. Though blackness can-
not be equated with an impairment, it functions as a disabling condition, and 
by virtue of both persons with impairments and black people being viewed 
as inhuman, black persons with impairments could be more oppressed than 
white people with impairments, because of the intersection of their impair-
ment with blackness. A woman with impairments could also be understood 
as doubly oppressed because of the stereotypes related to gender. In a nutshell, 
intersectionality is important in reclaiming humanity because it helps us to 
understand impairments and disability more broadly in the context of multi-
ple identities and the workings of power dynamics that shape privileges and 
oppression, as impairments intersect with other identities (Goodley 2013; 
Soldatic and Meekosha 2012).
Drawing attention to intersectionality enables an understanding of persons 
with impairments that goes beyond seeing them as a group on their own 
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‘with special needs’. Furthermore, while speaking with one voice against oppres-
sion could be one way of reclaiming humanness for persons with impairments, 
the effects of being privileged or underprivileged within the category of disabled 
persons themselves could defeat the purpose. As disability intersects with other 
identities, class dynamics play themselves out in ways that shape forms of oppres-
sion and privilege. As a result, a deeper understanding of intersectionality leads to 
a more nuanced analysis of persons with impairment, one that renders generalisa-
tions about speaking with a collective voice in reclaiming humanness inadequate.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed how disability is constructed and how persons with 
impairments have been dehumanised in the process. By virtue of their dehu-
manisation, impaired people find themselves confronted with specific barriers 
that limit their access to, and participation and achievements in,  society – 
more specifically in the spheres of education and employment. It is against 
this background that critical voices seek to reclaim humanness for and restore 
dignity to all people, especially persons with impairments. The issue at stake, 
however, is whether or not the voices of those who seek to reclaim human-
ness, and of the persons with impairments themselves, are being listened to, 
are being heard and acted upon. Without addressing this point of contention, 
reclaiming humanness might not be without its challenges.
Intersection with other identities of power in a disablist society could also 
stifle the voices of persons with impairments, as not all of them are oppressed. 
Those in a privileged position do not have the same experiences of disa-
blement and oppression as the underprivileged. In addition, the epistemic 
location in which oppressed persons with impairments think and talk like 
the oppressor could also work against bringing humanness back to them. It 
is these counter-productive issues that should be addressed as a priority to 
push the struggles for humanness to its desired conclusion. Bringing to the 
fore the value of the body through corporeality and decoloniality, in terms of 
consciousness of agency expressed by persons with impairments themselves, 
and listening to the voices of those with lived experience of impairment, are 
some of the ways in which the humanness of persons with impairments can 
be reclaimed and they can be given the dignity due to them just as it is given 
to those without impairments.
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reative endeavours can provide a powerful means of reflecting, and 
reflecting on, human experience and can therefore extend our under-
standing of the human other. My feature-length screenplay When Granny 
Went on the Internet is a creative product which takes as its centre an ‘-ism’ 
that sits low on the radar of public comment or concern: ageism. The story 
revolves around Granny who, at 75 years of age and after the unexpected 
death of her husband, suddenly finds herself alone and unable to operate any 
twenty-first-century technology. I use the creative product of the screenplay 
to explore the link between technology, patriarchy and sexism, and the tra-
ditional alignment between technology and men, as well as the alignment 
between technology and youth. Granny, as an old woman, is an outsider to 
digital technology and her sons, believing they are acting in her best interests 
and are ‘protecting her from herself ’, attempt to gatekeep her access to such 
technology.
The relationship between gender and technology is not static, but evolves 
over time. Eugenia Siapera (2012, 181–82) describes both technology and 
gender as ‘moving targets, involved in a fluid relationship in which they 
co-constitute each other’, along with other influencing elements. I sense that 
new media such as the Internet provide an opportunity for the traditional 
alignment between technology, gender and age to be disrupted. Through my 
screenplay I explore the notion that new media may provide a portal through 
which definitions of self can be reconstructed: Granny’s story disrupts the 
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traditional alignment between technology, patriarchy, sexism and ageism 
described by Siapera, and re-imagines it.
INT. GRANNY’S BEDROOM – DAY
The harsh sound of an alarm clock heralds the start of the big day. Granny’s eyes 
snap open. She switches on the light and puts on her hearing aid. She tries to jump 
out of bed but ends up rocking back and forth on the edge before she can finally 
stand. She is chatting ten to the dozen.
GRANNY
Ho-kay! Let’s get the show on the road. Today is the day! Can you believe 
it! I want you to tell me which outfit is better for the ship.
She opens the cupboard and starts taking out one vividly bright outfit after 
another, tossing them behind her onto the bed.
GRANNY (CONT’D)
What do you think? This one OR . . . this one?
Grandad lies silently. Granny pauses and turns, holding another colourful outfit 
in her hands. She faces the bed and Grandad.
GRANNY (CONT’D)
Sweetheart?
Granny’s expression changes as she realises that something is not quite right. 
She goes over and shakes Grandad. No response. She shakes him harder. He lies 
motionless. Granny drops to her knees next to the bed. She places her hand on 
Grandad’s chest, but there is no breathing. She grabs for the phone next to the bed 
and dials furiously. It rings for a long time before someone answers.
*
This is an early scene from When Granny Went on the Internet, a feature-length 
screenplay I wrote about a 75-year-old grandmother who suddenly finds her-
self alone after the death of her husband. Through this screenplay, I explore 
what it means to be old, female, alone and out of step with the technolog-
ical world around you. The protagonist, Granny, has to find her feet again 
without the partner who ‘did it all’ for her. In the aftermath of her husband’s 
passing she learns how to use a computer and then the Internet, which leads 
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to a changed perception of herself and to renegotiated relationships with her 
two sons.
I chose the title of my screenplay before I had encountered the work of 
pioneering feminist writer Barbara McDonald. The title When Granny Went 
on the Internet speaks on various levels: first, hailing old women and fami-
lies as an important target audience through the use of the word ‘Granny’ 
(although they are not the only audience); second, positioning the screen-
play as a comedy and therefore as non-threatening; and third, as an agent 
provocateur asserting that old women have the right to engage with new 
media.
The dialogue in the screenplay includes use of the word ‘old’. The deci-
sion to refer to the protagonist as old, rather than with a euphemism such 
as ‘senior citizen’, or the more innocuous-sounding term ‘older woman’, 
was influenced by McDonald’s writings about identity and difference in 
old women (McDonald and Rich 1984). McDonald has been described 
as the first person to really draw attention to the fact that old women are 
ignored, excluded and rendered invisible in society (see Adams 2008). She 
identified society’s view that ‘old is ugly, old is powerless, old is the end and 
therefore … old is what no one could possibly want to be’ (McDonald and 
Rich 1984, 91). Her powerful and clear writing encouraged me to use the 
word ‘old’ deliberately, and to choose that the protagonist of my screenplay 
challenge the stereotype of the old woman as benign, non-productive and 
inconsequential. I hope that the screenplay will provide a form of advocacy 
for the right of old women to experiment with new media and to enjoy its 
affordances, such as easy access to information and connection with people 
who live far away.
Another view is that it is life stages, rather than age, that better predict 
engagement with and use of new media (Helsper 2010). I have deliberately 
tried to highlight the protagonist’s life stage of widowhood. The norms and 
conventions associated with Granny’s life stage of advanced age and wid-
owhood are clearly displayed by one of her sons, Aaron, when he tries to 
persuade her to move to a retirement centre. He believes she is old, unskilled, 
should not be trying anything new, and needs looking after. Josh, her other 
son, on the other hand, believes that Granny’s new life stage of widowhood is 
as good a time as any for her to try out new things. As such, Josh focuses more 
on Granny’s life stage than on her age.
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Through McDonald I came to understand that the identity of grand-
mother is a safe one for women to occupy, given that the role stereotypically 
emphasises the nurturing of the young and is seen as supportive, useful and 
non-threatening. The choice of name for the protagonist – ‘Granny’ – con-
jures up the stereotype of the benign, inconsequential individual whose uses 
do not extend much beyond child-minding. However, Granny does have a 
real name: Sylvia Human. I chose the name Sylvia for her as it provides a con-
nection to the phrase ‘Silver Surfers’ being used in the online press to describe 
old people using the Internet.1 Her surname – ‘Human’ – suggests that she is 
an ‘everywoman’ and her experiences and feelings reflect those of many other 
old people. As such, she is a mirror of the human condition.
However, McDonald also says that ‘age in our society also gives us a second 
opportunity … to move out of that safe harbour of acceptability’ (McDonald 
and Rich 1984, 2). The two sons, Aaron and Josh, represent these two 
positions − the safe harbour and the move away from it. I trade on the stereo-
type of the granny, and pull the audience in through the use of comedy, but 
ultimately I invert expectations since my protagonist does indeed move out of 
that ‘safe harbour of acceptability’ as she engages with new media and starts 
to create a new self.
Aaron and Josh represent two polarised views of old women that can be 
found in the broader society: on the one hand, the view that an old woman is at 
the end of her life and should not be disturbing the status quo – this is Aaron’s 
position – and, on the other, that an old woman still has much living to do – 
this is Josh’s eventual position (although it takes him a little while to reach it).
It is interesting to me that the basis of ageism might be the family. Lise Weil 
(2007) maintains that McDonald’s recognition of family as the source of age-
ism is one of her most significant contributions to feminist thought. Granny’s 
elder son, Aaron, is the one who displays ageism most clearly, having fixed 
and preconceived ideas about what is and is not appropriate for a woman 
of Granny’s age. Aaron personifies the conservative, restrictive voice of tra-
ditional roles and expectations. As such, he serves to hamper her activities, 
and Granny is always concerned about what he will say. McDonald points 
out that ‘the need in an ageist society to rely on children for acceptance … 
results in a profoundly unbalanced power relationship, in which the old 
woman must often bend to her children’s definition of herself ’ (McDonald 
and Rich 1984, 60).
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Aaron believes that as Granny is approaching the end of her life, she should 
not be starting anything new or engaging with anything of consequence. 
Expressing a desire to revive an old skill, in this case driving, is interpreted by 
Aaron as proof of his mother’s lack of judgement. Despite her grief and inse-
curities Granny is an independent woman at heart. She strives to maintain 
her independence and declares that she wants to start driving again, a notion 
that is met with resistance from her two sons, as in the following extract.
EXT. GARAGE – DAY
Granny enters the garage clutching car keys and a remote control. She surveys the 
old car uncertainly. She tries the car door. It is locked. She points the remote at the 
car and presses a button. The garage door starts to close behind her.
GRANNY
Woopsie.
She quickly presses the remote again and the garage door rises. She presses the remote 
and tries to open the car door again, but this time she triggers the car alarm, which 
begins to wail and screech. Josh and Aaron appear in the background. Josh rushes in 




Granny looks somewhat bewildered as he takes the keys and remote from her and 
stops the alarm. She composes herself, and after a moment she puts out her hand 
for the keys. Josh hands them over hesitantly.
JOSH (CONT’D)
Do you need to go somewhere, Ma? I’ll take you.
GRANNY
I’m just wondering what to do. I’m going to need to start driving again.
Josh processes this information and tries to choose his words carefully.
JOSH
Ma, do you really think that’s the best thing?
GRANNY
Why not? I’ve had my licence for 40 years.
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JOSH




Aaron won’t like it.
GRANNY
Oh, Aaron. He worries too much. One or two little accidents and he thinks 
I can’t cope.
*
For Granny, the car and being able to drive represent autonomy of move-
ment and choice. Much has been written about women and technology, and 
Julie Wosk’s work, Women and the Machine: Representations from the Spinning 
Wheel to the Electronic Age (2001), elucidates the link between technology, 
patriarchy and sexism. Following Wosk, I try to show in the scene above and 
throughout the screenplay how technology is aligned with gender and, fol-
lowing Siapera (2012), that technology is gendered as masculine. When issues 
of gender intersect with issues of age, as in Granny’s story, the exclusion-
ary aspects of technology are amplified, resulting in the scene above where 
Granny’s sons try to stop her from driving.
Later in the screenplay I suggest that, although technology has historically 
been perceived as gendered and masculine, new media such as the Internet 
provide the opportunity for such an alignment to be re-imagined. In order to 
convince her sons that she should continue living alone, and to prove that she 
can cope on her own, Granny learns how to go on the Internet.
The storyline suggests that acquiring digital technological expertise can lead 
to an expanded definition of self, and can empower the individual to break 
free of expectations related to their role in the family and in society. Thus, 
it offers a challenge to stereotypes about age and gender, and suggests that 
new media may provide a portal through which definitions of self can be 
re-imagined.
The person that Granny becomes can be understood as an example of a 
‘resistance identity’. The idea of resistance identities was formulated by 
Manuel Castells (1997), who describes them as ‘stigmatised identities that 
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seek recognition – identities that do not enjoy a high material and sym-
bolic status’ (Castells cited in Siapera 2012, 173–74). This is precisely what 
Granny’s experiences elucidate. An old woman online is not taken seriously. 
An old woman as a teacher of new technologies is oxymoronic, and yet this is 
indeed what Granny becomes in the end.
The script functions as a form of consciousness-raising and advocacy for old 
people to be included in new media, and for the younger generation to be the 
conduit that allows this to happen. However, a film must still work as a film, 
and so I have created a multilayered script that is, on the one hand, a comedy 
aimed at a family audience, and on the other, a serious social commentary 
which uses flips in tone to create provocative content for those who care to 
look beyond the surface humour. My reasons for choosing the subject matter 
for my screenplay stem mainly from considerations about my late mother 
who, at 88, with a hearing impairment and with Parkinson’s disease, found 
herself increasingly isolated from life around her – the plight of many an old 
person. At the same time, her independent spirit led her to search for ways 
to become mobile and autonomous, including expressing a desire to learn to 
drive, which led to alarm among her adult children, and a desire to learn how 
to use the Internet.
My interest in notions of digital insiders and outsiders is reflected in the 
character of Granny, and was partly inspired by my mother’s situation. The 
Internet, along with Skype, email and social networking sites, holds posi-
tive potential for old people to expand their virtual horizons at a time when 
their real world is shrinking. I therefore constructed the events of the plot 
by researching and considering the multiple opportunities provided by new 
media, especially the Internet. The comic storyline rests on a bed of both real-
ities and possibilities related to new media and their affordances, particularly 
in regard to how these apply to old women.
I was inspired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Clickworkers’ project, in which members of the public were invited 
to volunteer a few minutes or more to map and identify areas on the sur-
face of Mars, meaning that people without scientific knowledge could do 
this (Benkler 2006). Another intriguing NASA project is ‘Target Asteroids’, 
through which amateur astronomers are invited to discover and study 
near-earth objects (Benkler 2006). It struck me that such Internet-based 
initiatives provide the ideal opportunity for old, retired or immobile 
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persons to contribute to important projects and, in so doing, gain a sense of 
self-worth. This presupposes, however, that the old person has access to a con-
nected device, is reasonably new media-literate, has a support system to help 
them navigate online problems, and possesses a degree of self-confidence, 
all of which would enable them to take advantage of such opportunities. 
Without access, skills, assistance and confidence, the old person is an outsider 
to new media and the prospects they afford. Although I did not specifically 
include the Clickworkers’ project and Target Asteroids in the storyline of the 
screenplay, these initiatives and the issues they raise sparked my ideas.
At the outset of the story Granny is neither digital native nor digital immi-
grant, and is not located anywhere in the digital dimension. Initially she is 
not particularly interested in the Internet and is not bothered by her lack 
of techno know-how. If it were not for her younger son Josh’s insistence, 
she would happily continue with a life lived ‘unconnected’. I have extended 
Marc Prensky’s (2001) digital native hypothesis and invented the category 
of the ‘digital stateless’ to refer to those who are indifferent to or unaware of 
new media, and do not belong to either the category of digital native or that 
of digital immigrant. Granny embodies the digital stateless person. Aaron, 
her elder son, tries to ensure that she remain stateless in this sense. Josh, by 
contrast, believes that Granny has the potential to become an ‘immigrant’, as 
demonstrated in the following scenes which follow on from Granny’s money 
being stolen at an ATM.
*
INT. KITCHEN – DAY
Josh and Granny sit at the kitchen table having a cup of tea, the rain visible 
through the window behind them.
GRANNY
I feel bad about the money. Don’t tell Aaron.
JOSH
Ma, you have to be careful at ATMs. You can’t trust anyone to help you. 










He just looked so helpful. And I wasn’t really sure how to use the stupid 
machine. That woman showed me so quickly. Boom, boom, boom, just like 
that. It’s easier to go into the bank. Your father always used to go into the bank.
Granny starts to cry. Josh moves to comfort her. He puts his arm around her tenderly.
JOSH
It’s okay, Ma. I’ll show you. We’ll go over it step by step.
Josh sits in silence for a moment, thinking.
JOSH (CONT’D)
Actually, Ma, there is a way of avoiding the ATM altogether. Online bank-
ing. With the computer.
GRANNY
That’ll be even worse. You know I can’t use that thing.
JOSH
But I can show you. It’s much safer and it’s easy. You can do your banking 





INT. GRANNY’S STUDY – DAY
The camera follows a cable up to a laptop which rests on a desk in front of Granny 
and Josh.
JOSH
Okay. Now I’ve connected the mouse. I think it’ll be easier than using the 
trackpad.
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GRANNY
Maybe this is a mistake.
JOSH
Just trust me. You’ll like it once you know how. It’s easy, I promise.
Granny looks sceptical.
JOSH (CONT’D)
Okay. You switch it on at the side here.
The familiar sound of a computer booting up is heard.
JOSH (CONT’D)
I’ll use 3G because you haven’t got the Internet yet.
He puts a dongle into the side of the laptop. He points to an Internet icon on the 
desktop.
JOSH (CONT’D)
That is for the Internet. You just double left-click on it and …
GRANNY 
(Interrupting)
I don’t want to try this thing right now, Josh. It’s too much. And I’m tired. 
And I don’t understand it.
JOSH
That’s the beauty of it, Ma. You don’t have to understand it. You just do it. 
You just click.




Just click, man. Please.
Granny clicks her fingers and laughs at her own joke.
JOSH (CONT’D)
Come on, Ma, please man. Just click.
GRANNY
Oh, for heaven’s sake! Okay, here.




No, on the left button.
Granny tries again.
JOSH (CONT’D)
No, actually double click.
Granny gives him a withering look. She clicks twice, slowly.
JOSH (CONT’D)
No, fast like this (he takes the mouse). Click, click, fast.
Granny folds her arms, looking stubborn.
GRANNY
At my age I don’t do anything fast.
JOSH




Now you’re just being silly.
Granny sits with folded arms and raised eyebrows.
JOSH (CONT’D)
Okay. Well, you know what, I’ll just demonstrate and you watch. Then if 
you feel like it later you can try on your own. Okay, so you double click, 
fast, on this ‘I’ which stands for Internet. Then you type the word ‘cross-
word’ here and then you double click here, and there you go!
A crossword puzzle fills the screen. Granny perks up a bit and leans forward, try-
ing to disguise her interest. Josh looks pleased with himself.
*
After noticing the possibility of online shopping, Granny ultimately embarks 
on a journey of acquiring expertise and surprises everyone, including herself, 
with her ability to learn how to use the Internet. She gains confidence and 
discovers an aptitude she never knew she possessed, and starts to refer to her-
self as ‘a natural’. All of this is possible through her grandson Max’s help. He 
personifies Paul DiMaggio and Eszter Hargittai’s (2001) concept of a social 
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support network or system, and without his encouragement it is unlikely that 
Granny would have continued with her online journey and been able to trav-
erse the ‘digital divide’. Without support and help, old people are unlikely to 
enjoy the maximum affordances of new media.
Granny personifies the South African who is venturing online for the first 
time. She is an unthreatening figure with whom South African audiences can 
identify. The idea of outsiders and insiders to the Internet and new media 
has been conceptualised as a digital divide and much has been written about 
it (see Dan Schiller 2007). The divide is most often seen as a case of ‘infor-
mation haves and have-nots’ (Siapera 2012, 69). In unequal societies such 
as South Africa, it is easy to mistakenly conceive of the digital divide as a 
fault line between those who are rich and those who are poor. However, it 
is somewhat simplistic to envision the digital divide as merely a question of 
financial affordability. Furthermore, one cannot assume that once a person 
owns a connected device they are on the right side of the digital divide, or that 
if they are young they possess techno know-how. In the screenplay I present 
factors other than the overly deterministic conditions of age and class that 
have clouded early considerations about new media access and affordances, 
and show that stereotypes about where, how and by whom new media are 
used are not necessarily accurate.
Granny’s plight as a widow, her conflicts with family members, and her 
predicament as an outsider to digital technology are the primary features of 
her life that are likely to resonate with the audience. In addition, her initial 
reluctance to learn how to use the Internet, perhaps because she fears making 
a fool of herself, could be an experience with which many digital outsiders 
identify, irrespective of age, race or class. It is not uncommon to approach 
new technology with a degree of resistance and a lack of confidence, and it 
is not uncommon to make mistakes when using new technology. Yet, as the 
storyline charts Granny’s adventures online, it demonstrates that not even the 
formidable intersection of age, gender, race, middle-class financial status and 
lack of confidence can prevent her growing technological proficiency, and 
that it is possible to cross the so-called digital divide, or traverse the digital 
hierarchy, and become an insider to new media.
Current events, issues and theories concerning new media and the Internet 
provided me with multiple story opportunities, and they form the foundation 
of the action and the events of the plot of my screenplay. The screenplay rests 
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on a bed of both realities and possibilities related to new media and the affor-
dances of the Internet, particularly in how these apply to old women. News 
media often report on acts of hacking, and it was one such case that became a 
foundational idea for the screenplay. Some years ago I read a newspaper arti-
cle about a teenager who hacked into NASA and accidently moved a satellite.2 
The humour as well as the potential for disaster inherent in this act struck me 
as very powerful, and I used it as the trigger incident in my screenplay, the 
event that sets the plot in motion. There are many similar stories of hacking, 
including several cases of hacking the NASA website.3 There are also reports 
of numerous NASA mobile computing devices being lost or stolen, including 
one containing details of the algorithms used to control the International 
Space Station (BBC 2012). Based on this, the events of the plot are entirely 
plausible, and having ‘even’ a digital newcomer such as Granny capable of 
carrying out such a hack, albeit by accident, serves to highlight the fragile 
nature of NASA’s security. Furthermore, hacking, as opposed to cybercrime, 
might actually have positive spin-offs such as improving the security of the 
system being hacked. Thus, in the screenplay, the audience may actually be 
sympathetic towards Granny when she becomes involved, albeit unintention-
ally, in hacking.
For some hackers, their online exploits can be construed as a job inter-
view, if you will; an example is George Hotz, a teenage US hacker going 
by the hacker name GeoHot, who hacked the Apple iPhone and the Sony 
Playstation 3. Although he was sued by Sony, he subsequently worked for 
Facebook and Google.4 This is not unlike what happens to Granny in the 
screenplay, when the attention she gains through her accidental hacking leads 
to her landing a job teaching old people how to use the Internet.
There can be no doubt that Granny is asserting herself as mistress of her 
own life and, as such, is carving out a new identity for herself and a new 
relationship with her adult children. In Granny’s case the Internet provides 
her with the opportunity to act differently to how she performs in real life. 
Judith Butler’s (1993) writings introduce the concept of performativity, 
and the idea that we acquire our gender identities through repeating expected 
practices. Such gender performances are not limited to the real world and may 
take place via new media devices and activities, such as going online and 
entering the cyberworld. Granny’s experiments with the Internet result in her 
developing abilities hitherto unrelated to her concept of herself. She begins to 
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see herself in a new way. For example, she starts buying things online. In her 
life up until this point she was only able to go shopping if someone, usually 
Granddad, gave her a lift to the shops; and once there, he would moderate 
her choices. Her shopping excursions were thus mediated by his needs and 
presence. Shopping online, however, frees her from all of this. She ends up 
shopping whenever she wants, spending as much as she wants, and choosing 
anything she wants.
However, her emerging new identity is threatened in the following scene, 
which is the midpoint of the screenplay, when Aaron is helping her to install 
all the new computer equipment she has bought and suddenly realises that 
she has accidentally moved a satellite.
*
INT. GRANNY’S LOUNGE – DAY
Aaron busies himself installing the new computer. While he sorts through cables 
and connections Granny takes a break.
GRANNY
My feet are killing me. I’ve got to sit for a bit.
AARON
This guy saw you coming, Ma. You don’t need half this crap. Why don’t you 
just keep using the laptop Josh lent you?
GRANNY
Because it isn’t Josh’s laptop. He has to give it back soon. And I want 
my own.
AARON
What are you actually going to do with a computer anyway, Ma, I mean, at 
your age and everything?
GRANNY
I’ll have you know that I’m quite good at the computer. I’ve been using it 
for shopping and I need it now.
AARON




Not groceries. Other things. I’ll show you. It was delivered yesterday.
Granny goes off and quickly returns with a small package, a shoe box and a certif-
icate. Aaron looks on, bracing himself.
GRANNY (CONT’D)
Okay. Now, you’re not going to believe it but THIS (she holds a mouldy piece 
of toasted cheese aloft) actually does look like the Virgin Mary.
Gob-smacked, Aaron stares at the piece of mouldy toast that Granny holds out 
towards him.
AARON
Oh my God. How much did you pay for this?
GRANNY
It doesn’t matter. Because THESE were a bargain.
She pulls out a pair of platform shoes with plastic goldfish swimming in glitter in 
the soles. Chuckling to herself, she starts to put them on. Aaron splutters incoher-
ently. He notices the certificate, which Granny has placed on the floor while she 
changes her shoes. He picks it up and begins to read.
AARON




You bought a title? This can’t be real. For God’s sake Mom please, you can’t 
do this!
A tense silence descends instantly. Aaron does his utmost to remain calm. Granny 
feels assertive.
GRANNY
Why not? It makes me feel better.
AARON
For one thing, you’ve got to watch your money.
GRANNY
It wasn’t expensive. And I can handle my money just fine.
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AARON
It’s all just too much for me, Mom. I can’t keep up with you. Driving and 
accidents and computers and buying crap online.
Granny remains silent as they face off.
AARON (CONT’D)
Why can’t you just relax and take it easy?
GRANNY
You want me to just sit at home and do nothing? Just stop everything?
AARON
No. Just the online shopping and the bladdy driving. Just stop. Please. We 




There must be. That’s where you should go. They help you if you want to do 







Granny clicks her tongue and ignores Aaron. She picks up the newspaper. The 
front page article is something about a ‘Satellite Sleuth’. She sits for a moment 
contemplating the picture and headline. Aaron reluctantly returns to installing 
the computer, aggressively and noisily moving things around. Granny looks up.
GRANNY
This picture in the paper is just like the one I saw when I went inline. You 
know when I was helping Max with his project? I copied and pasted this 
exact picture for him. That’s a coincidence, hey?





Let’s have a look. (He reads from the newspaper.) ‘NASA system engineers 
believe they are up against a hacking genius. NASA confirmed today that 
the orbital path of the DAS 5 weather satellite was altered from a source. 
Authorities are baffled as to how their system, which features state-of- 
the-art security protocols, could have been breached. The hacker …’ 
(A BEAT)




INT. HOSPITAL – NIGHT (FLASHBACK) CONTINUOUS
A speeded-up flashback of the hospital scene shows Granny and Max working on 
the laptop, the NASA logo visible among the satellites on the screen.
INT. GRANNY’S LOUNGE – DAY (CONTINUOUS)
We screech back to real time while Aaron’s face registers the full spectrum of emo-
tions and expressions as the penny drops. He finally bursts out with:
AARON




No, I think you bladdy did!
GRANNY
Surely not. How is it possible?
AARON
If you go on the Internet, no, if YOU go on the Internet, anything’s bladdy 
possible! Besides, people are always hacking into NASA. Their security’s 
bladdy appalling.
Granny looks scared. She eventually answers.
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GRANNY
It says here they managed to put it back.




I didn’t do it.
AARON
I strongly suspect you did.
Aaron gets up and crosses to the boxes. He starts packing the computer away 
aggressively.
AARON
All this crap is going back. You moved a bladdy satellite. What the hell’s 
next??? You can’t have this. You mustn’t go online any more. And it’s ONline, 
not bladdy INline. You don’t know what you’re doing. You’re dangerous. It’s 
got to stop now before we get into big trouble.
GRANNY
No. I want the computer. I like it. I’m a natural.
Aaron kicks the boxes out of the way. Granny flinches. He grabs his car keys.
AARON
A natural? A natural? I’m going. I can’t take this any more. I have to process 
all of this. My mother moved a fucking satellite.
He storms out.
GRANNY (to herself)
It’s not like they couldn’t put it back.
Aaron is out of earshot, already at the front door. He screams back at her.
AARON (offstage)
And Max has to stay here tonight, I’m working late and there’s no one to 
look after him.




The scene above illustrates that the Internet has provided Granny with a por-
tal to a new self, manifested through her shopping online, on her own terms. 
Back in the real world Aaron tries to regain control over Granny, but it is too 
late. Her new independence has provided her with a surplus of self-confidence.
As the plot unfolds, the question is posed: once Granny has access to a 
connected computer and the ability to operate it, what difference will this 
make in her life? Will her access to the Internet only get her into trouble, as 
when she inadvertently hacks into NASA and accidentally moves a satellite, 
or can it provide her with something positive? Throughout the screenplay we 
see the affordances of new media in Granny’s life, some of which are quite 
unexpected, particularly the construction of a different self as she moves from 
the stereotypical ‘old person’ position of resisting new technology towards 
embracing it. Another affordance of her engagement with the computer is 
that it ultimately helps bring the family together, as they try to solve the 
predicament that Granny has got herself into. In this way I link the concept 
of the digital outsider, or the digital stateless person, to questions of new 
media affordances, and connect all of this to questions of identity and family 
relationships.
Granny’s journey is one that takes her across the digital spectrum and up 
the digital hierarchy as she traverses DiMaggio and Hargittai’s (2001) five 
dimensions of digital inequality. Factors other than the overly deterministic 
conditions of age and class are presented, and stereotypes about where, how 
and by whom new media are used are interrogated through the fabric of the 
story and the lives of the characters. Granny’s story disrupts the traditional 
alignment between technology, patriarchy and sexism, and re-imagines it.
The screenplay suggests that the modification of self can continue even into 
old age and, furthermore, that new media provide a means for this modifica-
tion to occur, the latter point also made by Donna Haraway (Haraway cited 
in Siapera 2012). Granny questions and changes not only who she is, but who 
she is in relation to new media, as she moves from epitomising the digital 
stateless to being a self-described new media ‘natural’.
The Internet allows us to move far beyond our neighbourhood and thus, 
as Manuel Castells points out, personal identity is ‘no longer limited or 
determined by the immediate socio-political context of values, requirements 
and expectations’ (Castells cited in Siapera 2012, 174–75). This manifests 
in the screenplay when Granny experiences immense online support for her 
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predicament, made possible when her grandson Max and his teacher set up a 
Facebook support group for her. This online support translates into validation 
of her new self: she comes to see that it is permissible to be an old woman 
who enjoys experimenting with new media, even if she makes a few mistakes 
along the way. The online support mediates and modifies the pressures from 
members of her immediate family who want her to conform to gender and 
age expectations. Thus, her reconstructed self is fostered and impacted upon 
by her online supporters, who are diverse and geographically dispersed.
A final significant affordance is revealed at the end of the screenplay, 
when we realise that Granny’s access to new media and her proficiency have 
landed her a fabulous job opportunity – teaching old people how to use the 
Internet. This in turn suggests that she can continue to live independently, 
and the major axis of conflict in the screenplay is thus resolved, albeit in an 
open-ended manner.
When Granny goes online she enters another reality and is free to be who she 
wants to be, unfettered by Aaron’s expectations. The nuances of this other side, 
or cyber side, of Granny are revealed to Aaron when he realises not only the 
havoc she has caused on the NASA website, but also that she has been looking 
at support group websites for the newly widowed. He begins to realise that his 
mother may be more than he thinks she is, or wishes she were, and that her 
children, himself included, may no longer be the centre of her universe or able 
to influence and control her. Granny’s changing identity has consequences for 
Aaron, and for his perception of himself as being in charge of her life. This is 
manifested in the dialogue between Granny and Josh in the scene where she 
wakes up from her nightmare about trying to put the satellite back in its correct 
position, after the concert where her Grandson Josh played the part of a satel-
lite, and tries to correct her misadventures on the NASA website.
*
JOSH
Ma, Aaron says you shouldn’t …
GRANNY (interrupting)
Fuck Aaron.
Aaron reels and Josh practically takes a step back at his mother’s use of the ‘f-’ 




A symbol I use in the screenplay is Granny’s hair colour. Later in the plot 
Granny meets Jack, a charming man who lives in the retirement home she 
visits, and decides to throw a party, before which she elects to colour her hair. 
The subtext of this episode is that she is attracted to Jack and wants to look 
‘nice’, in other words ‘young’. I played this part of the storyline for humour, 
having the hair colour turn out to be a bright pink, to add a subtext to the 
main plot critiquing age-modifying attempts by old women. McDonald 
(McDonald and Rich 1984) is critical of women who try to ‘pass’ as younger 
than they are, believing that this is a denial of self, and Ann E. Gerike states 
that hair dyeing ‘represents the attempt of aging people to “pass” as members 
of a group with greater power, privilege and prestige than that to which they 
belong’ (Gerike cited in Rosenthal 1990, 37). That Granny chooses to dye 
her hair illustrates that she has internalised some of the ageism that permeates 
our culture.
However, by the end of story, when Granny is released from prison (her 
NASA misadventure did not go unpunished), her hair has returned to its 
natural grey, symbolising that she is at peace with who she is and is becoming 
her authentic self. Women should be free to choose whether they want to 
colour their hair or not, but because of the association of coloured hair with 
sexual attractiveness and reproductive potential and, conversely, of grey hair 
with being past one’s physical prime, it is not difficult to understand why 
women would choose to conceal their grey hair. That Granny finally lets her 
hair return to its natural grey is physical proof of her internal growth. She is 
owning who she is, and is proud to be herself.
Through advertising and social interaction we are constantly surrounded 
by messages of what is age-appropriate and gender-appropriate, and the fact 
that the audience might laugh at Granny experimenting with products aimed 
at the youth market shows how ingrained these notions are. Other notions 
of this ilk are that ‘old people, especially women, should not drive’, ‘old peo-
ple should not live alone’, and ‘old people cannot handle new technology’. 
Throughout the screenplay I try to contest these popular notions, and at the 
end of the story Granny drives her own car to the location where she will 
be teaching other old people how to use the Internet. On arrival there she 
successfully performs a complicated parking manoeuvre. The fact that she is 
able to drive independently and teach others how to use the Internet shows 
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how much she has changed, and that she is mistress of her own life. Her 
‘age-inappropriate’ choices remain, in terms of her dress sense – she loves very 
bright dresses and high heels, and has no problem wearing a swimsuit − and 
are proof that she is resisting the suffocating, societally imposed prescriptions 
of image. She is doing it her way, regardless of what ‘people’ may think.
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BEING A MINEWORKER IN 





eing a black mineworker in South Africa is neither a racial nor a class 
question; it is a multifaceted experience, one that challenges the presently 
dominant interpretations of what it means to be a black mineworker. 
These interpretations, characterised as they are by a logic of exclusive, sin-
gular extrapolations, do not allow for a holistic approach to understanding 
the experiences of the mineworkers, that is, an approach that encompasses 
economic issues, class issues, politics, gender, race and sexuality. A num-
ber of critical analyses of what it means to be a black mineworker within a 
non-Western spatio-historical temporality such as South Africa are based on 
a Marxist political economy paradigm (Allen 1992, 2003; Crush et al. 1991; 
Jeeves 1985; Yudelman 1984). These analyses reduce the experience of being 
a black mineworker to that of entering the proletariat, as though blackness as 
a racial category were not a problematic dimension of the experiences of black 
mineworkers. This approach to the meaning of being a black mineworker 
obscures rather than reveals the multiple concrete experiences of black mine-
workers, as opposed to just mineworkers, within the present modern world in 
general and South Africa and the non-Western world in particular.
A second dominant paradigm underpinning analyses of what it means to 
be a black mineworker within a spatio-historical temporality such as South 
Africa is that of critical race theory (Magubane 2007; Pollard 1984), which 
reduces the experience of black mineworkers to a problem of identity politics. 
Thus, by privileging the question of identity over that of economic power 
relations, critical race theories, like many other cultural studies paradigms 
110
Decolonising the Human
such as gender-based or disability-oriented critical analyses, obscure rather 
than reveal the multifaceted nature of the experience of black mineworkers 
in South Africa.
The mineworker is disposable and dispensable (Magubane 2007), and 
lives and works in the shadow of death. In pursuing this course of reasoning, 
I deploy the epistemic method of ‘shifting the geography of reason’ in order to 
read the experience of mineworkers in South Africa from the locus of enuncia-
tion of the oppressed subject, within the scheme of a colonial power differential 
based on a hierarchy of humanity. This method allows me to speak with and 
from the perspective of black mineworkers − in this chapter, specifically black 
mineworkers in the Platinum Belt of South Africa − as opposed to speaking 
for and about them. I reach the conclusion that being a platinum mineworker 
in post-apartheid South Africa is a racially and market-determined identity 
of colonised subjectivity, one that that relegates the dominated subject (the 
black mineworker) to the realm of the subhuman. This chapter, therefore, 
transcends the limits of current dominant reductionist perspectives on what it 
means to be a black mineworker in South Africa.
THE HISTORY OF MINING IN SOUTH AFRICA
Commercial mining of minerals in South Africa started with colonialism; 
the first mining operations took place in Namaqualand in 1852, and were 
followed by the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in 1870 (MMSD 2002). 
The rise of capitalism saw the beginning of proletarianisation (or at least 
semi-proletarianisation) of the local populations due to land dispossession 
and forced removals; hence, many men were forced to sell their labour to 
the newly-formed mines as part of the migratory labour system (Worger 
1987). In these mines, black male mineworkers were housed in well-secured, 
single-sex compounds and their movement was restricted to limit interaction 
with the surrounding communities. The compounds resembled prison-like 
conditions, with many of these workers dying of work-related diseases such 
as silicosis (a disease which of course also affected white workers ) and star-
vation (Crush et al. 1991; Demissie 1998; James 1992; Worger 1987). The 
same system of black oppression in the diamond mines was transferred to the 
Witwatersrand goldfields in 1886, when black workers were sourced from 
various independent and colonised territories in southern Africa (Crush et al. 
1991; James 1992).
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From the time that the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, and 
throughout the apartheid era until 1979, labour laws in the country were 
based on colour distinctions. Black mineworkers were semi-slaves, and were 
not allowed to participate in any strike action; they had their own labour 
unions, but these were excluded from participation in bargaining processes. 
This situation was supported initially by the Industrial Conciliation Act 
No. 11 of 1924, the Wages Act No. 27 of 1925, the Mines, Works Amendment 
Act No. 25 of 1926 and the Labour Relations Act No. 28 of 1956. This entire 
legislative framework (as well as later legislation) was designed to protect the 
employment security of white workers, while black workers were employed 
as cheap labour, thereby reducing production costs, and were not allowed 
to hold even low-level supervisory positions as these were reserved for white 
workers (McBean 1978). Labour on the mines in South Africa continued 
to be sourced from neighbouring countries, notably Mozambique, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia (later Rhodesia) (Department of Labour 
2007; Jeeves 1985). The Witwatersrand Labour Organisation recruited most 
of the foreign workers. The work-induced death rate was high among mine-
workers (Harington et al. 2004), with an estimated 470 deaths for every 
100 000 mineworkers per year (this figure included white mineworkers).
The life of black mineworkers was a daily struggle for existence. They were 
paid sub-poverty wages to cover their own expenses only (to the exclusion of 
their dependents), on the assumption that the wages they earned were subsi-
dised by agricultural and other activities in their home areas. On arrival at the 
mine, they were often given loans or advance payments and this practice was 
repeated on an ongoing basis to maintain them in a state of perpetual debt, 
therefore trapping them in a relationship of never-ending dependency (Allen 
1992; Demissie 1998; Van Onselen 1976). For those who did not die on the 
mines, there were no pension funds for them when they retired, although 
they were given a small amount of money to take back to their rural homes. 
But according to Charles van Onselen (1976), the amount was too little, only 
enough to pay the transport costs to return to their countries of origin or their 
homelands. The majority of these mineworkers would suffer a life of poverty, 
and would soon die of the diseases acquired while working in the mines; 
some ended up committing suicide (Meel 2003). This misery arising from 
the employment relationship was reinforced by the misery of the compound. 
The compound housing system was out of reach for the spouses and children 
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of mineworkers, and it perpetuated a lonely existence. In addition, during 
incidents of illegal labour unrest on the mines, compounds were quickly con-
verted into actual prisons to inhibit and undermine the blossoming of such 
labour activity. At times, mineworkers’ strikes were subjected to brutal sup-
pression by the repressive apparatuses of the South African state (Allen 1992; 
James 1992; Worger 1987).
This brutal site of economic production by, and social reproduction of, black 
mineworkers remained in existence until the end of apartheid. Significant 
changes did arise during the reform era of apartheid in the late 1970s and 
1980s, at least with respect to the whittling away of the employment colour 
bar (because of the sheer demand for skilled labour on the mines) and the 
right to strike. Despite this, however, a combination of mine security forces 
and state repression was used to brutally suppress strikes by mineworkers dur-
ing a period of mine unrest that lasted from 1985 to 1987 (Moodie 2009, 
2013). During this time, surrogate forces were also planted among the mine-
workers by the mine management to divide their union along ethnic lines 
and, as a result, workers were killed in uprisings between rival ethnic groups 
(Moodie 2013).
Up until the end of apartheid, there is no doubt that the semi-proletarianised 
status of black mineworkers also entailed a condition of racial capitalism 
such that their rights as citizens and as workers were both denied. This is 
what Halisi (1999) called racial proletarianisation − a process whereby black 
mineworkers were denied their citizenship rights in the city, with the result 
that they were forced to live half their life in the city and half in the rural 
areas. But, even in post-apartheid South Africa, mining has been resistant to 
broader processes of decolonisation and democratisation which are, arguably, 
taking place nationally. This was also articulated by Cyril Ramaphosa, one of 
the beneficiaries of the government’s black economic empowerment policies 
(Phillips 2004; Ponte et al. 2007), who argued that the mining industry in 
South Africa today is resistant to change because black people are co-opted 
into the mining industry but they are not given influential positions that will 
allow them to initiate change (Desai 2014). In short, black people do not 
have control of the mining industry, and the industry still operates on an 
apartheid template. Black mineworkers, as ‘subjects’ – in the sense used, in 
another context, by Mahmood Mamdani (1996) – and as workers continue 
to be subjugated socially, economically and politically through the specific 
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form of proletarianisation that took place historically in South Africa, and 
which saw them dispossessed of land and forced to be workers on the mines 
as well as in factories and on farms (James 1992; Worger 1987). This systemic 
condition, a condition of colonisation in the zone of ontological non-being 
(Fanon 1967; Gordon 2005, 2007) remains today (Maldonado-Torres 2007). 
Since 1994, certain reforms have been implemented to rectify past injustices 
and imbalances, but there have also been changes indicative of more fully 
integrating the South African economy into global neoliberal restructur-
ing processes. Mineworkers are still not free to withdraw their labour, and 
when they do, they are usually subjected to coercive force from the state, as 
witnessed during the Marikana Massacre (Alexander et al. 2012; Bond and 
Mottiar 2013; Magaziner and Jacobs 2013; Ndebele 2013; Sorensen 2012).
Despite the non-existence of an employment colour bar, black South 
Africans have not made significant advances into managerial and supervi-
sory positions on the mines. The black workforce continues to be subjected 
to dangerous working conditions, with low pay and living in conditions 
of poverty, either in mine compounds or in informal settlements near the 
mines (Ndebele 2013; Sorensen 2012). For example, in Rustenburg, mine-
workers live in compounds and informal settlements around the town while 
new housing development sites are reserved for white mineworkers and the 
black middle classes (Macmillan 2012). What makes it more difficult for the 
mineworkers is that the majority of them are migrant workers from the rural 
areas of South Africa or from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho and 
Mozambique; these workers need to maintain two households with their 
wages (Bond 2013).
In addition, economic instability in the mining sector has led to new 
challenges; the industry has experienced major retrenchments, leading for 
example to a decrease in employment levels from 800 000 in 1987 to just 
over 400 000 in 2001 (Sorensen 2011). Statistics gathered in September 2018 
show a slight increase in the number of people employed in the mining indus-
try, from 457 290 in 2016 to 464 667 in 2018 (Minerals Council of South 
Africa 2018). A number of factors have increased production costs in min-
ing, such as the political uprisings of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the concomitant 
sharp rise in oil prices, the devaluation of the South African rand, and labour 
unrest. Lower-grade ore has also resulted in lower profits, mine closures and 
retrenchments (Sorensen 2011). Following the gold seam deeper underground 
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through tunnelling, ventilation and locomotives has also resulted in higher 
costs of production and lower profits, and in even more inhospitable working 
conditions for mineworkers (Diering 2000).
The events in Marikana in August 2012, when 34 mineworkers were shot 
dead by police officers, show that the challenges faced by mineworkers in 
the country are still far from over despite 25 years of democracy. The wildcat 
strikes by mineworkers in Marikana, and the discontent of mineworkers in 
the country in general (Ndebele 2013; Sorensen 2012) are manifestations of 
the experience of being a mineworker in South Africa. The Marikana incident 
can in large part be viewed as an anti-colonial rebellion and a struggle against 
continued imperialism (Jacobs 2013).
DECOLONIAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
A MINEWORKER IN SOUTH AFRICA
Decolonial theory helps us to understand the processes that created a 
black mineworker, as well as the social, political and structural conditions 
under which black mineworkers continue to exist. As defined by Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres (2007), decoloniality consists of a family of thoughts that 
identify coloniality as the main cause of the problems faced by those people 
who happened to be affected by the negative aspects of Euro-North American 
modernity. These problems have included mercantilism, the slave trade, 
imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, neocolonialism, underdevelopment, 
structural adjustment programmes and the current neoliberal coloniality of 
markets. Coloniality is defined as a global power structure cascading from 
the above-mentioned processes, but surviving the decolonisation project and 
continuing to underpin asymmetrical power relations between the Global 
North and the Global South and to sustain a racially hierarchised modern 
capitalist world order.
This section of the chapter posits that it is difficult to fully understand 
the predicament of black mineworkers today without delving deeper into 
historical, discursive and structural processes unleashed by Euro-North 
American-centric modernity on those epistemic sites, such as Africa, that 
were subject to the darker underside – the more negative aspects – of this 
modernity, such as colonial dispossession, displacements, forced proleteri-
anisation, peasantisation and impoverishment. It is within this context that 
the category of a worker named ‘mineworker’ emerged as a market-defined 
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identity. In this context, I approach South Africa as a neo-apartheid polity 
where mineworkers continue to exist as a category of the working poor, with 
no right to withhold their labour.
The specific entry point for this analysis is the concept of ‘coloniality of 
being’, as introduced by Maldonado-Torres (2007) and elaborated on by 
Walter Mignolo (2011). Coloniality of being is a concept that helps in 
understanding how blackness was produced by Euro-North American-centric 
modernity as a deficient and lacking subjectivity, one that was uncivilised and 
had less ontological density than white subjectivity, under whose tutelage it 
had to remain. Besides forced conversion to Christianity, manual labour was 
articulated as one of the means for civilising black people by drawing them 
into the evolving capitalist system as providers of cheap labour. But coloni-
ality of being also speaks to the dispensability of black life, as happened in 
Marikana in August 2012. From a decolonial perspective, the mining sector 
is understood as a site of hyper-exploitation of labour just like the plantation 
in the period of the slave trade, and the factory under industrial capitalism.
Colonialism has left its mark, and in many ways continues to structure, 
for instance, present-day cultures, labour relations, sexualities and knowledge 
production. Coloniality stands on three pillars: coloniality of knowledge, 
coloniality of power and coloniality of being. Decolonial theory is an attempt 
to challenge the coloniality of knowledge, or the dominance of so-called 
Northern theories. Coloniality of being raises critical questions about the 
humanity (or, more specifically, the inhuman condition) of colonial-type 
subjects (Maldonado-Torres 2007); as Ndlovu-Gatsheni states: ‘coloniality 
of being is a useful tool that helps analyse the [contemporary] realities of 
dehumanisation and depersonalisation of colonized Africans into damnés’ 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 8), or those living in the zone of non-being 
(Fanon 1967; Santos 2007). Coloniality of power, or the colonial matrix 
of power, entails global power structures which continue to reproduce and 
re-inscribe – on an international scale – colonial-type economies, cultures, 
political landscapes and social reproduction practices (Quijano 2000, 2007).
Decoloniality therefore helps us to unmask the challenges and problems cre-
ated by current Euro-North American modernity or civilisation. It is beyond 
doubt that the South African mining industry of today inherited the colonial 
template for managing its activities; it is a direct product of a brutal colonial 
and apartheid structure that produced the mineworker as a category of the 
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poor. There is therefore a need to decolonise the industry in order to imagine 
a future beyond modernity, one that will recover the lost ontological density 
of black mineworkers in the country. And decolonising it will not only lead 
the recovery of this lost ontological density, but will also be a starting point 
in the project of imagining a future society beyond the rhetoric of modernity. 
The current black political leadership in the country have become gatekeepers 
of the system created by the colonial and apartheid-era oppressors, and have in 
effect become worse oppressors of the very people who elected them into office. 
Thus there is also a need to decolonise the Westernised elites holding influential 
positions of power in the government and in the mining industry.
Frantz Fanon argued that black people are generally viewed as a prob-
lem, and they live in what he called the ‘zone of nonbeing’ (Gordon 2005, 
2007). Those who live in this zone have their humanity and their souls ques-
tioned, and their rights to satisfaction of their basic human needs are denied 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007). The globalisation of the political economy is still 
embedded in Western philosophy, which believes in the subalternisation of 
the world other, or the non-European world, and what is needed is a decolo-
nisation of this epistemic view (Grosfoguel 2007). Therefore, to understand 
the situation of mineworkers it is necessary to incorporate new research tech-
niques. W.E.B. Du Bois argued that to understand the oppressed people, 
particularly African subjects, within coloniality, the current conventional 
scientific methods were not helpful. Knowledge based on scientific investi-
gation did not provide answers to the question of race. Understanding the 
system that was oppressing them was the best way to achieve this (Du Bois 
[1903] 2008). Hence decolonial theory is deployed here to understand the 
system behind the oppression of black mineworkers. Deploying a decolonial 
critique of the mining sector will enable me to assess whether the dignity of 
the African mineworker has been recovered.
The so-called discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867 unleashed dev-
astating consequences for the black indigenous peoples in the region that 
became the Union of South Africa in 1910, and the aftermath is being felt 
even today. The process of proletarianisation, based on accumulation by dis-
possession, was a violent one, as it involved forced removals, expropriation 
of land and slavery-like conditions to satisfy the mining industry’s labour 
needs, with labour seen as a civilising process for the subjugated (Allen 1992; 
Magubane 2007; Worger 1987). Capitalism took a pronounced racial turn 
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when it reached Africa and other non-European lands, and black people bore 
the brunt of this racialised capitalism (Halisi 1999; Magubane 2007). As 
Magubane (2007, 180) argues: ‘Every settler in the colonies wants to own 
slaves and thus avoid manual work. The use of slaves in the process of coloni-
zation was a calculated strategy to ensure a captive labour force to reap high 
profits, on territory appropriated without regard to any rights of indigenous 
owners … The question of slavery became a crucial issue for the rising bour-
geois “civilization”.’ Cecil John Rhodes created a system of forced segregation 
on the Kimberley diamond mines, and this system was used over time as a 
crucial framework for social regulation on the mines and in the cities around 
South Africa (Allen 1992; Callinicos 1987).
In the South African mining industry, a mineworker can be fired at any time, 
and can be disciplined thoroughly for withdrawing their labour without the 
approval of their employer (Alexander et al. 2012). The abundant availability 
of potential mineworkers, and their possession of a widely available skill, make 
them ‘the dispensable other’ as described by Bernard Magubane in his book 
Race and the Construction of the Dispensable Other (2007). The dispensability of 
a mineworker’s life is evidenced by the events that took place at Marikana on 
16 August 2012, when 34 mineworkers were slain for withdrawing their labour 
and demanding higher wages (Alexander et al. 2012; Bond and Mottiar 2013; 
Magaziner and Jacobs 2013; Ndebele 2013; Sorensen 2012). Being a mineworker 
in the South African context, as I have shown above, has always meant being 
reduced to the category of the miserable working poor, with the mineworker 
both past and present being paid a wage that Magubane (1984) describes as a 
slave wage. Trapped in extreme poverty, mineworkers continue to live in beastly 
conditions in hostels and shacks, unable to free themselves from this misery.
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITION 
OF A BLACK MINEWORKER
In interviews, mineworkers on South African platinum mines recounted their 
varied experiences in the mining industry; despite these variations, the major-
ity of them gave similar accounts of poor working conditions and low wages.1 
Others articulated personal experiences of ill health, while a few lucky ones 
who had no experience of illness were concerned about their friends who had 
succumbed to diseases. They also pointed to the continued experiences of 




Sondela informal settlement is a mixture of Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) houses and shacks that make up the  housing infra-
structure of the settlement. It houses mineworkers from the mines around 
Rustenburg, the largest urban area in what is known as the Platinum 
Belt – an area of platinum mining in North West Province.2 Overcrowding 
in Sondela is common, as a result of high demand for accommodation there. 
The situation in the settlement clearly resembles Frantz Fanon’s description 
of a ‘Native city’ where people live on top of one another (Fanon 1967, 30). 
Around 15–20 people share a toilet and a tap for water in the RDP section 
of the settlement, while the shacks are devoid of any source of running water 
and electricity.
In fact, the Rustenburg Integrated Development Plan (IDP) for 2012–2017 
demonstrates that Sondela is not necessarily unique in the mining area 
(Rustenburg Local Municipality n.d.). According to this IDP, in 2011 21 per 
cent of the houses in the city of Rustenburg were informal or backyard shacks, 
while 16 per cent were in informal squatter camps. There were about 20 000 
RDP houses, 30 000 houses in informal settlements and 10 000 houses in 
newly developed areas that had neither waste management services nor san-
itation facilities. As a result, residents revealed that they eased themselves in 
bucket toilets and nearby bushes. The Rustenburg Local Municipality IDP 
Review Final Report for 2018−2019 indicates that there are 24 informal set-
tlements and 24 000 households in and around Rustenburg characterised 
by high levels of poverty and lack of security and shortage of housing; the 
total of backyard and informal units in Rustenburg numbers about 68 800 
(Rustenburg Local Municipality 2018−2019, 14).
In the poorer section of the informal settlement, it is easy to find vacant 
shacks to rent because most of the mineworkers, on receiving some income, 
quickly vacate them for relatively better accommodation in the RDP section. 
Besides the absence of sanitary facilities, the shacks are rat-infested. The pres-
ence of large numbers of stray dogs at the dumpsites poses a danger to the 
residents. Some residents maintain the rural practice of keeping livestock with 
them such as goats and sheep, which occasionally feed from the dumpsites as 
well. Sondela is also a hub for unemployed rural immigrants and retrenched 
mineworkers, who turn to the dumpsites to search for recyclable materials 
such as plastics, paper and metal objects that can be sold.
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Jabula Hostel
Jabula Hostel is located about 200 metres south of Sondela, and it houses 
more than 1 000 mineworkers from the Anglo Platinum Khuseleka Mine. 
Violence is common in this settlement, as witnessed during the platinum min-
ing strikes in early 2014. Such violence and strikes often spread to the nearby 
Sondela informal settlement, where foreign-owned shops mostly owned 
by Somali, Ethiopian and Chinese nationals are targeted. Attacks are also 
directed by members of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction 
Union (AMCU) at members of the rival union, the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), and often result in serious injuries and fatalities.3
This is unlike the housing situation for mineworkers during the period of 
official segregation under colonial rule and the apartheid era, when black 
mineworkers were housed in overcrowded compounds (Allen 1992; Van 
Onselen 1976; Worger 1987). At the Anglo Platinum Jabula Hostel, commu-
nal accommodation has been renovated and divided into tiny single rooms 
with room for only a small bed. Apparently mineworkers are free to own a 
television set and a fridge, but no cooking is allowed in the rooms (interview, 
Leketo, 18 August 2014; interview, Mzala, 18 August 2014). Contrary to the 
claim made by Andries Bezuidenhout and Sakhela Buhlungu (2011) that, in 
post-apartheid South Africa, mining compounds (or hostels) are exclusively 
for lowly-paid contract workers at Anglo Platinum, permanently employed 
mineworkers are the ones housed in the compounds, while contract workers 
seek accommodation in the informal settlements in and around Sondela.
The monthly rent for the housing units in Jabula Hostel is R1 000, and 
another R1 000 is paid for food in the dining hall. Those staying outside 
the hostel are entitled to a ‘living out allowance’ of R1 000 for accommoda-
tion and R1 000 for living expenses. Contract workers are entitled to similar 
allowances, although their payment is regulated by their labour broker who 
determines the terms of their remuneration. In effect, a hostel dweller, in 
terms of their monthly wage, earns R2 000 less than a non-hostel dweller. 
Nonetheless, the lower-paid contract workers who live in Sondela must some-
how ensure that the living out allowance, assuming they actually receive it 
in full, is sufficient for all purposes. Whether the allowance is sufficient to 
meet the needs of such workers is not a concern for management. This makes 
staying in the hostel more advantageous for the mineworkers, because they 
are closer to the mine and do not have to spend time cooking as they all eat 
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in the dining hall. Besides, there is more security and safety for them at the 
hostel than in Sondela.
Surprisingly, access of women, children and other visitors to the hostel is 
still tightly restricted. If a spouse intends to visit her mineworker husband, she 
has to make an application to the hostel manager so that alternative accom-
modation can be sought for the couple for a short period of time (usually four 
weeks). By virtue of the fact that mineworkers number in their thousands, 
many stay on this waiting list for long periods before they can secure alterna-
tive accommodation for themselves and their visiting wives. The frustration 
experienced by mineworkers who fail to have access to their spouses is a con-
cern for most of them. The branch chairperson of AMCU at Khuseleka Mine, 
Siphamandla Makhanya, who had a particular understanding of the role of 
Jabula Hostel and the state of housing for black mineworkers in the shacks 
around Sondela, provided a summary of all the problems of accommodation 
and living conditions experienced by the mineworkers:
Look at these shacks where they live, there is no electricity, no water and no sewage 
system but they [mineworkers] are the ones who extract this precious metal. Look 
at the hostels, if you go back to history these were designed purposefully to accom-
modate slaves, meaning they will stay ten of them in one room, and secondly they 
were not supposed to sleep with a woman because that was going to make him 
weak, unable to work the following morning and this is the case today with those 
hostels. (Interview, Siphamandla Makhanya, 20 August 2014)
What he claims clearly resonates with the thoughts of the black mineworkers 
interviewed. To a large extent, Makhanya’s viewpoint implies that black mine-
workers are treated as labour units used for extracting and accumulating surplus 
value. Even with rooms of their own in Jabula, they are still not permitted visits 
from women and are denied their sexual rights; ongoing struggles for these rights 
are still being waged by the union and the affected mineworkers.
In speaking about how living conditions determine the working conditions 
of the mineworkers, Makhanya is not trying to give analytical significance to 
the former. Rather, he is simply claiming that an examination of their living 
conditions probably speaks volumes about their working conditions (which 
I discuss below). Specifically, the low wages they receive make it difficult for 
them to find better accommodation of their own. Unlike in the past, when 
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hostel accommodation was free of charge, charges are now deducted from 
their wages; and yet some problems still exist and restrictions continue to be 
upheld. In the next section I discuss the presence of diseases on the mines, 
and how this has impacted on the mineworkers.
DISEASES, INJURIES AND COMPENSATION
Those interviewed for this research, including union leaders, stressed disease 
outbreaks and high death rates among mineworkers. This was also high-
lighted by the then minister of health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, on 19 June 
2014 in a parliamentary debate (Motsoaledi 2014). Silicosis and tuberculosis 
(TB) remain the biggest killers of mineworkers since colonial and apartheid 
times, as articulated by Allen (1992), Jeeves (1985), Van Onselen (1976) and 
many others. However, what is devastating is that the prevalence of silicosis is 
concealed by the mines as well as by the medical practitioners who diagnose 
and treat the mineworkers, in order to spare the employers from having to 
pay compensation to the families of dead mineworkers. Generally, mining 
companies are unwilling to pay for such ill health or death of mineworkers, 
as the law requires.
During an interview with the AMCU chairperson of education at Anglo 
Platinum Khuseleka Mine, Lazarus Khoza, on the prevalence of diseases 
among mineworkers, he had this to say: ‘Per day we have more than 300 
people who are sick … Most of these diseases they get them at work but some 
diseases are those gotten outside such as HIV and Aids, but these become 
serious because of the conditions underground’ (interview, Lazarus Khoza, 
3 September 2014). This statement by Mr Khoza is a gruesome revelation 
of how serious the question of health is among the mineworkers, and this of 
course threatens the viability of the mining industry as most of these diseases 
are acquired while working in the mines. The majority of the workers were 
reported to have spinal cord TB when they actually suffered from silicosis 
(interview, Siphamandla Makhanya, 20 August 2014).
Unlike the situation in previous years, when silicosis and TB killed black 
mineworkers together with white mineworkers (Allen 1992; Maloka 1996; 
Nicol and Leger 2011), today these diseases have become ‘a black man’s dis-
eases’, mainly because of reduced numbers of white underground mineworkers 
in the country. Accordingly, most white mineworkers at Anglo Platinum hold 
supervisory positions. One of the mineworkers, Nkulumo, revealed that blast 
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smoke kills more people than dust, because it is very poisonous (interview, 
Nkulumo, 17 August 2014). Unfortunately, black workers are coerced into 
going underground, even when the tunnels are still filled with smoke and dust.
Unfortunately, as reported by mineworkers in the interviews, the contracts 
of those who fell sick were often terminated without compensation. Ngqeleni 
lamented: ‘When you are sick the mine is losing because you are no longer 
productive’ (interview, Ngqeleni, 14 August 2014) The mine does not want 
to keep sick people on its payroll, and this is when the relationship between a 
mineworker and the mine becomes most tense. Another mineworker, Mzala 
equated the treatment of black mineworkers who fell sick at Anglo Platinum to 
a cow that stops giving milk to its owner (interview, Mzala, 14 August 2014).
Mine management sends the majority of mineworkers who are diagnosed 
with silicosis and TB home to die; those who seem fit can develop signs of sili-
cosis years after they have left the mine (for example, after retirement). Usually, 
when black mineworkers are no longer wanted by the mines, they will go back 
to their rural homelands where they will die in poverty, as Meel (2003) argues 
in his research on the suicide rate among former mineworkers. And yet due to 
fear of losing their jobs, the majority of mineworkers conceal their sicknesses:
When you are sick they will send you to hospital and you will be given medication 
there … some people hide their illness for fear of losing their jobs because once 
you became sick all the time the mine will say you have a bad record and they will 
eventually send you to the Medical Board, which will then send you home and 
this will be the end of you … Once you are gone the company will forget about 
you and you will get nothing. (Interview, Mfundo, 18 August 2014)
Hence, to remove all responsibility for the ill health of mineworkers, the mine 
reconstructs the health problem as emanating from outside the mine and 
therefore washes its hands clean of all guilt.
But, even if in fact these illnesses emanate from outside the work environ-
ment, the mine cannot disclaim all responsibility for them. Indeed, not all 
diseases arise through underground work, because some are acquired from 
where mineworkers stay, notably under the inhumane conditions in shack 
accommodation at Sondela informal settlement described earlier. Sondela is 
a key site of accommodation for mineworkers because the wages paid by the 
mine are inadequate to obtain decent accommodation.
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Similarly, many of the mineworkers who suffer injuries associated with min-
ing accidents are neglected, receiving limited or no compensation. Instead, 
blame is heaped on them for negligence and they are at times suspended or 
fired. According to mineworker Mkhonza, there is a need for the mine to 
make payment to a worker who is injured. Families of workers who die as a 
result of accidents are only paid if it can be proved that the accident was not 
in any way the fault of the worker (interview, Mkhonza, 15 August 2014). 
For example, if a mineworker is hit and injured by a rock, the mine always 
looks for minor issues that suggest worker guilt. They pose questions such as: 
when the rock fell, did the mineworker have his gloves on? Did the mine-
worker have good quality boots? Was he in overall good health? Any negative 
answer to these questions would suggest to the mine management that the 
worker should be held in some way accountable for the accident.
The strategy of shifting the blame to the victim ignores the dangers associated 
with the mining environment. It also seeks to promote the colonial mentality 
of denying any authentic humanity to black workers, and denying their capac-
ity to act in a reasonable manner underground. In this regard, the lives of black 
mineworkers can easily be sacrificed in the pursuit of mining profits.
The education chairperson of AMCU, Lazarus Khoza, thus emphasises 
a racial dimension to accidents and deaths at Anglo Platinum. In his view, 
white fatalities are unheard of. When asked about the life of a black mine-
worker in the mining industry, Khoza expressed the following view: ‘I would 
say it’s a very difficult life because a black person is still working under very 
difficult conditions, and we have many fatalities that lead to death. Ever since 
in my time here I have never seen a white person who has died because of 
accidents; only black mineworkers do. Black people are the ones working very 
hard extracting this platinum, the conditions are very dangerous’ (interview, 
Lazarus Khoza, 3 September 2014).
Thus, accidents, diseases, injury and death are the lived reality of black 
mineworkers. These, combined with other diseases such as HIV and Aids, 
mean that the health and safety of black mineworkers are currently severely 
compromised. This also leads to many social problems outside the mines, 
such as grinding poverty and the presence of numerous orphans in black 
communities such as Sondela.
According to another mineworker, David, the system of payment for injured 
and dead mineworkers has been complicated by the agreements accepted by 
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the previous union (NUM), which mostly connived with mine management. 
According to him, NUM ensured that the families of dead mineworkers were 
not paid any money due to these mineworkers, including their pensions, so 
that the money could be shared between NUM representatives and some 
corrupt mine managers. He said this was also the case with respect to diseases:
When you are sick, this is the time when the mine dumps you, here they 
want people who are healthy, even if you have worked for more than 20 years 
for the mine without having health problems, but the day you will get sick 
everything changes. This is the time Anglo wants you out of their premises. 
What they will do is to send you to the hospital and doctors will recommend 
you unfit, then you are sent back home and you are given only R4 000 and 
that’s all. (Interview, David, 17 August 2014)
Based on interviews with mineworkers, there appear to be different under-
standings of the time period that should elapse before a worker starts receiving 
compensation payments while recovering at home or in hospital during an 
illness, insofar as compensation is received. The variance in the interviewees’ 
understanding of this issue might have arisen because many of them had 
never had the experience of being sent home as a result of ill health; but, for 
those who had, it took from two to five months for the worker to access the 
money, which was usually paid in instalments.
CONCLUSION
The mining industry in South Africa needs to be understood in the context 
of coloniality, as it continues to function on an apartheid template with race 
in large part structuring social relationships and social status on the mines. It 
is an industry that remains resistant to change, and thus a decolonial critique 
of it becomes fundamental not only analytically but ultimately for transform-
ing the industry to the benefit of black mineworkers. The AMCU branch 
chairperson, Siphamandla Makhanya, speaks about ‘the living and housing 
conditions of mineworkers reflect[ing] their working conditions underground’ 
(interview, Siphamandla Makhanya, 20 August 2014). This statement is 
important in the sense that it highlights the conditions of existence and expe-
riences of black mineworkers both inside and outside the work environment. 
These conditions, as this chapter highlights with specific reference to the case 
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study of a mine in the Platinum Belt, are marked by poverty, frustration and 
indignity – as indicated in relation to daily work activities, wages, hostel and 
informal settlement accommodation, and health and safety. The question of 
dignity is particularly crucial, because coloniality of being is a condition in 
which people are stripped of their human dignity and their very human-
ity is questioned. By extension, mineworkers need decent accommodation 
and social protection against unhealthy and unsafe work conditions. This is 
what black mineworkers are saying, and I have sought to give voice to their 
far-reaching concerns in this chapter. But, within the mining industry itself, 
their voices are rarely heard unless they engage in overt struggles around their 
demands. In line with the coloniality of knowledge, black mineworkers are 
treated by the mines (and by government) as unworthy of being heard, as if 
their thoughts are not sufficiently rational and reasonable. All this reflects the 
enduring prevalence of the coloniality of power in the mining industry in 
post-apartheid South Africa.
NOTES
 1 The mineworkers quoted in this section of the chapter were interviewed for a broader 
research project I undertook from 2013 to 2016. Pseudonyms were used to protect the 
identities of the interviewees, with the exception of AMCU union representatives who 
agreed to be identified by their full names.
 2 The Platinum Belt is located in what is called the Bushveld Igneous Complex (BIC), 
which harbours the largest platinum reserves in the world. The BIC is so vast that it 
covers several heavily populated urban centres such as Rustenburg, Polokwane and 
Pretoria (Davenport 2013). The North West Province, in which the Platinum Belt is 
located, produces 65 per cent of South Africa’s platinum as well as 35 per cent of its 
chrome (Davenport 2013; Manson 2013).
 3 See for example reports of such attacks published in the Mail & Guardian (19 
September 2012), Drum (22 May 2014) and News24 (3 May 2014). AMCU has been the 
dominant union in the Platinum Belt since 2014, taking over from the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM), which was the dominant union there for many years. Soon 
after the Marikana massacre that saw 34 mineworkers gunned down by police officers 
in August 2012, NUM lost its majority of the workers on the mine, who defected to 
the rival AMCU because they felt that NUM was siding with the employers and that 
mineworkers had been reduced to a life of poverty under its leadership (Bond 2013; 
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f the human is a given, then the human exists in the world. In a sense, 
the human is inseparable from humanity; for there to be humanity there 
must be life. However, the mutual standing of the human and humanity 
has allowed an ontologically absurd separation, one that suggests the human 
can exist without humanity. The conception of the human has to do with 
certainty about, and mastery of, the ways of life of the human who is a sub-
ject in an antiblack world, that is, a white human. The subject that is fully 
embodied, the full subject as opposed to the figure of lacks and deficits, is one 
that is in control of its existence. The subject is, therefore, the transcendental 
and free agent of its own making.
First, it is important to ask: what is the subject in relation to the human 
question? Why pose the question of the human now? What does it mean to 
think of the human? Is it that the human and the subject are the same? Or, 
put simply, what is the human in the matrix of power relations? It is impor-
tant to claim, in relation to these questions, that the human has a relational 
capacity to the world. There are institutions, structures and reality as such, 
the reality of the antiblack world, that support the human. The formation 
of the subject and its constitution is not the preoccupation here; rather, the 
human question will be pursued, through a critique of the subject. The silent 
scandal – the non-human, the slave, in relation to the subject – is what fore-
grounds this meditation.
What is understood to be the human has nothing to do with the slave. 
The human and the non-human, as ontological axes structurally imposed by 
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antiblack racism, provide a clear determination of who lives and who must 
die. The slave exists in the realm of non-existence. Therefore, this existence 
is not a meaningful one, but one of humanity called into question. What 
emerges then is the question of the non-human. What does it mean to think 
from the positionality of the non-human? The subject is incompatible with 
the existence of the slave. The question that preoccupies the slave has to do 
with being prefigured as non-human – it is the question of life and death, 
of knowing that it is possible to be killed at any time, without any form 
of accounting being required. The burden of life assigns a different weight 
to the human (the subject) and the non-human (the slave). It is this onto-
logical axis that I will deal with in this chapter, drawing on an episode that 
Frederick Douglass ([1845] 1995) recounts, in his Narrative of the Life of 
Frederick Douglass, about his aunt (named Aunt Hester) being whipped by 
the slaveholder Captain Anthony. It is not the cruelty of this episode that is 
my preoccupation, but the understanding of the mechanics of dehumanisa-
tion that leads to the invention of the flesh, where the non-existence of the 
slave is affixed to absolute ontological destruction.
At stake here is the politics of the slave, the figure who is denied any form 
of being. The life and death of Aunt Hester, as immortalised by Douglass, are 
dependent on the will of her master, Captain Anthony, who is human after 
all, and has the prerogative to lord over her existence because she is the slave, 
his possession, his property, his thing – that is, nothing human. The way of 
seeing through the eyes of the subject is not the perspective of the slave, but 
rather, of the subject imposing the world onto the other – the world that 
crushes the existence of the slave as the non-human who has no place in the 
world. The construction of the coherent embodiment of existence has to do 
with the subject, and the human question revolves around making the world 
a better place − and this better place means glossing over the question of 
enslavement.
Clearly, the question of life as primal falls within the realm of a discursive 
code that does not pertain to the slave. Thus, the subject will render it absurd 
to extend its ontological privileges to that which is not human. The slave as 
the figure of the impossible is structurally positioned outside the subject. It is 
outside the capacity to acquire – what can Aunt Hester acquire that will free 
her from the brutality of her master? The affirmation of the constituent sub-
ject has a place in things human, and it is the inscription of antiblackness that 
132
Decolonising the Human
instils the discursive code which fixes the binary of who is human and who is 
non-human. It is this discursive code that belongs to Aunt Hester’s master, as 
its definer and chronicler.
The subject acquires the package of existence from the discursive code, 
while conversely it extracts life from the slave. The merciless whipping of 
Aunt Hester that Douglass describes attests to this, and she has no structure 
of power, no world, to stand upon as there is nothing that gives validity to 
her existence. She cannot acquire anything that is deemed important for the 
human. She does not own her own life. The symbolic practices that have to 
do with life are for subjects, and they are constituted in the structure of white 
power. The constitutive subject sees itself as an individual in the world, and 
also as the subject of self-mastery. The subject is not reducible to the sym-
bolic order, as it is the subject that creates this order. In other words, there 
is mutual reinforcement between the subject and the symbolic order. If both 
the subject and the symbolic order are in favour of dehumanisation, then the 
brutalisation of Aunt Hester will not call for any moral response or any form 
of sanction. The subject creates the world, structuring it through violence and 
making sense of reality through control and possession of the other. The pos-
session of Aunt Hester by Captain Anthony reveals how the slave is compelled 
to see herself as that which is unseen and non-existent as human.
Taking Aunt Hester’s flesh as the point of departure, my aim here is to 
wrestle with the question of the flesh, and to dwell on the modalities of its 
inscription. It is only the will of the master that determines the degree of 
dehumanisation of the slave. It is clear that no ethical and moral codes can 
come to Aunt Hester’s defence, or exempt her from the structure of reality. 
The lashes that are directed at Aunt Hester’s flesh can only be started, con-
tinued and stopped by Captain Anthony, and not by the posing of ethical 
questions about the human. By virtue of his whipping of her, he is exempted 
from responsibility in the ethical realm because these are his ethics, and the 
antiblack world protects him. Thus, he is whipping the slave – that is, noth-
ing is being whipped. There is no violation of the human. No violation at all. 
For the slave is the thing that cannot be violated. The suspension of ethics 
is what Captain Anthony enacts, and thus he confirms that Aunt Hester is 
nothing but flesh. Indeed, what is whipped is the flesh and not the human 
being. What, then, does it mean to be abstracted and structured as nothing 
but flesh?
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Aunt Hester is structured by Captain Anthony’s will as the master sub-
ject. His absolute truth is to be obeyed by Aunt Hester – she should not 
do what the master does not want. Her whipping is indicative of the fact 
that Captain Anthony’s ‘Word’ should be obeyed at all times. At no point 
should there be a contravention. It is this Word – the absolute truth − that 
Aunt Hester happened to contravene. His encounter with the scene causes 
Douglass to vividly describe ‘the blood-stained gate’ (Douglass [1845] 
1995, 5), which is not a metaphor but the real picture of slavery. To enter 
through this gate is what Douglass equates with hell. Even if that blood 
can be wiped off or cleaned afterwards to leave the gate spotless, blood 
will always be there. The sadistic drive of the whip serves as the impulse of 
the visual orgy – the blood must be there – a spectacle, a scopic discipline 
imposed on those who witness it – everlasting, haunting. Captain Anthony’s 
sadistic drive engraves marks on the flesh through the merciless lashes of the 
whip; the bleeding that results from it and the intensification of the whip-
ping are pleasurable in that nothing can stop the whipping. It is the drive, 
the overdrive, the deadly drive.
Hortense Spillers (2003, 21) evokes what she calls ‘the hieroglyphics of the 
flesh’ in order to account for Aunt Hester’s sadistic brutalisation as a result of 
her contravention of the master’s Word. Anthony Farley (2005, 223) writes: 
‘The mark must be made on the flesh because that is where we start from.’ It 
is the flesh that determines difference, human hierarchy, and reveals, in the 
account of Aunt Hester’s whipping, how she cannot be treated as a human 
being. Within this context, Alexander Weheliye (2014, 32) calls upon us to 
‘understand the workings of the flesh’. This is underpinned by Spillers’s rev-
elation of the flesh as the site to be violated at will. There is no recourse to 
its irreparability, but the continuation of terror exercised upon it through 
‘prescribed internecine degradation’ (Weheliye 2014, 66 emphasis in the orig-
inal). For Spillers, the markings of the flesh signify the entity that is written in 
blood, and a scene of radical expulsion that shows the nakedness of dehuman-
isation. It is misrecognition and disregard; the whipping by the master as the 
hieroglyphics of the flesh, the whip being the writing instrument upon the 
surface that is the flesh, and the ink being the blood that comes from ceaseless 
lashes marked upon Aunt Hester’s flesh. What then emerges is that the body 
ceases to be such. It becomes non-corporeal, it becomes property. It can be 
itemised, catalogued, tagged, indexed, classified, ordered, priced, exchanged, 
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replaced, sold, dispatched, liquidated, expunged, and undergo whatever else 
can be done to a thing. Through capture, birth, inheritance and transaction, 
the slave is the property of the master. The flesh, according to Spillers (2003), 
is the entity that stands as evidence against the high crimes committed against 
it. The flesh is the witness. Alas, there is no juridical structure that can listen 
to its testimony.
The subject is the human, and a thing is not human. In other words, to 
do violence to the subject is not equivalent to doing violence to a thing. The 
subject can be accounted for because it has ontological weight as the figure of 
the human. In the event of death, the subject dies and there is mourning that 
follows. There cannot be mourning for a thing, as it has never existed. The 
ontological difference remains stark, and this shows the different lived experi-
ence of those who dehumanise and those who are dehumanised. The birth of 
the subject is possible in the realm of the human, and this is the subject that 
possesses humanity – that is, humanity is born. Things are not born; they are 
invented (in this case it is violent invention as absolute destruction, as that is 
what dehumanisation is). Things are outside humanity as such.
Achille Mbembe’s (2001) conception of the subject is tied to its subjection. 
Both are in close physical contact and violence becomes, as Mbembe (2001, 
174) notes, ‘a labyrinth of forces at work’. This violence, Mbembe insists, is 
saturated in structures and institutions.
The slave is not a usable human, but the object of value – the value accumu-
lated by the master; the slave is nothing in the domain of being human. The 
exterior of the human is what the slave is – nothing. The master determines 
the fate of the slave, and this is not in the realm of choice. The slave does not 
know what satisfies the master, even if the slave thinks they do, as their fate is 
contingent upon knowing that they will die under the brutality of the master 
anyway. The life of the slave is that of the master. Having no value on their 
own, and having value in terms of their overuse and misuse, deprivation and 
degradation, shame and humiliation, dehumanisation and death, the slave 
has nothing that counts as human. The slave, Mbembe insists, is deemed by 
the master to have no reason and transcendence to aspire to. The value of the 
slave lies in being a tool of the master, a thing and nothing at the ontological 
level. Mbembe writes: ‘The “thing” – and, by extension, others, the Other – 
can be made mine. In this sense, I have ownership of it; I possess it. It can be 
absorbed in, and by, my I. I can submit by myself. I can realize myself at its 
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expense. Thus I create myself as a free, autonomous individual in a class of my 
own: as a subject’ (Mbembe 2001, 191 emphasis in the original).
This is the ‘objective thought’ of the master subject, the human in their own 
right, the individual who relates to the world, their world – the figure who 
lords over everything that is there in the world. The master subject is the ‘I’ 
whose objective thought not only justifies himself as human but himself as 
lord – the individual as the transcendental subject. His existence is that of I 
for I; it denies the existence of the other by creating I and Other wherein dehu-
manisation and death are rendered possible. The ontological justification of 
the ‘I’ is the master himself, who claims not to need any form of justification 
because he is justification in himself. The master subject owns a thing that 
he lords over, the thing is his by virtue of his own justification. This excess of 
justification is nothing but narcissism. The master subject sees the world from 
his ‘objective thought’. His thought is not only definitive, it is absolute truth. 
Everything that has to do with reality and existence rests with the master 
himself. Narcissism creates the possibility of boundlessness; everything dwells 
in the ‘objective thought’ of the definer and chronicler of objective truth. It 
thus remains a dubious fact – that is, the master is the absolute truth and the 
slave, as a thing, signifies a lie.
If Aunt Hester’s flesh is to be located in this violence, what emerges is the 
collapse of the narrative that seeks to narrate it. It is the spirit of violence that 
haunts Aunt Hester’s flesh. She is violated because the spirit of violence signi-
fies her to be vulnerable to violence – or, the spirit of violence annihilates her 
as her flesh is incarcerated. This not only occurs at the level of possession, but 
also through Aunt Hester not being allowed to be on her own. She is violated 
by the structure that makes Captain Anthony her master, the institution that 
makes her the flesh that is commanded by Captain Anthony’s will. The spirit 
of violence is directed to its referent – Aunt Hester’s flesh. What haunts this 
flesh is the sadistic drive, its impulses, its excess and its fulfilment of perverted 
fantasies. Why would there be an acute narrative to give an account of such 
madness?
Douglass provides the narration, but he still has no narrative, and no gram-
mar to account for the violence that befell Aunt Hester. Even though he gives 
a vivid explanation, it does not capture the extent or excess of the violence 
enacted against that which is nothing. For Douglass, Aunt Hester is the sub-
ject qua human and not a thing. By giving an elegant description of her as 
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a woman of note, the spirit of violence that unmakes her as such and makes 
her as a thing becomes interesting. What would the narration have been like 
if Douglass had given the account of Aunt Hester through the register of 
Mbembe’s ontological question – ‘But what does it mean to do violence to 
what is nothing?’ Clearly, what is fundamental here is not simply the vio-
lence, but its sadistic proportion, its arbitrariness, its inescapably firm grip, 
one that mutes the language that seeks to narrate it, blinds the eye that seeks 
to see it, deafens the faculty of hearing. This violence is the spirit: it is not 
the human spirit, it is the spirit of human suspension, of dehumanisation. 
To see Aunt Hester is not to see the human. Thus, her violation is that of a 
thing – that is, nothing is violated, there is no violence. Spillers (2003) shows 
how the inscription of the slave is nothing but violence – the topology and 
topography of terror – the abstraction of the body from its form, which then 
results in ontological erasure. The flesh signifies ‘an empty vessel, a commod-
ity, an unsuffering property’ (McKittrick 2006, 70). It is clear that this is not 
the body of the human. Aunt Hester’s body is relegated to what Katherine 
McKittrick (2006) calls the ‘ungeographic’, as it belongs nowhere but to the 
master. It is the body that has no interiority or corporeality – the abstracted 
and extracted entity – the flesh.
The analytics of the flesh are necessary, if not fundamental, to an under-
standing of Aunt Hester’s flesh. The flesh is the site upon which violence is 
exercised and where it makes its marks visible. Spillers (2003, 21) amplifies 
the point thus, by referring to ‘slavery’s technologies through marking, [that] 
also … suggest that “beyond” the violating hand that laid on the stigmata of 
a recognition that was misrecognition, or the regard that was disregard, there 
was a semiosis of procedure that had enabled such a moment in the first place’.
The flesh as the analytic serves as the perspective through which Aunt Hester 
is looked at. As the slave, she lives the life that is not life − a void, a delirium, 
and nothingness. She finds herself there, and this is the life that is determined 
by Captain Anthony – the master in the capacity qua master. Aunt Hester’s 
life and death rest in his hands; he can let her live and he can kill her in the 
way he deems fit. To be the master is to possess that which is nothing, to do 
whatever to it and to practise any form of what Saidiya Hartman (1997) terms 
‘terror making’, which is the operating logic of the power vested in the mas-
ter by himself and for himself. Slaves are structured by what Calvin Warren 
(2018) registers as ‘ontological terror’, which, in essence, is what haunts Aunt 
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Hester’s existence. Ontological terror, by way of extending Hartman’s ‘terror 
making’, is the infrastructure that is designed and maintained to discipline 
slaves who are reduced to mere flesh rather than beings with bodies, minds 
and souls. It is the nothingness of blacks that renders them reducible to noth-
ing but flesh.
The flesh, according to Hartman (1997, 3), signifies the ‘slave’s ravaged 
body … the spectacular character of black suffering’. Hartman opens her 
text with Aunt Hester’s brutal whipping and thereby punctuates the fact that 
to be enslaved is to be subjected to ‘despotic terror’. If there is to be subject 
formation, this materialises for the slave as destruction, suppression, erasure, 
and the slave being nothing but the flesh. For Hartman, to reproduce the 
brutal account of Aunt Hester can be anaesthetising, and the narratives that 
reproduce it will go to the banal extent of rendering the pain as the thing 
to be transcended. Christina Sharpe (2010, 2) amplifies this argument thus: 
‘The anxiety that Hartman and others articulate around repeating this scene 
inheres in the awful configurations of power, desire, pleasure, and domina-
tion to be found not only in the original scene, but also in its transmission, 
transformation, and renewal, to which we in the present are equally inured. 
Reproducing black pain as that which is shocking and horrible, for Hartman, 
can create a routinised display of terror (which will then not be terror due to 
anesthetisation at work).’
By offering an alternative reading to Hartman’s, Fred Moten (2003) asserts 
that the object has the capacity to resist. If such an object means the slave, 
for Moten slaves can resist what dehumanises them and reduces them to 
flesh. For Hartman, the slave is caught in the scene of subjection, whereas 
for Moten it is in the scene of objection. For Moten, Aunt Hester is an object 
that engages in the objection to its whipping – Captain Anthony’s whip is 
resisted. While Hartman moves away from Douglass’s ‘primal scene’, Moten 
focuses on it so that the crux of his intervention is the reanimation of Aunt 
Hester’s whipping, but with a more rigorous focus on its sonic dimension. 
The primal scene, for Moten, cannot be avoided since such a move is illu-
sory. Therefore, the primal scene should be reproduced. Moten also insists 
that in the recounting of the primal scene there is a particular function of 
the aesthetic signature that comes through Aunt Hester’s scream. What Aunt 
Hester possesses, through her scream, is the ‘phonic materiality’ which, for 
Moten, is the amalgamation of blackness and sound. It is in her scream that 
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Moten registers both the performance of blackness and that of humanity. In 
fact, Moten insists on performance as the very nodal point of resistance. The 
content of Aunt Hester’s scream, for Moten (2017, ix), is ‘an alternative to 
representation’.
More fundamentally, however, the opposition of these possibilities faces a 
deadlock with Aunt Hester’s flesh. The contentiousness of the primal scene 
seems to clearly suggest different registers. On the one hand, Moten insists on 
the primal scene and its radical breakdown because of the capacity of the slave 
to resist, or to exist. On the other hand, Hartman refuses the preoccupation 
with the primal scene for the very fact of it being available for reproduction 
that leads to its anaesthetisation. Hartman goes straight to the analytics of the 
flesh and the violent inscriptions that the flesh is subjected to. If performa-
tivity is to be taken as the last word, perhaps it is important to highlight 
the following: for Moten there is a possibility of a ‘freedom drive’ – the rad-
ical force that constitutes the making of the human as such. For Hartman, 
performativity is not the possibility but the non-recognition of Aunt Hester’s 
humanity. It is looking for the ways in which violence veils itself – that is, ‘the 
extreme and paradoxical condition of slavery, often mistaken for nonsense or 
joy’ (Hartman 1997, 35). Moten (2017) argues that black performance resides 
where the language of ontology gets exhausted. The objects that can, do resist – 
or, more to the later corrective that Moten installs, performance is marked as 
the resistance of the object and the object engages in the remaking that will 
make it not be an object again. As Farley (2005, 239) amplifies: ‘The slave is 
trained to enjoy being taken for an object. The master’s will is the slave’s desire.’ 
This is sadistic; the master extracts at the level of excess to create the nothingness 
of the slave. If performativity is to be taken into account, it does less to account 
for the lacerated flesh that is subjected to Captain Anthony’s brutal lashes. Aunt 
Hester cannot be reduced to the mercy of what Hartman refers to as the liberal 
extension of feelings. In performance there is a captive body.
To be the slave, as a site of enjoyment, a site of extraction, is fundamentally 
what it means to be captive. While the master enjoys the slave, there is no 
joy for the slave but pain, suffering, misery and all the existential ordeals that 
negate humanity. Slavery, Hartman (1997, 25) insists, is ‘observing violence 
and conflating it with pleasure’. This means the pleasure of the master is the 
erasure of the slave, for the master derives pleasure from dehumanisation.
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Farley (2005, 225) writes: ‘Bodies are marked white-over-black.’ It is this 
marker that justifies mastership – the master as the figure that lords over 
the slave on the basis of being white. Both the slaveholder and the overseer 
assume the same position in relation to the slave – they mean one and the 
same thing: master. The master is known for unleashing violence on the slave. 
Douglass vividly describes Captain Anthony’s overseer, Mr Plummer, in this 
way: ‘Mr Plummer was a miserable drunkard, a profane swearer, and a savage 
monster. He always went armed with a cowskin and a heavy cudgel. I have 
known him to cut and slash the women’s heads so horribly, that even 
the master would be enraged at his cruelty, and would threaten to whip him 
if he did not mind himself ’ (Douglass [1845] 1995, 3).
From the above, it is clear that Mr Plummer, the overseer, assumes the 
role of the master and his conduct is as such. Even though he knows his 
place (he crosses boundaries at will and that ‘enrage[s]’ Captain Anthony), 
he never ceases to have the place of the master. The threat that he will be 
whipped by Captain Anthony is just an empty gesture. If there is something 
that Captain Anthony enjoys, it is the violent and sadistic character of Mr 
Plummer. Douglass attests that Captain Anthony is not a humane slaveholder 
(as if there could ever be one). Even though Captain Anthony is enraged by 
the barbarity of Mr Plummer, all he is worried about is that Mr Plummer 
should not impersonate him. But that changes nothing, in that the desire 
of Mr Plummer is to be a master. Indeed, Mr Plummer reigns like Captain 
Anthony. The slaves should not see the hierarchy of mastership − the height 
of the slaveholder above the overseer.
Douglass is naive to expect humanness from the slaveholder. Even an 
extreme degree of benevolence cannot extinguish the mastership of a slave-
holder. What needs to be affirmed is that mastership cannot be separated 
from flesh-mongering. The barbarity of Mr Plummer does not affect Captain 
Anthony at the humane level. Rather, it concerns the place of being a master – 
the cruelty of the overseer should not be exercised more than that of the mas-
ter. That is what affects Captain Anthony: the barbarity is at that level. There 
cannot be any feeling of compassion for the slaves that Captain Anthony tasks 
Mr Plummer to oversee. Also to be noted is that Captain Anthony has made 




Douglass commits an error in making a distinction between two overseers, 
Mr Severe and his successor, Mr Hopkins. He describes Mr Severe as a cruel 
man, as his name suggests, writing: ‘He seemed to take pleasure in mani-
festing his fiendish barbarity. Added to his cruelty, he was a profane swearer’ 
(Douglass [1845] 1995, 7). Indeed, Mr Severe is the same as Mr Plummer, 
both being profane swearers and notable sadists. Douglass even goes on 
to note that Mr Severe continues to swear even in his moment of death. 
Mr Severe’s successor, Mr Hopkins, is regarded as the opposite of his prede-
cessor. He is said to be less profane, not cruel and not noisy. As an overseer, he 
is the sovereign figure above the slave – he enslaves. ‘He whipped, but seemed 
not to take pleasure in it. He was called by the slaves a good overseer’ ([1845] 
1995, 7). This is the error of seeing the good in the evil institution of slavery. 
The slaves who see Mr Hopkins as good do not want the end of slavery, it 
seems. This suggests their contentment with having an overseer who is better 
than his cruel predecessor. Even though Mr Hopkins is claimed not to have 
taken any pleasure in whipping, this might be an error on the part of Douglass. 
The very act of whipping is pleasure-seeking, as the one who whips is gratified 
by consuming the flesh of the slave. The facts that still remain with regard to 
Mr Plummer and Mr Hopkins are threefold: one, both are overseers and they 
subject slaves to the despotic terror of slavery; two, by cracking the whip on the 
flesh of the slaves they are the extension of their master; and three, they do not 
see humans, but slaves upon which they solidify dehumanisation.
Having stated that Captain Anthony was not a humane slaveholder (some-
thing that cannot be expected) it is interesting that Douglass gives another 
twist to his characterisation of the master. He writes:
He was a cruel man, hardened by long years of slaveholding. He would at 
times seem to take great pleasure in whipping a slave. I have often been awak-
ened at the dawn of day by the most heart-rending shrieks of an own aunt of 
mine, whom he used to tie up to a joist, and whip upon her naked back till she 
was literally covered with blood. No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory 
victim, seem to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. ([1845] 1995, 4)
Is it Aunt Hester’s heartless whipping that makes Douglass question the 
‘humanness’ of the master? At no point, of course, does Douglass claim that 
Captain Anthony is humane. The criticism here has to do with the paradox 
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(master + humanness). The humane master is an oxymoron. Thus, Captain 
Anthony does not need to commit this act of whipping Aunt Hester to be 
disqualified from humaneness. The master is not humane, by virtue of being 
a slaveholder. The same is true of those who support slavery – there cannot be 
selflessness and kindness in slaveholding.
Aunt Hester’s flesh does not signify an individual or an event, but the 
totality of slavery and its aftermath. The human question, its ethical dimen-
sion and legality, faces difficulty when the figure of the slave is introduced. 
The slave is not the subject, and is not the figure that is related to the 
world. The paradigm of difference is the one that renders Aunt Hester 
nothing but flesh, as she is ontologically nothing. Aunt Hester’s flesh is 
outside the liberal discursive register of ‘we are all human’, by virtue of 
its location in relation to the question of slavery as the basis of critique. 
There is no humanity if there is still slavery and its aftermath. There is no 
humanity if race is still the organising principle of the modern colonial 
world. There is no humanity if the infrastructure of antiblackness still exists. 
There is no humanity if the despotic terror of blackness still persists. There 
is no humanity if structural violence, mass incarceration, police brutality 
and ontological exclusion are still the markers of blackness. There is no 
humanity if blackness is still dehumanised.
To pose questions from the site of being dehumanised has nothing to do 
with the claim of being human, but everything to do with ending dehumani-
sation. Aunt Hester’s flesh cannot be seen as that which is violated by Captain 
Anthony, but as a conduit through which the structural position of being 
blackened in the antiblack world inscribes, legitimises and validates itself. 
In point of fact, Aunt Hester appears in order to be available for dehumani-
sation. So, her presence in the ontological realm is superfluous, as she is the 
slave. What, then, does it mean to be the human? Aunt Hester is not human, 
and her structural positionality as the slave renders the question meaningless, 
as it does not correspond with her existential misery. Aunt Hester is flesh, she 
is the captive figure, and her life is not her own. The human question will be 
relevant after the infrastructure of dehumanisation ceases to exist. This is not 
the effort of the master, or his generosity. Rather, the revivification of the slave 
from dehumanisation and the meaningful creation of the human world will 
bring with them other ontological possibilities. Aunt Hester’s flesh serves as 
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‘LANGUAGE AS BEING’ IN THE POLITICS 




gũg ı̃  wa Thiong’o’s decoloniality and political philosophy of liberation 
are prominently represented in his struggles for the decolonisation of the 
mind, especially in the politics of language in literature and education. 
What arguably distinguishes wa Thiong’o from other African writers is his 
unique observation of language as being. His take on language extends to 
more than viewing it as a carrier of culture and a means of communication; 
he sees it as a means by which the dis-membered being can be re-membered. 
This chapter, by focusing on language as being in the politics of wa Thiong’o, 
as reflected in his writings, deviates from views of language as deconstruc-
tion (Orwell 1977), language as a room without a view (Kafka 1937), 
language as unmaking (Marquez 1982), language as disillusionment and 
seduction (Nabokov 1995), language as a door through which reality escapes 
(Robbe-Grillet 1955), language as an expression of otherness (Nganang 2001) 
and language as just a narrative (Brink 2007). Wa Thiong’o’s unique focus on 
language has often been met with harsh responses. Peter Vakunta (2010, 75) 
argues that wa Thiong’o’s ‘pontifications against the use of imperial languages 
in African literature’ are ‘spurious’ and a stunt that is ‘simply seeking negative 
attention’. Vakunta is not alone in his criticism of wa Thiong’o’s linguistic 
stance; David Cook and Michael Okenimkpe (1997) state that wa Thiong’o’s 
thinking does not conform to any specific political, dogmatic doctrine, and 
Evan Mwangi (cited in Boehmer 1993) accuses wa Thiong’o of preaching 




Wa Thiong’o’s dedication to the struggle for liberation of the African being 
needs to be understood from a decolonial locus, where the colonial being 
has been dis-membered through the erasure of their languages, and thus 
re-membering can only be achieved through the return to the languages of 
those whose humanity has been denied or questioned. Rendering a person’s 
language otiose is a violent decapitation of that person’s humanity; it is to 
dis-member their being. Humanitas, the Eurocentric concept of a human being, 
which excluded those on the margins of modernity, justified and solidified its 
humaneness through the usage and nuances concentrated in language. In his 
activism for the revival of African languages, wa Thiong’o coined the terms 
dis-membering and re-membering, which Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) 
equates with coloniality and decoloniality, respectively. Wa Thiong’o’s take 
on linguicides and linguifams (linguistic starvation) as acts of dis-membering 
the African being marks him out as not just an occasional Marxist and 
post-colonial philosopher and novelist, as most readings of his work have 
mistaken him for, but as a decolonial philosopher. Wa Thiong’o argues that 
‘our’ humanity (that is, those who exist in the zone of non-being) was denied 
by ‘them’ (those who exist in the zone of being, and give themselves the power 
to classify beings and non-beings), thus exposing the un-humanity of a struc-
ture of enunciation (institutions, categories of thought and languages) that 
built for itself an image of ‘humanity’ which allowed it to disqualify what did 
not fit its imaginary. In doing so, he moves beyond the language, culture and 
identity preoccupations of the post-colonialists; he has thus taken a different 
route from them in his disavowal of the racial imaginary of modernity upon 
which coloniality was erected.
Wa Thiong’o’s confronting of the linguistic dis-memberment of being is 
a decades-long fight against linguistic Darwinism and feudalism in colo-
nial Africa, one that can be traced from his early student years to the 1962 
Makerere Conference of African Writers of English Expression, in Kampala, 
Uganda (Wali 1963), where he participated in the deliberations on African 
literature. This fight was followed by several books and essays in which wa 
Thiong’o chose to be faithful to his language (see wa Thiong’o 2006), despite 
facing opposing views from other African scholars like Chinua Achebe (1975, 
1978, 1989), Léopold Sédar Senghor (1962), Wole Soyinka (1988), Gabriel 
Okara (1970) and Biodun Jeyifo (2018). Wa Thiong’o’s call to decolonise lan-
guage led him, in 1968, to become actively involved in the intellectual struggles 
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to transform the English Department at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, 
a department that remained colonial in content and structure. The document 
‘On the Abolition of the English Department’ (wa Thiong’o 1995) was a call 
for the ‘decolonisation of the cognitive process’ (wa Thiong’o 2016, 42) and 
of the study of so-called universal literature, which in essence was European 
literature. In 1977 wa Thiong’o decided to abandon writing in English and 
turned to his native language, Gikuyu. In pursuit of his linguistic ideology, he 
published his first play in Gikuyu, Ngaahika Ndeenda, in 1977 (wa Thiong’o 
and wa Mı̃riı̃  1977), leading to his arrest by the Kenyan authorities. The issue 
of linguistic coloniality and coloniality of being has remained fundamental, 
and unresolved, in the era of post-colonialism. There is a need for an ongoing 
reassessment and reclamation of submerged and silenced languages, for the 
construction or rediscovery of an intelligible self.
The rejection of English and the turn to Gikuyu embody a rejec-
tion of the Western European model of being. Wa Thiong’o’s several 
writings make it clear that language is central in dis-membering the mode of 
being-in-the-world-with-others. His radical but humanistic advocacy for the 
use of African languages in the writing of African literature needs to be under-
stood well beyond the existing post-colonial language debates, or as just an 
idealistic, nativist, Third World fundamentalism or Afro-radicalism that seeks 
to take the Global South out of the world to some imaginary pristine authen-
ticity of the impossible past. The advocacy for the indigenous languages 
should not be dismissed as reverse linguicide but understood as a decolonial 
call for space for, and recognition of, indigenous languages and being. Language 
cannot be separated from being, for languages are carried by bodies, hence 
how one deals with languages is how one deals with human beings (Mpofu 
2019). Marginalising indigenous languages is the marginalising of the bodies 
that carry those languages. The advocacy to have African literature written in 
an African language comes from the observation that ‘creative imagination is 
one of the greatest of re-membering practices’ of a dis-membered being and 
of marginalised bodies (wa Thiong’o 2009, 16). Language is more than a 
communication system; it is a carrier of memory, a point that eluded Biodun 
Jeyifo (2018) in his critique of wa Thiong’o. The critique is based on issues 
of linguistic and communicative competence, and on ‘what … a would-be 
African writer [should] do who wishes to write in the indigenous mother 
tongue but whose language neither has a writing script nor print capitalism of 
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even an embryonic form’ (Jeyifo 2018, 143). What Jeyifo exhibits is a failure 
to appreciate that language extends beyond the literal and economic means 
of communication often attached to it; it assumes metaphorical connotations 
aligned to life itself.
Wa Thiong’o’s decolonial call for a decolonised mind, for restoration of being 
and dignity to the victims of coloniality, becomes the unmasking of linguic-
ides and linguifams. His literary work is concerned with how a dis-membered 
people can relaunch themselves into the world that has no space for them 
(Thiong’o 2009). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 23) states that wa Thiong’o’s 
decoloniality is ‘ranged against imperialism, colonialism and coloniality 
as a constituent part of the modernist politics of dis-memberment, aliena-
tion, exploitation and alterity’. Thus for wa Thiong’o (1986), decoloniality 
becomes a search for a liberating perspective aimed at restoring the humanity 
and being of the African after centuries of suffering dis-memberment. This 
chapter is written in English, a colonial language, which means my mother 
tongue is suppressed in academia, but also that the English language should 
be interpreted as part of the cultural equipment I use to challenge coloniality, 
by using its tools of domination to lay the seeds of its defeat.
LANGUAGE AND BEING
Frantz Fanon, having experienced what it means to be voiceless, learned that 
‘to speak is to exist absolutely for the other’ (Fanon 1963, 17) for language is 
essentially being. To render one language-less is to render one a non-being, 
for non-beings, though they might communicate, do not have a language. 
The ability to think, enunciate and speak is a marker of being (Mignolo 
2011a, xxiv). The colonised, branded as lacking a language and letters, can-
not enunciate and therefore is not a ‘human’ being. Language is where the 
identity of the people is located, for language is not what human beings 
have, but what human beings are (Mignolo 2011b, 139). Walter Mignolo 
(2009, 160) clearly states that thinking is done by a ‘racially marked body in 
a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or gets the call to speak, to 
articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living organ-
isms “human” beings’.
Wa Thiong’o (2009) discusses the mythical story of Osiris in Egypt, who 
was killed by his brother Set; Set then cut his body into pieces and scattered 
them all over Egypt. Isis re-members the scattered pieces of Osiris to life with 
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the help of a deity. The significance of the myth lies in that a dis-membered 
being is re-membered to wholeness. Wa Thiong’o is the Isis of the present 
who seeks to re-member to wholeness beings who are dis-membered through 
memory loss and linguicide. Every African writer has an Isis role to play, as 
African writers cannot afford to be intellectual outsiders in their own land – 
they ‘must reconnect with the buried alluvium of African memory – that 
must become the base for planting African memory anew in the continent 
and the world’, and connecting with memory must mean ‘a return to the 
base, the people, must mean at the very least the use of a language and lan-
guages that the people speak. Any further linguistic additions should be for 
strengthening, deepening and widening this power of the languages spoken 
by the people’ (wa Thiong’o 2016, 76). The decades-long linguistic advocacy 
and activism, the call to return to the base, the resurrection of African lan-
guages by African writers, is a means of restoring the being of those who exist 
in the margins of modernity, an act of re-membering.
Dis-memberment captures not only physical fragmentation but also epis-
temological colonisation, as well as the ‘cultural decapitation’ that resulted 
in deep forms of alienation among Africans (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015, 25). 
This dis-memberment of Africa was ‘simultaneously the foundation, fuel, 
and consequence of Europe’s capitalist modernity’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 2). 
It is part of the ‘imperial/racist reason’ (Du Bois 1903) that doubted the being 
of the other, and is done, according to wa Thiong’o (2009), by uprooting 
Africans from their memory. Re-membering becomes the process of plant-
ing the memory and resisting Western modernity, as expounded by Hegel’s 
view of Africa without history, memory or discernable being (Hegel [1837] 
1944, 99).
Valentin Mudimbe (1994, xii) shares the same understanding with wa 
Thiong’o, in that ‘the geographical expansion of Europe and its civilization … 
submitted the world to its memory’. Dis-memberment meant that African 
bodies became ‘branded with a European memory’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 10). 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015, 25) adds that the long-term consequences of this 
dis-memberment process were human beings ‘out of sync with their being 
and human beings who have lost name, language, culture and identity. At 
play here were broader processes of mapping, naming and owning as part 
of the inscription of coloniality’. The effects of linguistic erasure included 
looking at oneself from outside of the self or with the lenses of a stranger; and 
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identifying with the foreign base as the starting point towards the self, that 
is, from another self towards one’s self, rather than using the local as the 
starting point, from self to other selves (wa Thiong’o 2012, 38–39). The 
effects of linguicides and linguifams have continued to be lived after the end 
of colonisation.
Thus to read wa Thiong’o’s advocacy for African languages from a 
post-colonialist perspective is flawed, as wa Thiong’o (1986) emphasised the 
linguistic impact of coloniality of being, as opposed to language as a mere car-
rier of culture and identity. Wa Thiong’o moves beyond colonisation logic that 
focuses on the 50 years of decolonisation and the supposed end of colonial 
empires, as he questions why the continent remains in a subaltern position 
within the global power hierarchy since the Atlantic slavery era (wa Thiong’o 
1986). Coloniality is the racialised invisible power structure designed by the 
Euro-North American-centric modern world (Grosfoguel 2007) that hierar-
chises human beings according to racial ontological densities. Wa Thiong’o 
details the workings of coloniality as the biggest linguistic weapon, a weapon 
that annihilated a people’s being by making them ‘want to identify with that 
which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other people’s 
languages rather than their own. It makes them identify with that which is 
decadent and reactionary, all those forces which would stop their own springs 
of life’, leading to a collective death wish (wa Thiong’o 1986, 3).
Gabriela Veronelli (2015, 108) describes coloniality of language as the 
‘linguistic racialization of colonised populations as communicative agents 
beginning in the 16th century and continuing until today’. Linguistic clas-
sification through coloniality of language, which is equivalent to colonial 
racial classification, led to the dehumanisation and silencing of indigenous 
languages and the bodies that carry those languages. Opposite racial commu-
nicators became linguistically unequal, with the languages of the colonisers 
valorised as ‘real languages’, for they could create and transmit knowledges, 
whereas the ‘languages’ of the colonised were just vulgar mumblings incapa-
ble of carrying, let alone creating, knowledge. The colonised, as inferior and 
non-being, could not be communicative agents as they lacked the ability to 
express, transmit or produce knowledge: ‘The coloniality of language is an 
aspect of the process of dehumanizing colonized people through racialization. 
Because racialization is inseparable from the Eurocentric appropriation and 
reduction of the universe of the colonized, the relation between language and 
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racialization is performed within a Eurocentric philosophy, ideology and pol-
itics, which include a politics of language’ (Veronelli 2015, 119).
To appreciate language as being, one needs to remember the lived metaphor 
of Waiyaki wa Hinga, who was buried alive with his head facing downwards 
and not facing Mount Kenya as rituals demand, and King Hinsta, who was 
decapitated and his head put on display in British museums as a figure of art 
(wa Thiong’o 2009). The two shared the fate of physical dis-memberment, 
which wa Thiong’o likens to the dis-memberment of being through linguis-
tic coloniality. The killing of these two is symbolic of the death of memory, 
memory that has been cut off from the head, an act that ‘dis-membered the 
colonised from memory, turning their heads upside down and burying all 
the memories they carried’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 7). This memory, which is 
the consciousness and identity of the people, is carried through their own 
languages. The physical decapitation explained here is the linguistic lynch-
ing of being, as the metaphorical headless bodies are branded with European 
memory, a death knell of being.
The turn of the sixteenth century becomes important, as it sets the stage for the 
racialised linguistic hierarchy leading to the denial and dis-membering of those 
who embody difference, and the automatic awarding of humanity to colonisers 
who possessed ‘languages’. Elio Antonio de Nebrija, in celebrating his invention 
of grammar for the Castilian language, explained to Queen Isabella the purpose 
his work would serve, namely to elevate the Castilian language from a vulgar 
status to the status of a language that could express knowledge, a language worth 
learning for ‘many barbarians who speak outlandish tongues’ (Mignolo 1995, 38; 
Nebrija [1492] 1946). For Nebrija, language alone distinguished human beings 
from other living systems, from wild animals, for language is the unique distinc-
tion of man (Mignolo 1995, 39). Any letters or other symbolic characters that the 
colonised used to write were described as works of the devil and not ‘languages’, 
a view articulated by Diego de Landa Calderón, a Spanish Franciscan priest and 
bishop of Yucatán, in regard to his encounters with Amerindians and the accom-
panying epistemisticides: ‘[they] found a great number of books in these letters, 
and since they contained nothing but superstitions and falsehoods of the devil we 
burned them all, which they took most grievously, which gave them great pain’ 
(De Landa Calderón cited in Mignolo 1995, 71).
By being given a prescribed grammar, Castilian became a language of 
knowledge, since knowing meant having a language and having a language 
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meant being able to express this knowledge. But as the racialised perspective 
would have it, the colonised did not have knowledge since they did not have 
language, and lack of language disqualified a person from humanitas. It is this 
context that gave birth to Oduche in Achebe’s Arrow of God (1964), Ocol 
in Okot p’Bitek’s Song of Ocol (1964) and Joseph in wa Thiong’o’s The River 
Between (1965). These characters are examples of those who aspired to white-
ness, to be human as defined by the racialised perspective. Wa Thiong’o’s ideas 
are in tandem with those of Nebrija in that they both hold that language is 
more than just a vehicle of communication; it is a means to one’s identity and 
to articulation of one’s reality and humanity.
Coloniality of language was not a spinoff or an accompanying process of 
colonisation, but colonisation itself. Colonisation was a linguistic process. 
Coloniality reduced the colonised to inferior thing-beings, reducing their 
communication to infantile blabbers (Quijano 2000), thus establishing the 
relationship between language and being. Wa Thiong’o’s advocacy and use of 
African languages is resistance to linguicides and erasure of being. Concerning 
African languages and their peripheralisation, Kwesi Wiredu (1992, 302) says 
that in light of the global privileging of Eurocentric knowledges, languages 
and coloniality in the world, in Africa ‘conceptually speaking then, the maxim 
of the moment should be: African know thy self ’. Wiredu and wa Thiong’o 
gesture towards epistemic disobedience that prefers a radical refusal of iden-
tifying, seeing and knowing the African being in terms of Eurocentric lenses. 
The motion of African self-knowledge that Wiredu points to is central to the 
advocacy of indigenous languages, counter to Eurocentric fictions of racial-
ised linguistic hierarchies. Language, as argued by James Baldwin (1979), 
defines the other. Wa Thiong’o, by using Gikuyu in his writings and broadly 
advocating for the use of indigenous languages, is the ‘other’ who resists and 
refuses to be defined by a language or languages that refuse to recognise him 
and his humanity.
Wa Thiong’o challenges the humanity of the master’s language and the 
perceived lack of humanity in the languages of the colonised. Through the 
discourse of the Anthropos (the other), he seeks to restore the humanity of 
those colonised through linguistic liberation without resorting to reverse lin-
guicides and Afro-radicalism. Wa Thiong’o’s linguistic shift, as evidenced in 
some of his literary works written in Gikuyu, is an attempt to delink from, 
to get outside the linguistic prison of coloniality. Coloniality defined what 
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language is and what it is not, and in the process linguistically classified beings 
and thing-beings, which wa Thiong’o, through linguistic disobedience, is 
exposing as just the darker side of the modernity that keeps the colonised 
mentally and spiritually imprisoned. The dominant language, then, becomes 
the criterion against which the level of civilisation of the colonised will be 
measured, as ‘the colonised is elevated above his jungle status in proportion 
to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural standards’ (Fanon 1963, 18).
WA THIONG’O GOES NAKED
The conversation between Prospero and Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest 
gives a better interpretation of wa Thiong’o’s analysis of language and being 
in the age of coloniality. Caliban has no ‘language’, and has to be taught and 
given a language; therefore he is in debt to Prospero’s kind human gesture, his 
gift of language (wa Thiong’o 2009, 2012, 2013). Language becomes a colo-
nial tool of auto-enslavement and loss of being for ‘when you did not know 
yourself, I gave you language’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 16), and ‘I created you, 
but of course, in my image’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 39); ‘your language was mere 
babble. I gave you purpose’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 29), says Prospero to Caliban. 
Language is the conception of one’s being and that of others. This linguistic 
logic of conquest leads to linguicides and linguifams (wa Thiong’o 2009, 18) 
resulting in loss of memory and remembrance. The loss finds its epitome in 
Wizard of the Crow (wa Thiong’o 2006), where Tajirika’s quest to become 
‘white’ means losing his name and his language. Loss of one’s language means 
a loss of being; adopting the colonising languages means achieving human 
status. Tajirika becomes a representation of a native dis-membered from his 
memory, dis-membered through language.
Language as the house of being (Heidegger 1982) is laden with identity, cul-
ture and memories of the people who use the language; George Steiner (1992, 
128) emphasises this by adding that ‘it is not man who determines being, but 
being via language [that] discloses itself to and in man’. Coloniality, as a form 
of dominance, remained with formerly colonised persons and communities 
long after flag independence, and after the arrival of what have been called 
post-colonial societies and experiences; maintained through coloniality of lan-
guage and inferiorisation of the colonised, it kept colonial relations between 
the former coloniser and the former colonised intact. Language as part of the 
colonisation process was more than just communication of meaning; it was 
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communication of power, not a model of signs but one of war and battle that 
determined power relations (Foucault 1980).
Coloniality of language dehumanises by denying the language of the 
colonised, by placing it in dichotomous relations that are not equal but hier-
archically defined by the location of the language. Wa Thiong’o’s linguistic 
disobedience should be understood as an act of regaining African humanity, 
and a refusal to surrender to the illusion of modernity and its promises to 
grant the peripheral Anthropos the humanitas status. Wa Thiong’o’s works 
should be read against the logic of coloniality: he deliberately seeks to decol-
onise both language and being, thus opening up alternatives and possibilities 
for other imaginaries of language and being, expressing what Catherine Walsh 
(2009) calls the paradigm other, a paradigm that emerges from colonial differ-
ence. In essence, a reading of wa Thiong’o shows how the logic of coloniality 
manifested itself through language and denied the humanity of the other, 
giving rise to the call to decolonise the ‘mind’ (wa Thiong’o 2006) and the 
‘imaginary’ (Gruzinski 1999), that is, knowledge and being.
Jose de Aldrete and other colonialists on a mission to civilise the bar-
barians established a link between linguistic behaviour, clothes and good 
manners, and being civilised (Mignolo 1995). Those who existed in the zone 
of non-being were described as lacking all markers of civility, that is, lack-
ing a language, clothes and manners. A causal relationship was established 
between language and clothes; thus the lack of alphabetic writing and mastery 
of colonial languages relegated one to the status of a naked beast with no 
language, for language distinguished the beasts from those that spoke ‘our’ 
language. Wa Thiong’o, by advocating for and also writing in African lan-
guages, assumes the beast status and therefore goes naked, as he fails to adhere 
to the linguistic behaviour that is equated with civility. Going naked means 
discarding the colonial idea of being and rejecting the ‘civilisation’ imposed in 
the name of modernity, and this involves decolonising the mind. By delink-
ing from English, wa Thiong’o delinks from the Western idea of civilisation. 
Colonial languages used as a form of psychological subjugation by colonisers 
have to be decolonised, and wa Thiong’o does so by writing in his indigenous 
language as a way of liberating the imprisoned being from the metaphysical 
empire (wa Thiong’o 2006, 16). His metaphorical nakedness is a decolonial 
process of re-membering. The lack of civility he enacts by writing in Gikuyu 
and advocating for the humanity of the African is a desire for self-definition 
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and attainment of sovereign subjectivity. Re-membering is resistance to the 
objectification and dehumanisation of Africans. It is a struggle to regain 
lost humanity even after administrative colonialism; wa Thiong’o (2013, x) 
argues that ‘the physical empire’ has been pushed back but ‘the metaphysical 
empire remains’.
Civility was defined by the coloniser in terms of letters and clothes. In 
their eyes, the indigenous people lacked letters (grammar), and lack of letters 
meant lack of language. Walter Mignolo (1995) establishes that in the cul-
ture of the European Renaissance, letters and civility went together and were 
markers of one’s humanity. Christopher Columbus joined the bandwagon 
of those who argued for the relationship between language, nakedness and 
being, noting in his journal entry about the Guhanahani natives that ‘God 
willing, when I come to leave I will bring six of them to Your Highness so 
that they may learn to speak’ (Columbus [1492–93] 1990, 31). The indige-
nous Africans stood accused of walking around without any clothes, which 
meant that their beastly status was never in doubt: they lacked both markers 
of civility, that is, letters and clothes. Their nudity disqualified these colonised 
communicators as beings. Mignolo (1995) adds that there is an implicit con-
nection between linguistic behaviour and good manners as signs of civility, 
hence speech came to be used to differentiate human beings from barbarians. 
By disregarding English in favour of his indigenous Gikuyu, wa Thiong’o 
lost civility and went around without the clothes of the master’s grammar and 
letters. From a racialised perspective, Gikuyu has no Eurocentrically valorised 
expressivity. By going naked, wa Thiong’o expressed his being outside of the 
logic of coloniality, moving away from the monologic colonial perspective of 
language to a plurilogic understanding of language that is accommodating of 
the periphery in expressing their realities, and thus exposes the hidden work-
ings of linguistic coloniality and its denial of being to the indigenous people.
The disobedience of writing in Gikuyu and the advocacy for indigenous 
languages meant ‘speaking’ outside the colonial linguistic boundaries and 
outside the racially prescribed relationship between language and being. 
Wa Thiong’o’s seminal work, Decolonising the Mind (1986), clearly artic-
ulates that colonialism deprived the indigenous people of their power to 
‘speak’, deprived them of their identity and humanity, and forced the colo-
nial languages on them, imposing an alien identity and categorising them 
as non-beings unless they carried the European memory. Languaging in 
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indigenous languages and advocating for their space and recognition is an act 
of re-membering, re-enacting and restoring the humanity of those bodies that 
carry those languages.
While Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and Léopold Sédar Senghor embraced 
the use of English and French in their writing to speak to the empire and its 
victims, wa Thiong’o refuses to wear the empire’s clothes, and speaks back to 
the empire naked in Gikuyu, as well as through his advocacy of African indig-
enous languages. He claims the right of those on the margin to speak, produce 
and transmit knowledge in their language, thus opening up alternative linguis-
tic centres (wa Thiong’o, 2012). As a way of naming linguistic racialisation, 
Veronelli (2015) coined the term ‘monolanguaging’ as a way of capturing the 
linguistic hierarchy of superiority and inferiority. Monolanguaging questions 
the ‘communicative interaction between people who perceive themselves as 
having a language in the full sense, and animal-like beings who are assumed 
to have no language but who can be trained to understand the former well 
enough to be able to follow their orders and do what they want’ (Veronelli 
2015, 124). In wa Thiong’o’s literature, African languages are communal 
places of resisting erasure and conceptualisation of communication and com-
munal life, outside the prison of the coloniality of language. It is through 
languaging that those at the receiving end of the darker side of modernity can 
keep their memories and their being alive. Speaking in one’s languages chal-
lenges the racialised concept of monolanguaging, as one assumes the voice 
needed to engage in a dialogue with one’s native audience.
Linguicides include colonisation of the cognitive base and also a struggle 
for all levels of power (wa Thiong’o 2012); Fanon (1963, 38) adds that ‘colo-
nialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying 
the native’s brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it 
turns to the past of the oppressed people and distorts, disfigures, and destroys 
it’. The imposition of colonial languages was a calculated erasure of mem-
ory and forced amnesia. The imposition is also evident in the geographical 
markers of identity, where for example Lake Namlowe became Lake Victoria, 
Mosi-oa-Tunya became Victoria Falls. To be included in the category of 
human, the colonised periphery had to adopt the universal languages, from 
the time of the ‘discovery’ of the New World to the current era of flag inde-
pendence. Language continues to be a contentious issue, as was evident in the 
#FeesMustFall student protests of 2015–16 in South Africa which, among 
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other things, called for the use of indigenous languages in teaching and learn-
ing in higher education. According to Nebrija ([1492] 1946), ‘Indians’ had 
to be taught the Castilian language if they wanted to climb up the ladder of 
humanity, for at the time of their conquest they lacked language, knowledge 
and manners. This also speaks to wa Thiong’o’s and other Africans’ experi-
ences in school.
The teaching of colonial languages was a calculated, racialised attempt to 
erase the language and humanity of the colonised; Veronelli (2012, 89), like 
wa Thiong’o, observes that ‘colonised people had to be sent to school and 
trained in the disciplines of linguistic docility to forget their ways of life. 
Only they would be inside the prison’. Francis Nyamnjoh (2012) adds that 
education continues to legitimise illusions of the superiority of Eurocentric 
knowledges and languages under the guise of abstract universalism. Education 
in post-colonial Africa remains a tool to lighten the darkness of the African 
for the ‘interest of and for the gratification of colonizing and hegemonic oth-
ers’, including African intellectuals and elites who act as ventriloquist puppets 
of coloniality (Nyamnjoh 2012, 129).
Robinson Crusoe prided himself on teaching Friday how to speak (wa 
Thiong’o 2009, 10), attesting that ‘first I let him know that his name to 
be Friday, which is the day I saved his life … I likewise taught him to say 
“Master”, and then let him know that was to say my name’. Coloniality of 
language and being was enforced through formal colonial education, just as 
‘Friday’s body no longer carries any memory of previous identity to subvert 
the imposed identity’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 10). The type of education that the 
colonised student had to go through was a process of linguicides and forced 
memory erasure. Education was weaponised by coloniality to achieve memory 
loss, as observed by John Spencer (cited in Kane 1963, 21) in that education 
(school) is ‘better than the cannon, it made conquest permanent. The cannon 
compels the body and the school bewitches the soul’. Formal education insti-
tutions became sites for dis-membering the African child. Through linguistic 
erasure and naming, Friday is denied his being and is reduced to Crusoe’s 
property. Europe planted its memory on the African body through the vast 
naming system of language.
Wa Thiong’o (2000, 159) decries the dehumanisation of Africa’s peoples 
and their languages even in a global arena like the United Nations, pointing 
out that ‘if you look at the United Nations and all its Agencies, there is no 
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requirement for an African language, although all the other continents are 
linguistically represented in the United Nations, and Europe has the lion’s 
share of that situation’. This is true, as captured in the closing statement of the 
‘Asamara Declaration on African Languages and Literatures’ (2000) issued at 
the conference titled ‘Against All Odds: African Languages and Literatures 
into the 21st Century’, held in Asmara in January 2000. Though tiptoeing 
around the gravity of the matter, the declaration describes the current infe-
rior status of African languages, stating that ‘we have noted with pride that 
despite all the odds against them, African languages as vehicles of communi-
cation and knowledge survive and have a written continuity of thousand of 
years. Colonialism created some of the most serious obstacles against African 
languages and literatures. We noted with concern the fact that these colonial 
obstacles still haunt independent Africa and continue to block the mind of 
the continent’ (Against All Odds Conference 2000).
Though modest in its analysis, this international conference did agree that 
African languages cannot be sidelined in the struggle for Africa’s humanity. 
Wa Thiong’o spurred on Africa’s linguistic transformation, a process which, 
according to Ali Mazrui (2004), cannot be achieved through the master’s 
language if genuine advancement of African languages is to be achieved. Such 
advancement is only possible if African people are involved ‘as full and equal 
partners in the struggle to challenge the semantics of the dominant discourse 
and to inscribe new meanings and uses that a counter-hegemonic discourse 
has the potential to arise’ (Mazrui 2004, 78). By writing in African languages, 
wa Thiong’o is involving those masses of African people in the advancement 
of their indigenous languages.
Before his turn to indigenous language, wa Thiong’o, like most of the early 
generations of African literary writers, adopted the use of these imposed lan-
guages. It was a case of trying to use the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s 
house (Lorde 2007) until he made his radical shift from the use of European 
languages to the use of an indigenous African language, as a way of fighting 
imperialism. This Damascene shift expressed the realisation that one cannot 
use the master’s medium of being to resurrect the African being, which would 
be like whispering in the graveyard. His return to his native language is prem-
ised on the belief that his writing ‘in Gikuyu language, a Kenyan language, 
an African language, is part and parcel of the anti-imperialist struggles of 
Kenyan and African peoples’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 28). The choice of language 
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that a person uses is central to how they define themselves and how others 
define them. Martin Heidegger (1993, 217) states that ‘those who think and 
those who create with words are the guardians of this home [of being]’; hence 
African writers are guardians of the house of being, and that house of being is 
language (Heidegger 1982).
As the guardians of the house of being, African writers have always been 
faced with a choice, either to write in their native tongues, thus reaching a 
limited audience, or to use a ‘global’ language for a global audience. When 
‘faced with this dilemma, African writers are forced to write in an adopted 
language imported through colonization, yet this allows them to cham-
pion the cause of their people on the world stage’ (Bandia 2009, 15–16). 
Ironically, Achebe and other African writers who chose the coloniser’s lan-
guage over their own are, in wa Thiong’o’s view, the Oduche in Achebe’s 
Arrow of God (1964). In Arrow of God, Ezeulu, the Chief Priest, sends one of 
his four sons, Oduche, to learn the wisdom of the Whiteman as he will be his 
‘eyes there’ (Achebe 1964, 189). After learning enough of the said wisdom, 
Oduche comes back home and imprisons the sacred python in a box. Wa 
Thiong’o identifies this class of African writers as the Oduches who have an 
incurable desire to be identified with the colonisers from whom they learned 
their lessons (wa Thiong’o 2009). He says that ‘Oduche’s story is that of all 
other graduates of the prison-house of European languages, they capture the 
python, a symbol of people’s being and imprison it in a box to suffocate and 
possibly die’ (wa Thiong’o 2009, 50). Wa Thiong’o (2009) directly calls out 
Senghor, a Senegalese writer, for cannibalising African languages to enrich 
the French language – he is the Oduche who seeks to imprison the African 
python in a French box. Wa Thiong’o says of Senghor that he ‘hardly ever 
talked of enriching any African language, and the only time he showed enthu-
siasm for African languages was when he banned Ousmane Sembene’s Ceddo, 
(a brilliant film about slavery in which the characters speak their language) 
because Sembene had spelt Ceddo with two d’s instead of one’ (wa Thiong’o 
2009, 55).
Wa Thiong’o’s advocacy for indigenous language has been labelled a form 
of nativism (Ashcroft et al. 2001) and a Third World fundamentalism that 
seeks to banish colonial languages and being. Wa Thiong’o does not employ 
this false colonial logic of banishment in the name of re-membering, for one 
cannot use the same exclusionary logic of coloniality to restore the humanity 
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of those who have been dis-membered. Decolonisation of language is not the 
pursuit of ‘othering’ and the exclusion of colonial languages, but a call to decentre 
those languages and the accompanying racialised linguistic hierarchy. What 
wa Thiong’o refuses to accept is the villagising of indigenous languages and 
bodies, and the reduction of the indigenous to mere local specificities with 
no impact on the universal canon of humanity. Asserting the humanity of the 
dehumanised cannot be done by sanitising the linguistic wound, but through 
languaging in indigenous tongues. This is not a philosophical contradiction 
for writers who have weaponised and domesticated colonial languages in the 
struggle for decolonisation, but rather an alternative way of unmasking the 
racist linguistic hierarchies.
It should be noted that through his philosophical journey, wa Thiong’o has 
come to clarify the place of colonial languages in challenging the empire and its 
idea of the human (wa Thiong’o 2012), as he continues to write in English. His 
advocacy for indigenous languages is not a call to erase the colonial languages 
and the bodies that carry those languages; it is part of the decolonial struggle 
which Gayatri Spivak (1996) calls strategic essentialism as opposed to Third 
World fundamentalism and Afro-radicalism, although vigilance should be 
exercised to avoid strategic essentialism declining into the essential (Mpofu 
2019). The writing in a colonial language by wa Thiong’o seems to be a con-
tradictio in adjecto, but Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014, 238) sums up this 
perceived contradiction as an enabling one:
The fertility of a contradiction does not lie in imagining ways of escaping 
it but rather in ways of working with and through it … An enabling con-
tradiction is a contradiction that recognizes the limits of thinking or action 
in a given period or context but refuses to view them at a distance or with 
reverence, as is typical of conformist thinking and action. An enabling con-
tradiction is inflexible with the limits and rather comes as close as possible to 
them and explores their own contradictions as much as possible.
Wa Thiong’o’s language as being is not about revenge or erasure of colonial 
languages, but rather a practice of decentring colonial languages as the only 
real languages and the Eurocentric idea of humanity as the only humanity. 
The future imagined by wa Thiong’o is one of co-existence of languages, 
where all languages are equal in their differences. In his Globalectics: Theory 
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and Politics of Knowing (2012), there is delinking from the colonial centre to 
cultivate pluriversal centres, as exemplified by the concept of ‘globalectics’, 
which is derived from the shape of the globe. Aimé Césaire (1972) agrees that 
there is no one centre, and any point is equally a centre. Wa Thiong’o (2012) 
calls for a globalectical existence that embraces wholeness, interconnectedness, 
equity of potentiality of parts, tension and motion. In a globalectical existence, 
languages and cultures are a network not in terms of a racialised hierarchy, but 
on an equal level without doubting the humanity of the other, thus moving 
away from the Eurocentric linguistic and cultural universe.
Writing in indigenous language and advocating for their use is wa Thiong’o’s 
practice of strategic essentialism, one that articulates the ‘discourse of the 
Anthropos’; it is a ‘body politics of the Anthropos which forces humanitas to 
think through exteriority, to localise and contextualise itself in its historical 
and geopolitical determination’ (Luisetti 2012, 50). It is a refusal to surren-
der to the racialised linguistic hierarchy, a refusal to put on the metaphorical 
clothes of civility. Wa Thiong’o challenges the silencing and criminalisation 
of indigenous languages and bodies, and calls for a new humanity built on 
differences and on respecting multiple local particularities.
CONCLUSION
Wa Thiong’o’s narration of the story of a farmer who brought up an eagle 
among the chickens (2009, 97–98) is a befitting conclusion to this discus-
sion. The eagle was raised as a chicken and could not remember its eagle-ness. 
It knew the language of chickens, hence it assumed the being of a chicken and 
could not fly, nor dare to try. It took a hunter to make the eagle re-member its 
being. The eagle only starts to fly after it re-members its wings. Wa Thiong’o 
assumes the role of the hunter, who through the use and advocacy of African 
languages reconnects Africans with their being, re-members their memory 
and reminds them how to fly. Through the concepts of dis-memberment 
(coloniality) and re-membering (decoloniality), and by practising epistemic 
disobedience, he consistently challenges linguistic feudalism and argues for 
the collapsing of a racialised linguistic hierarchy, so that there is no one uni-
versal linguistic centre that uses language to assign the status of being and 
non-being. By engaging in linguistic disobedience, wa Thiong’o excludes 
himself from the ‘magic of the Western idea of modernity’ and its ‘ideals of 
humanity’ (Mignolo 2011a, 161). His lack of patience with ‘feeble’ African 
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men of letters (wa Thiong’o 1986, 1997) who have rushed to defend the 
language of the centre, and appropriated it as their own at the expense of 
indigenous language, speaks of his disappointment with the African commu-
nity’s keepers of identity and knowledge.
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THE UNDERSIDE OF MODERN 





oaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) argues that Western science is 
 implicated in the power dynamics of the world. For this reason, if 
Western science is linked to modernity, it must also be linked to colo-
niality. Western science and modernity are premised on a number of basic 
principles, one of which is an emphasis on knowledge that issues from the 
mind, which is divorced from the body. In other words, thinking is the prod-
uct of a ‘rational man’ who is unencumbered by ‘body-politics’ that speak to 
the thinking being’s social and geographical positioning. As such, because 
the thinking being is not restricted by positioning and location, their knowl-
edge is not only universal, it is also apolitical. Further, the importance that is 
placed on the (thinking) mind, as opposed to the (feeling) body, introduces 
a hierarchy and opposition between the mind and the body. Therefore, posi-
tioning such knowledge as apolitical and a-contextual hides its inherent dis-
criminations and hierarchies, naturalising them and allowing them to escape 
deconstruction. Anibal Quijano (2007) attributes this propensity to assume a 
privileged place among other knowledge systems to the cloaking of Western 
knowledge in mystery, making it the exclusive province of a privileged few. 
It is thus made seductive by being coupled with power. In this regard, then, 
Euro-North American modernity has assumed an almost automatic right 
to dominate thinking, and now underpins all aspects of life, what Ramón 
Grosfoguel (2007), Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007) and Walter Mignolo 
(2007) call coloniality. Therefore, the assertion by Western science that it 
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is ‘objective’ and thus beyond contextual considerations masks its historical 
situatedness, its provincialism, and its complicity in universalising intersub-
jective relations that encompass even African subjects.
This chapter seeks to denaturalise Western science by placing it 
under a decolonial lens so as to unmask its situatedness and highlight its 
context-dependence. Decolonial thinking, as posited by decolonial scholars 
such as Grosfoguel, Mignolo, Maldonado-Torres, Santos, Quijano, Enrique 
Dussel (2014), Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015), Sylvia Wynter (1991) and 
others points to an intricate relationship between Western expansionism, cap-
ital, knowledge and coloniality. That is to say, modernity has two sides: one 
that was always intended to benefit the West, and a darker side that effected 
violence in order to enable the benefits enjoyed by the West. Modern science 
is characterised by solipsism – a monologue internal to the subject, informed 
by the maxim I conquer therefore I am, the predecessor of Descartes’s cog-
ito ergo sum, I think therefore I am – which gives epistemic privilege to the 
Western man (Grosfoguel 2013). While Western modernity is conceptual-
ised and written about to give the impression that it was a singular event, it 
was in fact multiple in its manifestations and impacts. ‘Modernity’ is used in 
this way to underscore a particular point: the centring of the Enlightenment 
philosophy underpinning modern rationality that was to inform colonialism. 
The possibility of dialogic thinking is closed off, as other knowledge systems 
are systematically denigrated and condemned to a marginal status.
In this chapter I will argue that while Western science has pushed for and 
assumed a universal status it is, in fact, a provincial view of the world – a 
knowledge system that, like any other, vies for and underpins a particular 
perspective on the world. I begin by giving a definition of decoloniality, 
and then explore the concepts of modernity and coloniality, showing how 
one is dependent on the other. Finally, I will subject the practical example 
of HIV/Aids (human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune defi-
ciency syndrome) to a decolonial critique, and show how the epidemic was 
imagined and accounted for by dominant discourses which constructed a 
particular subject/object while they simultaneously constructed the Self/
Other dichotomy. These questions are important to us, because they are a 




COLONIALITY OF KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND BEING
Decolonial thinking is an invitation to unmask and to deconstruct received 
knowledge about many aspects of our naturalised life. Central to decolo-
nial epistemic perspectives is to shift the geography of reason away from the 
fundamentals of Eurocentric thinking to include other knowledge systems. 
The fundamentals of Eurocentric knowledge are based on a binary system 
that excludes certain knowledge systems, while elevating others. This is not 
a simple and innocent matter of knowledge systems vying for ascendancy in 
a world order just for the sake of it. On the contrary, the site of knowledge 
production and vetting has been a subject of and basis for violence, discrim-
ination and domination. The repression and imposition of knowledge speak 
to one’s legitimate place in the world order. Knowledge is thus a mechanism 
that justifies domination and conquest. From this point of view, knowledge 
is an important place to start in order to understand relations of differently 
positioned people, nations and continents in the current world order.
The prisms through which people are understood, the rewriting of 
their cultures, knowledge systems and ways of being, all amount to what 
Grosfoguel (2007), Maldonado-Torres (2007) and Mignolo (2007) call colo-
niality of knowledge. This means that the primacy of place that is accorded 
Western ways of knowing and being, which are then imposed in understand-
ing other knowledges and ways of being, constitutes coloniality of knowledge. 
These other ways of knowing and being are rendered unintelligible when 
filtered through Western sensibilities that, for example, set greater store by 
the mind in juxtaposition with and preference to the body and spirit, that 
prioritise instrumental/rational pursuits such as profit which lead to individ-
ualism, and that conceive of nature and culture as dichotomous entities with 
culture gaining mastery over nature. While these ways of being and knowing 
have been exalted to represent the epitome of evolution, so to speak, they are 
in fact particular to a certain way of thinking. More than that, they undergird 
a particular sociopolitical agenda.
Decolonial thinking points to an intricate relationship between Western 
expansion, capital, knowledge and coloniality. As posited by decolonial 
epistemic perspectives, the coloniality/modernity dialectic points to how 
modernity co-exists with coloniality. Coloniality is the relations of domina-
tion that continue even after colonialism has ceased. While colonialism had 
physical structures that perpetuated its existence, such as Christian missionary 
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schools, trading enclaves and manufacturing plants, as well as government 
structures wholly run by colonists, coloniality is ubiquitous; its footprints are 
found in every aspect of life and are not dependent on the physical presence 
of the colonial administration. Coloniality has proved to be more enduring 
than colonialism. This is in some part due to the knowledge systems with 
which it conceives of and engages with the world. The idea I think, therefore 
I am is central to Western science (Grosfoguel 2008, 2012) and its implica-
tions spill over into other facets of life. Informed by this maxim, Western 
ways of knowing are instrumental in effecting a violent world system that 
is, first and foremost, true to the spirit of conquest, subjugation and appro-
priation (Maldonado-Torres 2008). By espousing a hierarchical opposition 
between the mind and the body, nature and culture, black and white, men 
and women, work and play, public and private, Western knowledge follows 
the logic of maximum accumulation at whatever cost, neatly expressed by 
Darwin’s notion of the ‘survival of the fittest’.
I make two related arguments here. First, Western science cannot be 
thought of as outside the aspirations of modernity; it is premised on moder-
nity – they are two sides of the same coin, so to speak. Western science, which 
is characterised by a mathematical, logocentric understanding of the world 
that informs the bullying tendencies mentioned above, presupposes knowl-
edge that is universal and a knower who is not situated. Related to this is the 
way in which, by systematically hiding its locus of enunciation, it accords 
itself a ‘god-eye view of the world’ (Grosfoguel 2008, 4). The boundedness 
and embeddedness of Western science in a particular, prescribed context are 
systematically hidden, enabling it to catapult itself to an omnipotent, omnis-
cient and omnipresent status. Like a god, it purports to exist at a distance 
from the sociopolitical mess of everyday living and the power dynamics that 
bear on this. Dussel (2014) argues that had Descartes, the propagator of the 
Cartesian thinking that became the bedrock of Western science, acknowl-
edged the relationship between the body and the mind, he would have been 
forced to put a price on slavery. By systematically minimising this relation-
ship, slavery could be morally justified as the enslaved were thought of as 
bodies without souls and, like the beasts of burden, they could be exploited 
with impunity. Therefore Western science, as a product of Cartesian thinking 
that hides the locus of enunciation as well as the enunciator, is systematically, 
strategically and wilfully blind to sociality and power dynamics. It hides the 
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beneficiaries of the world order espoused by the science, and naturalises the 
suffering of those who are imagined through its prisms. In this way, it priv-
ileges the enunciated and obscures the identity of the enunciator. This is a 
strategic lever of power that needs to be unmasked. That is to say, in a way, 
Western science not only perpetuates modern aspirations of conquest, silenc-
ing, discrimination and domination, but also naturalises these aspirations in 
that it purports to espouse a natural, apolitical view of the world. It is wilfully 
ignorant of the suffering perpetuated by the modernity/coloniality dialectic, 
as it thrives on a reductionist model of the world.
MODERNITY/COLONIALITY
The modernity/coloniality dialectic is important in decolonial thinking. 
Central to coloniality is the logic that produces the Other and the institutions 
that uphold it, including institutions that reproduce modern conceptions of 
being, power and knowledge. These conceptions are rooted in linear and 
dualistic thinking informed first and fundamentally by the Cartesian system 
of thought. This world view, predicated on particular notions of being that 
divorce the body from the soul, gives rise to dualistic and teleological think-
ing that presupposes a linear trajectory of development. This forms the basis 
of modernity.
Central to this thinking is that an evolved being is Christian-centric, has 
gravitated towards ‘civilisation’ and is a master over ‘nature’. The idea of a 
teleological scale of development that encapsulates modern thinking is the 
basis for coloniality; it is the essence of Othering, which is informed by the 
I think, therefore I am world view that privileges individualism, reductionist 
and binary thinking, hierarchies and rational thinking devoid of emotion. 
This kind of thinking displaces other knowledge systems and ways of engag-
ing with the world that emphasise communality, a complex understanding of 
the world and how people and things interrelate, and thinking that is medi-
ated by one’s location and positionality. Moreover, it precludes the possibility 
of historical conversations by postulating an in situ view of the world. In this 
sense, the above-mentioned knowledge systems can be viewed as mechanical 
and instrumental, on the one hand, and humanistic, on the other.
The Euro-North American tendency to universalise its knowledge is intri-
cately linked to coloniality which is, in turn, linked to colonialism premised 
on subjection and subjugation of those thought of as the empire’s Other. 
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This idea of the Other follows from the arguments made above – the hier-
archisation of knowledge and thus of people. Grosfoguel (2008) argues that 
racism is the idea that some people are less human than others, and as such, 
also have inferior knowledge and thus inferior intelligence compared to ‘real 
humans’. Furthermore, the idea of the Other is a direct consequence of the 
modernity/coloniality dialectic. The Other is one conquered by the Self, and 
thus becomes colonised by the Self. In the quest for conquest, the Other is 
vanquished and made in the inverse image of the Self, in order to fortify the 
Self. Therefore, the other side of modernity is coloniality. Maldonado-Torres 
(2008) reflects on the modern subjectivity as a consciousness born out of 
the radical unevenness between the European and the native. He argues that 
modernity is thus born in the moment when Western civilisation takes the 
place of God and defines its mission as an expansionist one, rendering every 
Other a slave by means of ‘naturalising war’. This state of war that charac-
terises relations between Europe and the native is ‘the radical suspension or 
displacement of ethical and political relationships in favour of the propaga-
tion of a particular death ethic that renders massacre and different forms of 
genocide as natural’ (Maldonado-Torres 2008, xi). The conquest and the col-
ony are quotidian exercises in which ‘imperial God and imperial man become 
immediate proofs of the existence of each other’ (2008, xi).
In the same way that abyssal thinking (Santos 2007) presupposes that recog-
nition can only be possible between coloniser and colonised, the modernity/ 
coloniality complex highlights their interdependence – as subject and object. 
The European expansionist impulse, birthed since 1492, paved the way for a 
dynamic constitution of different aspects of life in the empire and its Other. 
Following from this, Mignolo (2011) argues that to understand the local, 
one must simultaneously understand Europe’s relation with its Other. And 
according to Dussell (2014, 12), the development theory which promises 
modernity is, in fact, a fallacy as it envisions each country and each nation 
as an entity in itself, with unhindered ability to ‘develop’. On the contrary, 
decolonial perspectives argue against the growth path envisioned by develop-
ment theory. According to decolonial epistemic perspectives, empire and its 
colony are implicated in the reproduction of each other. The universalising 
tendency of Western knowledge systems is wilfully blind to this dialectic. 
Dussel (2014) asserts that while some scholars criticise modern rationality as 
an instrument of terror, he criticises it for concealing its own irrational myth 
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about its universality, its ‘zero sum’ and ‘god-eye view’ of the world. That is, an 
all-knowing point of view that is independent of time and place and devoid of 
human interference, and is thus universal and wilfully ignorant of the pain it 
perpetuates by negating the ways of being and knowing of its Other.
Further and related assertions of the decolonial epistemic perspective are 
that Western science functions by, firstly, separating units of the world into 
boxes, whereas we are all constituted in dialectical relations – this puts paid to 
the notion that some people are yet to progress towards modernity. The fact is 
that we are all in modernity, but are experiencing different aspects of it. The 
possibility of experiencing modernity positively rests on the possibility of the 
Other experiencing it negatively. These are the two inextricably related sides of 
modernity. Secondly, difference is organised into hierarchy; and thirdly, these 
orientations are naturalised. Finally, Western science intervenes in the produc-
tion of inequalities in that the creation of the Other justifies their exploitation 
and differential treatment. In this way, we see a link between racism and capi-
talism, and how racism powerfully enables capitalism. Because Western science 
is blind to the dialectic of modernity/coloniality, it automatically buys into 
the dualism inherent in evolutionary thinking – progressive versus primitive, 
science versus folklore, us versus them, here versus there, and so on.
MODERNITY/COLONIALITY AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION
The above characteristics imply a hierarchy of being, which can be summed 
up by historically fraught questions such as Do you have a God? Do you have a 
soul? Do you have knowledge? (Grosfoguel 2013). This logic, characteristic of 
the modern world view, not only informed and resulted in inequalities and 
violent encounters between the peoples of the world, but also sought to jus-
tify them. These questions, which are informed by the modernity paradigm 
that espouses a developmentalist view of the world, imply a need for some 
nations to be always catching up with Western ideals of modernity.
It is from this point of view that we can understand Santos’s (2007) argu-
ment about an abyssal line informed by abyssal thinking, characterised by 
binary logics of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, where one cannot recognise the Other. The 
distance between the two is thought to be deep and infinite. More than that, in 
theory, the distance needs to be closed at whatever cost and, ostensibly, for the 
benefit of the people who are seen to be lagging behind. Grosfoguel (2008, 4) 
sums up the West’s attitude in this regard thus: ‘Develop or I will kill you’; 
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‘Transform or I will kill you’; ‘Democratise or I will kill you.’ From this point 
of view, knowledge becomes less a matter of surviving and thriving on one’s 
own terms and in one’s own context than a primary site for international rela-
tions of domination and conquest. For this reason, Maldonado-Torres (2008) 
characterises modernity as a paradigm of war.
Characterising knowledge systems and people in a hierarchical manner 
is problematic on a number of fronts. Firstly, the universalising principle 
does not take into account contextual factors. This tendency precludes the 
possibility of envisioning pluriversal knowledge systems representative of a 
pluriversal world with a plurality of experiences and values. By espousing 
an omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent god-eye-view knowledge sys-
tem, the possibility of dialogic thinking is closed off. This essentially deprived 
Africans and other marginalised people of the world of legitimacy and recog-
nition in the global cultural order dominated by Eurocentric presumptions. 
The former were thought of as ‘body’ – a thing without knowledge and the 
consciousness to assume an equal place in the world order, or understand 
and frame their plight in terms of that which questions their position in the 
political economy of the world.
The purported value-free nature of Western science does not necessarily 
mean absence of biases. As argued above, the biases are seen in the perpet-
uation of a particular world view and relationship. This is the crux of the 
matter, and can be transposed to all aspects of life – what Quijano (2000, 
cited in Grosfoguel 2008, 6), calls the ‘colonial power matrix’ that involves 
the economy, education, health and wellbeing, religion, social organisation, 
the legal system, politics and all other aspects of life. Grosfoguel (2008, 4) 
calls this a Western-centric, Euro-North American-centric, capitalist, sex-
ist, patriarchal, Christocentric, liberal dispensation. Anything outside of 
this matrix of power is denigrated as inferior and deficient. At the core of 
relations of domination is a deep-seated doubt about the very humanity 
of the Other, expressed in the question: are you really human? This gives 
rise to radical alterity, the reification of difference, with strategic outcomes 
that will be alluded to when the example of so-called African sexuality 
and HIV/Aids is considered later in this chapter. In this vein, I argue for 
thinking by metonymy – that is to say, how HIV/Aids was understood 




Quijano (2007, 542) discounts the notion that Europeans are the exclusive 
bearers, creators and protagonists of modernity. How then do we account 
for this long-standing fallacy? In response, Grosfoguel (2008), for instance, 
would argue that knowledge systems from other parts of the world were sub-
jected to epistemicide in a quest to have the West prevail over other nations. 
In essence, what is being argued here is that what has come to be known as 
Western science also has its roots in other parts of the world. While acknowl-
edging and foregrounding this important insight, I start from the premise 
that has taken root which purports a unique Western science, whose motiva-
tions and use were coupled with the sinister project of Western expansionism 
and its concomitant characteristics. Following Thomas Kuhn (1962), it can 
be argued that Western science is functioning from within a particular par-
adigm. Kuhn argues that all scientific inquiries occur within paradigms that 
dictate the parameters of inquiry and interpretation. As a result, scientific 
inquiries are designed to explore the applicability of the accepted paradigms 
to an expanding range of data. They do so in order to affirm the validity of the 
paradigm, rather than to challenge it.
THE PRIMACY OF WESTERN SCIENCE: 
HISTORY AND CONTEXT
The point made above – that all knowledge systems represent a way of see-
ing, perceiving and thus engaging with the world – behoves underscoring. 
Furthermore, all knowledge systems represent a political view. In the case of 
Western science, this view can be summed up in the statement I think, there-
fore I am, thereby privileging the thinking subject involved with himself to 
the exclusion of others. This assertion simultaneously calls for a suspension of 
any other way of perceiving and engaging with the world and advocates for 
the domination of a particular way of seeing and engaging with it. History is 
replete with examples of warfare waged on the knowledge front. Indeed, the 
idea of coloniality that encapsulates being, knowledge and power speaks to 
this in a fundamental way. The maxim I conquer, therefore I am – the precursor 
of I think, therefore I am – is accompanied by epistemicides associated with 
actual genocides. Sylvia Wynter (1991) attributes this genocidal impulse of 
the West to the belief that the world was given to whites – the Imperial man – 
by God to conquer – propter nos (for our sake). This belief, based on the 
understanding that God resides in and favours places of the world where there 
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is enlightenment, was the driving force of the founding fathers of Europe. 
This view is captured by the observation that places unoccupied by Europeans 
are in a state of nature, where life is barbaric, nasty and short. Therefore, these 
places need Western civilisation. Moreover, this civilisation will be imposed 
by hook or by crook if need be for, according to the logic of propter nos, 
beyond the equator one can sin no more (anything and everything is allowed 
at the behest of God and by His will). Maldonado-Torres (2008) argues that 
1492 signalled a radical change in how difference was perceived. Seduced by 
the possibility of wealth, European voyagers and explorers conceived of the 
idea of propter nos that gave them carte blanche to steal, plunder and pillage 
with impunity. He argues that whereas the guiding principle heretofore was 
the ‘love of God’, this radically changed to the ‘love of gold’. By questioning 
the humanity of the people they encountered on their so-called voyages of 
discovery, the European voyagers could absolve themselves of any moral obli-
gation towards them.
Grosfoguel (2008) argues strongly for linking European colonial expansion 
to the subsequent intellectual division of labour whereby the West became 
the producer of knowledge thought of as credible and the referee in deciding 
what was credible knowledge. He sketches a picture of bloodshed en masse 
in these epistemic wars that sought to hierarchise knowledge, rendering some 
knowledge as credible while discounting other knowledge systems. He argues 
that these hierarchical tendencies are the basis for the Western-centric, racist, 
patriarchal and sexist knowledge that enjoys epistemic privilege today. This 
knowledge is based on Eurocentric assumptions that give impetus to practices 
of Othering which not only recognise and give primacy to difference, but 
also put such difference in a hierarchy that speaks to the very fundamen-
tal question: are you human? These universalising binaries – human versus 
sub-human, exterior versus interior, progressive versus backward, universal 
versus local – underscore this implied question. Such universalising schemas 
undergird and are undergirded by power dynamics. Knowledge and power 
thus go together and, as such, coloniality of knowledge is equal to coloniality 
of power and coloniality of being.
In an insightful piece that traces the factors that might have influenced 
Descartes’s cogito ergo sum, Dussel (2014) argues that Descartes needed to 
conceive of a science without people, so to speak, to come to this conclusion. 
By conceiving of a science that divorced the body from the soul, Descartes 
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closed himself off from the external world opened up to us by our feelings, 
imagination and passions. In this way, the purportedly pure machine of sci-
ence is blind to race, gender and class. These important sociological indicators 
would not be primary sites and pillars of analysis – they would be incidental 
to analysis. From this point of view, ‘the quantitative indeterminacy of any 
quality will only be the beginning of all illusory abstractions about the “zero 
point” of modern philosophical subjectivity’ (Dussel 2014, 10). This is part 
of a long history of the Christian world founded on the idea of the primacy of 
the soul above the body. The body was and could be nothing but an object of 
knowledge. From the Eurocentric perspective, certain races are condemned 
as inferior for not being rational subjects. They are objects of study, conse-
quently bodies closer to nature. In a sense, they become dominatable and 
exploitable: Cartesian thinking is able to ignore and naturalise the modernity/ 
coloniality dialectic by disregarding the union of the body and the soul. The 
thinking individual, who stands above their experiences and thus in a par-
ticular locus of being and enunciation, is essentially independent of both 
intersubjective and social relations: ‘First in that supposition, the “subject” is 
a category referring to the isolated individual because it constitutes itself in 
itself, in its discourse and its capacity of reflection. The Cartesian cogito ergo 
sum means exactly that’ (Quijano 2013, 26). Therefore, knowledge flowing 
from such a standpoint denies intersubjectivity and social totality as the sites 
of production of all knowledge. The ‘object’ to be studied is not independent 
of a given field of relations either. Furthermore, the idea that the subject is 
the bearer of ‘reason’, while the ‘object’ is not only external to it, but is of 
a different nature, is a falsehood founded on Euro-North American abyssal 
thinking. Cartesian thinking thus emphasises difference and not inequality. 
Where inequality is considered, it is thought to be of nature – only European 
culture is rational, and can contain subjects; the rest are irrational, they can 
only be objects of study (Quijano 2007, 174).
This falsehood is sustained by violence and by ideologies that supposedly 
reflect a reality. By denying intersubjectivity, the Other is made absent in the 
conversations that take place following the logic of cogito ergo sum, except as 
an object of Eurocentric knowledge. As such, ‘the radical absence of the other 
not only postulates an atomistic image of social existence in general, but also 
denies the idea of a social totality, which led to adopting a reductionist vision 
of reality’ (Quijano 2007, 173). Descartes’s posture and considerations were 
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geared towards upholding relations of domination between empire and its 
Other. This is in view of the argument that knowledge is not so much a relation 
between an individual and something, but rather a relation between people 
for the purpose of something. Acknowledging the union of the body and the 
soul would have meant putting a quantifiable price on slavery (Dussel 2014).
The knowledge that flows from the premise of ergo et sum is thus used to 
hide relations of domination by hiding the union of the soul and the body. 
From this point of view, such knowledge can only be instrumentalist. It can-
not respond to the fundamentals of inequality. Knowledge informed by the 
prescripts of cogito ergo sum is thus about privileging a certain understanding 
of the world that is silent on the relationship between the individual and 
society, and between empire and its Other. It is thus not far-fetched to argue 
that Euro-North American knowledge is decadent in that it seems unable to 
respond to the challenges that it spawns. Tied to capitalism, Western science 
purports to have similar values of mastery and survival of the fittest. As such, 
it has wrought much unnecessary pain and cannot seem to be able to cor-
rect itself, as evidenced by increasing inequalities, exclusion of the majority 
of humanity, degradation of the planet and climate change. This assertion 
provides a response to the question of whether coloniality is abstract or con-
crete. The coupling of difference and hierarchy results in the same outcome 
of violence. Therefore, coloniality or modernity not only produces identities 
and categories, but also the experiences of people. Modernity thus ignores its 
own decadence by always producing the same narrative – a reductionist view 
of the world produced by supposedly pure observation that isolates variables 
in a mechanical model of that world. It is caught in its original objectives of 
effecting an unequal world order and expanding its global domination. It is 
from this point of view that I argue that Euro-North American knowledge 
cannot go far in resolving the many challenges that beset the world.
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
Western science has bypassed any real scrutiny and criticism by shrouding 
itself in mystery. Instead, critique has largely centred on what have been called 
‘epistemologies of equilibrium’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2015), which advance a 
modernist critique of modernity, and thus do not fundamentally challenge its 
precepts but rather serve the perverse role of obfuscation. Western science is 
supported by ‘institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even 
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colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles’ (Said, cited in Smith 1999, 2) that 
bolster its clout. It erected an abyssal line between itself and other knowl-
edge systems, casting itself as a superior kind of knowledge, while castigating 
these other systems. The abyssal line denotes both vertical and horizontal 
hierarchies. Vertically, other knowledge systems are relegated to an inferior 
position. Horizontally, the line defines its purported characteristics and, by 
so doing, marks its inclusionary and exclusionary criteria. Western science 
fashions itself as universal, objective, logocentric, apolitical and impartial, 
effectively casting itself as having a god-eye view of the world, outside and 
above world power dynamics and other worldly concerns, except to add to 
knowledge in aid of human civilisation and progress.
By implication, other knowledge systems are thought of as local, intuitive, 
subjective and partial, and thus fraught with human frailties such as emotions, 
politics and the attendant short-sightedness. An example is the notion of a 
‘scientific West’ and an ‘intuitive East’, with antithetical pairs of attributes, 
namely scientific versus intuitive, theoretical versus practical, causal versus 
correlative thinking, adversarial versus irenic or geometric versus algebraic. 
Furthermore, Western science has remained valid across historical periods, 
geographic locales, social strata, gender identifications, and economic and 
technological differentials. However, Sander Gilman (1985) asserts that sci-
ence works differently in the real world. Paula Treichler (1991) argues that 
when cultural differences among human communities are taken into account, 
they tend to be enlisted in the service of this reality, but their status remains 
utilitarian. Western science has assumed the role of both player and arbiter, 
in that it prescribes a particular view of the world. Also, it imposes its view of 
what constitutes credible and worthy knowledge. It is a master signifier – the 
alpha and the omega of knowledge systems. As such, the methodologies asso-
ciated with Western science emphasise distance of the observer, purporting 
to be concerned with pure observation without interpretation, thereby con-
cealing their human qualities and interests. In a continuing vein, it assumes a 
static and mute object of study (atoms that have no subjectivity of their own), 
which thus unproblematically fits within knowledge parameters informed by 
Eurocentric imaginations.
This approach has led to an intellectual division of labour in which the 
West’s Other is used as raw material, and as human species are processed 
through Western knowledge and lenses in order to vindicate the primacy 
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of place of this knowledge in the world and in epistemology. My contention 
here is not so much about the usefulness of the knowledge derived from 
Western science, but rather about that of any knowledge system: such a 
knowledge system is necessarily incomplete, perspectival and, as such, has 
to be put on the same analytical plane as any other knowledge systems. In 
the next section of the chapter I use the example of how HIV/Aids has been 
studied to underscore the points I have made above.
HIV/AIDS AS AN ÜBER OTHERING SITE
While Western science is but a particular and provincial view of the world, 
its epistemological primacy of place is tied to Western capital and modern 
thinking. In this context, this section of the chapter reflects on the matrix 
of hierarchies implicated in knowledge production, power and being as a 
form of soft oppression in the realm of sexuality. Sexuality, while a site of soft 
oppression, is very much at the centre of questions about one’s humanity and 
one’s conception of Africa, the continent that has always borne the brunt of 
and suffered the consequences of the Western gaze. What does each have to 
do with the other? In considering this question, I will speak about the rela-
tionship between these seemingly unconnected aspects of life, and show how 
inequalities are perpetuated and justified by this complex matrix, using the 
example of ‘African Aids’ as a prime and contemporary site of Othering. I will 
argue that the HIV/Aids epidemic has been a site that has strengthened abys-
sal thinking, recentring the West and its knowledge systems, while excluding 
and silencing others. Against a Eurocentric norm, knowledge of others as 
sub-human, and as raw material to be analysed through prisms that essen-
tially question their humanity, drove and informed impulses and practices 
that are central to how HIV/Aids has been conceived of and approached. The 
advent of HIV/Aids became the site for rationalising the study of the exotic 
Other, a curiosity that invited the unidirectional Western gaze that ultimately 
makes objects of subjects.
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (1992) remark on the unjust conclusions 
that conventional scientific methods reach regarding people who are thought 
of as the Other of the researcher. They caution against the difference-making 
tendencies of such methodologies, which emphasise a speaking individ-
ual who is not based and rooted in any context. From this point of view, 
the speaking individual is taken at face value. Such an apprehension of the 
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speaking individual ignores a number of issues that relate to science. Firstly, 
that individual utterances, while representing a particular world view, are also 
partial and perspectival. This is not least a result of the fact that the speak-
ing individual speaks into a constraining and already prescribed mould, as 
directed by the questions they are asked and which reflect the researcher’s 
point of view and interests. Secondly, that the spoken, in an interview, is 
a snapshot that precludes historical conversations. Thirdly, that, taken out 
of context, data collected through conventional methods are open to being 
exoticised by a researcher who presumes distance between himself or herself 
and those researched. Lastly, that for research to achieve justice, data collected 
through conventional methods should not be read and interpreted in and 
of itself; it should also be restored to a world of meaningful interconnected-
ness. The above considerations also, and perhaps mostly, apply to surveys and 
other closed-ended ways of collecting data, which, by virtue of controlling for 
‘extraneous variables’ and thus painting a pure rendition of ‘results’, are given 
higher scientific value.
Other important points are made in the Comaroffs’ Ethnography and 
the Historical Imagination (1992) that could be used to support my asser-
tion about how the HIV/Aids epidemic is a contemporary and prime site 
of Othering. In particular, they highlight the Othering tendencies of con-
ventional research. These are manifested in the assertions made above that 
Western science, in particular, is premised on abyssal thinking, which pur-
ports to uphold a distance between the researcher (holder of knowledge) and 
the researched (objects to be subjected to the researcher’s knowledge). This 
distance is such that the researcher and the researched cannot recognise each 
other. In this vein, Comaroff and Comaroff argue that the interview encoun-
ter becomes more like an interview between strangers who lack any sort of 
entanglement, whereas an interview is not so much an encounter between 
strangers as a meeting of people who are implicated in each other. It is this 
posture and understanding of the world that informed the mass movement 
of scholars and researchers from the North to study what became known 
as ‘African Aids’, ostensibly perpetuated by an ‘African sexuality’ to which 
the high prevalence rate of HIV/Aids in Africa was attributed. The curios-
ity of these scholars and researchers was informed by the apparently exotic 
nature of this African sexuality which, according to them, is characterised by 
practices such as polygyny, dry sex, wife inheritance, promiscuity, the virgin 
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cleansing myth and intergenerational sexual relations. This view of Africa is 
informed by a belief that the continent is not only different from the USA, 
for instance, but that the difference is hierarchical. African sexuality is seen to 
be informed by ‘African culture’, which has yet to evolve from what Hobbes 
observed many years ago about ‘man in the state of nature’ – unbridled sexu-
ality that is animal-like and does not show a higher consciousness (Lloyd and 
Sreedhar 2019).
As an example of this, Treichler (1991) argues that early medical observ-
ers constructed the medical evidence they were observing to fit pre-existing 
assumptions about African sexuality and disease. This corroborates Gilman’s 
(1985) assertion that the actual may not mimic closely the ideal of science. 
Contrary to being objective and neutral, Gilman argues that the association 
of Africans with sexuality and the tendency to link African sexuality with dis-
ease have a long history in Western thought and, as such, may influence how 
science is carried out and the resultant conclusions. Treichler (1991, 189) 
asserts that a view is entrenched that ‘in dealing with Aids, we are not just 
dealing with sex, we are dealing with life ways and complex cultural patterns’, 
which further cements the view that Africans are promiscuous by nature and 
are culturally resistant to modifying their sexual behaviour. She postulates 
that, for example, Edward Green, a prominent anthropologist who plies his 
trade in Africa during his sojourns there from abroad, holds the view that 
‘changes in behaviour which promote[s] the spread of Aids will go against 
social and cultural norms and values in Africa and against deeply ingrained 
behavioural patterns’ (Packard and Epstein 1991, 356). In this way, ‘tradi-
tions’ are reified as historically static. This type of cultural essentialism leads 
to exoticism, which entrenches the view that Africans are not people with 
problems, they are the problem. Deconstructing the specific case of ‘African 
Aids’, Paul Farmer (2001) points to the epistemic injustice perpetuated by the 
systematic conflation of structural violence with culture. He attributes this 
tendency to Western ideas about an exotic Other and its epistemological tools 
that confirm the Other’s ‘backwardness’.
Western ideas of the world compartmentalise aspects of life such that sex-
uality and social reproduction are thought of as ‘local’, while the economy, 
for instance, is thought of as ‘global’. So, while Africa is in intricate rela-
tionships with the rest of the world at the level of the economy, somehow 
social reproduction in Africa is divorced from these relations (Fassin 2007). 
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Therefore, contrary to the purported status of science as a perfect knowledge 
of things (Dussel 2014, 15), research on HIV/Aids in Africa, informed by this 
abyssal thinking, has played into the usual tendencies of Othering and thus 
silencing. Mark Hunter (2010) argues that without addressing the structural 
reasons why women and men have more than one sexual partner, for instance, 
any behavioural intervention campaign is unable to provide a major break-
through. Remarking on a different topic altogether, Grosfoguel (2008, 1) 
makes a point that is general to knowledge production: ‘With few exceptions, 
[Western “experts”] produced studies about the subaltern rather than studies 
with and from a subaltern perspective; theory was still located in the North, 
while the subjects to be studied are located in the South.’ HIV/Aids was a 
classic site where such tendencies were repeated with little, if any, reflexiv-
ity. Critical thinking would have awakened researchers to the fact, stated by 
Hunter (2010), for example, that the most celebrated Zulu ‘traditions’ today 
emerged in the colonial period.
Believing in their expert status and superior knowledge, researchers from 
the North conceived studies about an imagined Africa that went on to prove 
their preconceived ideas about the continent. Decolonial epistemic perspec-
tives can help us understand why this was possible in the first place. In the 
first instance, views about Africa informed what could be said to be colonial-
ity of knowledge, of power and being. Coloniality of knowledge can be seen 
in the imposition of a particular world view on the understanding of HIV/
Aids. Firstly, drawing on colonial views of Africa, the advent of HIV/Aids 
resurrected notions of the Other, who is not only different, but also inferior. 
Secondly, the reductionist, compartmentalised view of the world led to the 
obscuring of root causes for the disproportionate prevalence of HIV/Aids in 
Africa. The history of epidemics is thus an integral part of the history of racial 
segregation in South Africa (Hunter 2010). This obscuring led to the silencing 
of inequalities and structural violence against people who are most vulner-
able. Instead, the victims of such structural violence were blamed. Malkki 
(1995, 17, cited in Fassin 2007, xv) asserts that this is ‘anthropological cul-
turalism’ which, by essentialising difference, produces ‘subtly de-historicising, 
dehumanizing effects’. Behavioural and culturalist interpretations that have 
been used to explain the dramatic spread of the disease are as ineffective as 
they are unjust.
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Commenting specifically on the injustices of Aids research in South Africa in 
particular, Didier Fassin (2007) goes on to say that causing suffering and ignoring 
the effects of that suffering are a contemporary reality. He asks a moral question: 
what is a just society? He responds that it is one that remembers, because ignoring 
the past not only harms understanding of the present, but also compromises pres-
ent action. The solutions advanced from the premises of biomedical medicine, 
for instance, are just as reductionist as behavioural and culturalist interpretations, 
focusing on fighting the disease while ignoring the factors that make victims vul-
nerable to disease, and not offering any long-term solutions to the extent that, 
should there be another global epidemic, the very same sub-alternised groups that 
have been imagined through the Euro-North American prism will be as vulnera-
ble as they are now to HIV/Aids.
The site of intervention was the individual and their behaviour, and solu-
tions were effected at that level. Other points of view were systematically 
silenced. For instance, research has shown that communities most affected 
by HIV/Aids display more than average knowledge of how HIV is transmit-
ted and how it could be prevented (Farmer 2001). However, this knowledge 
fails to translate into health-affirming practices. Audrey Pettifor et al. (2004) 
and Lisa Arai (2008) argue further that while the structural determinants 
of sexual ills are apparent, policy approaches prioritise changing motivations 
such as choice, rather than changing the determinants themselves. Giving a 
concrete example of a place characterised by premature death on a large scale, 
Hunter (2010) argues that places are power-laden and formed in relation to 
other places; he emphasises that the participants in his study attributed their 
heightened vulnerability to isimo – the way they understood things to be 
(conspiring against them). Such conversations were precluded by a unilateral 
understanding of HIV/Aids as an illness perpetuated by a set of factors that 
are internal to the individual (their behaviour) or group (their culture).
Tuhiwai Smith (1999, 2) highlights ‘ways in which the pursuit of knowledge 
is deeply embedded in the multiple layers of imperial and colonial practices’. She 
says that for indigenous communities, research is a dirty word due its objectify-
ing tendencies. Informed by the logic of individualism, proposed interventions 
to counter the spread of HIV/Aids have favoured the market economy. These 
include buying expensive pharmaceutical drugs and other products, while 
leaving the contextual structural issues that increase vulnerability intact. The 
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logic of wanting to have and construct the Other is closely linked to capitalism. 
In the widespread disregard of death in capitalist societies and the advancing 
of solutions that do not question and undermine capitalism’s premises, we see 
glimpses of how reductionist and thus racist solutions (that blame the victim’s 
behaviour and culture as deviant) powerfully enable capitalism. In this vein, 
then, the dominant approach to understanding and responding to the HIV/
Aids epidemic has ignored the modernity/coloniality complex that perpetuates 
a dialectical relationship between development and underdevelopment.
By imposing a world view on mute Others, the West sought to effect indi-
rect rule over Africa, using HIV/Aids as a means to achieve this aim. Treichler 
(1991), amongst others, argues that the Aids epidemic was the site on which 
power relations of domination already in place were reproduced. In this sense, 
both Smith (1999) and Treichler (1991) argue that narratives, too, perform a 
function of domination and subjugation: ‘Information does not simply exist; 
it issues from and, in turn, sustains a way of looking and behaving towards the 
world’ (Treichler 1991, 124). As such, issues of power and representation loom 
large in the perpetuation of an unjust order. Furthermore, the question of Aids 
in Africa cannot be fully understood unless issues of racial exploitation, subju-
gation and discrimination are simultaneously considered. These factors, more 
than the purported different and thus regressive cultural and sexual mores of 
Africans, go a long way towards accounting for the disproportionate HIV/Aids 
vulnerability amongst individuals, groups and nations on the continent.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have argued for the simultaneous reading of modernity and 
coloniality. I have reasoned that, contrary to the view that Western-derived 
knowledge is apolitical and acontextual, it is strategically political and can 
be implicated in sustaining an unequal world order. I have used the pre-
cepts of decolonial thinking to argue that the disembodied and unlocated 
neutrality of the ego-politics of knowledge is a Western myth that works to 
perpetuate its dominant position in world politics. Informed by and flowing 
from Cartesian thinking, Western knowledge that privileges modern concep-
tions of being, knowledge and power is wilfully and strategically ignorant of 
the dialectic of modernity/coloniality that pursues coloniality of knowledge, 
power and being. I have sought to show the relationship between these seem-
ingly disparate loci of understanding.
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At the core of domination is the logic that produces the Other while simul-
taneously defining and recentring the Self. By adopting a narrow view of the 
world, Western science or knowledge precludes the possibility of historical con-
versations about the relationship between the empire and its subaltern. As such, 
Western knowledge silences views from its periphery while it valorises itself as 
universal. HIV/Aids, as I have shown, is a classic and contemporary site on 
which these power dynamics have been elaborated and entrenched in Africa.
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THE FICTION OF THE JURISTIC PERSON: 





hen we reflect on the role of the company in modern society, its per-
vasiveness in every element of our existence as human beings is con-
spicuous. It is evident in the food that we consume, the water we 
drink, clothes we wear, pharmaceuticals we depend on and jobs that provide 
us with the income that enables us to acquire these resources to sustain life 
(O’Connell 2010, 202). It is particularly striking that these functions are 
accomplished by an entity that has neither body nor soul nor will (Dewey 
1926, 655). That said, a company is not merely the aggregate of a group of 
people; it has, by definition, a personality of its own that is recognised by 
the law.
What then is the nature of the juristic person that is a company, and what 
are the implications of this for natural persons (of flesh and blood)? The law 
may posit a technical answer to this question, namely that a company is an 
association of natural persons authorised by the state, in terms of its charter 
or memorandum of incorporation, to undertake a specified business and in 
doing so be empowered to act as a natural person. Penington (1931, 36) 
defines a company’s being as ‘an artificial being existing only in contempla-
tion of law’, as an entity that has properties conferred upon it by ‘the charter 
of its creation’. The most important properties, according to Penington, are 
those of immortality and individuality.
Pennington’s definition is particularly useful as it extends beyond a descrip-
tion of the functioning of a company into the purpose of its recognition 
as a legal person, namely the immortal ownership of property. This on its 
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own may still not provide clarity as to the relationship between the juristic 
person of a company and natural persons, but it implores us to interrogate 
the normative underpinnings of the concept of the company. In this chapter 
I propose to do this by considering the historical development of the recog-
nition of the juristic person, specifically within the context of imperialism 
and colonialism. I will argue that the juristic person occupies a place in the 
zone of existence while simultaneously maintaining some natural persons in 
the Fanonian ‘zone of non-being’ (Fanon 1967, 82). And I will anchor this 
conceptual exploration in the context of South Africa, not only because of 
the relevance to the country of the colonial elements of the company in the 
form of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC), but also because of the 
contemporary implications of the South African Constitution (Republic of 
South Africa 1996b) for the relationship between natural and juristic persons 
in this society.
In undertaking this exploration I am not suggesting that the concept of a 
company (or commercial juristic persons) is homogeneous or without excep-
tion. Nor am I attempting to demonstrate a genetic linear growth from early 
imperial enterprises such as the DEIC to the modern company, such as those 
incorporated in South Africa today. There is, however, a significant norma-
tive underpinning within their conceptual similarity of design and purpose 
which this chapter seeks to expose. Colonial oppression has been described as 
systemic. The modern company, as a constituent institution, remains an appa-
ratus for control over land. Furthermore, this control is ideologically racialised 
and manifests itself in the poverty of those relegated to the zone of non-being.
What is significant about such a contention is that it may lead us to a 
more honest engagement with the elastic and mystifying nature of the com-
pany, in turn facilitating a more deliberate engagement with the power 
dynamics that a company enables – and the concomitant accountability of 
the natural persons behind the company. This may prompt us to reassess 
the suitability of the current discourse on the human rights  obligations of   
the company (which remain controversial), to the extent that this discourse 
entrenches the power dynamics that enable this juristic person to violate 
human rights for the benefit of natural persons who are veiled from account-
ability’s gaze. A more apt approach to concerns about the ways in which the 
company violates natural persons may be to reassess the  legitimacy of the 
current form of an institution that facilitates such violations with relative 
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impunity. That is, this may compel us to interrogate the cause rather than the 
symptom of the company’s deleterious power over natural persons.
UNPACKING THE NATURE AND PURPOSE 
OF JURISTIC PERSONALITY
According to Judith Katzew (2011), the idea of the company was initially 
designed to provide for the consolidation of capital from various sources to 
support the entrepreneurial ventures of individuals or groups of individuals. 
In the context of the joint-stock or share-based company, this means separate 
ownership (of those who invested in the company, thereby bearing the risk 
of losing that investment in exchange for the potential growth of the invest-
ment) and control (of those whose investment was not at stake, but who 
stood to gain from the beneficiation of the company that would be achieved 
through their effective management of resources) (Katzew 2011, 694). The 
incentive of the shareholders to invest was presumably the limitation of risk 
to the extent of the initial investment (notwithstanding what liabilities might 
be engendered by those charged with growing the investment) and the addi-
tional potential for its growth (Katzew 2011, 694).
The notion that ‘the business of business is business’ has been credited to 
economist Milton Friedman and justifies the proposition that the purpose of a 
company is to maximise profits (Friedman 1962, 112). This had the effect of 
delegitimising activities of the corporation outside of making money, or related 
to spending that was not specifically geared towards making more money. The 
shareholder value doctrine (advocating for the primacy of shareholder interests) 
has become conventional wisdom and dictates the approach taken by corpora-
tions in several jurisdictions. It exonerates the company from obligations other 
than the making of profit, as the interests of the juristic person are presented as 
exclusively profit maximisation (Denning 2013). The furtherance of these inter-
ests has been widely regarded as being subject only to the rules of the game – the 
game being the operation of the free market and the prohibition of deliberate 
acts designed to circumvent its functioning (Baird and Henderson 2008). The 
fiction of the company has therefore provided a vehicle for the avoidance of 
liability of the investors and the entrepreneurs that it seeks to invite with the 
prospect of gain relative to diluted risk (Bilchitz 2008, 754).
The Salamon case is the classic authority for the distinct legal personality of 
a juristic person (Salomon Case 1896). The characteristics of legal personality 
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are the ability to have an identity (and a name), own property in that name 
(which then forms part of a patrimonial estate), have standing before a court 
to sue and be sued, and have the entitlement to rights. With this descriptive 
account in mind, it is pertinent to consider some of the theories that seek to 
explain the nature of the company as a juristic person.
The origins of the modern corporation have been attributed to Roman law. 
The early fictional theory of juristic personality is credited to Pope Innocent IV 
(who was incidentally also a champion of the divine right to conquest, which 
will be visited later in this chapter), in the context of ecclesiastic corporate 
bodies being immune to criminal or civil sanction on account of having no 
body to be punished nor any will to be condemned (Dewey 1926, 655). It is 
from this that the theory of the corporation as an immortal fictional person 
is said to have arisen. The recognition of this fiction was later developed, as 
the concept of the nation state rose to prominence, into the theory that the 
state alone could grant recognition of personhood (Dewey 1926, 666–69). 
This came to be known as the concession theory, on the basis that the rec-
ognition of capacity of the juristic person was a concession by the state, as 
the presiding authority over social relations (Dewey 1926, 666–69). This, 
John Dewey argues, was done in an attempt to entrench power and simulta-
neously exercise that power to prevent the collective power of ecclesiastical 
and business groupings from encroaching on the power of the state (Dewey 
1926, 667).
Alternatively, the will theory suggests an interpretation of a fictional person 
as nuancedly distinct from an artificial person. This employs the concession 
theory to hold that the juristic person is artificially constructed by, and given 
content through, legal recognition (Dewey 1926, 670–73). The will theory 
suggests that a fictional being comes into existence in the formation of a juris-
tic person. The will theory presents the collective volitions of the members or 
shareholders (particularly the majority of them) as culminating in the distinct 
volition of the company (Dewey 1926, 670–73).
In a similar vein, the group personality theory relies on Frederic William 
Maitland’s conception of the company as an aggregation of groups collecting 
to pursue specific interests which culminate in ‘psychic organisms, possessing 
not fictitious but real psychic personality’ (Dewey 1926, 670). An alternative 
take, borrowed from Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s conception of the state, is 
that a company functions in a distributive rather than a collective manner. 
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This is particularly so in the context of the contestations for power within the 
various collectives that constitute the company, and which pursue contrary 
interests at times. As such, the company displays its own will and consists of 
various groupings, but is essentially psychically distinct from these groupings 
(Dewey 1926, 670). The problem with the elasticity of these theories is that, 
due simply to a legal construct, juristic personality conveniently facilitates the 
pursuit of individualist interests without the burden of concomitant liability 
(Dewey 1926, 668).
The representative theory centres on the separation of ownership and 
control (Deiser 1909a, 228–29), in terms of which collective ownership is 
represented in shareholding/stakeholding. The shareholders’/members’ rights 
are indivisible and their individuality is irrelevant. They operate within a nexus 
of association. This theory requires acceptance either that rights are held by 
a non-existent (unreal) entity, or that the collection of rights loses the prop-
erties of each individual right and is aggregated into the will of the majority. 
This would have the effect of excluding minority or dissenting shareholders/
stakeholders from the nexus of association. In terms of this theory, technically 
minorities should not be entitled to interfere with the will of the majority, 
but this is not the case as justiciable minority shareholders’/stakeholders’ 
protections are granted in several jurisdictions (Deiser 1909a, 228–29). The 
representation theory proves contradictory, in that the legitimacy of juris-
tic personality is founded in the representation of constituent rights-bearing 
individuals acting collectively; however, when acting in association, each indi-
vidual necessarily loses individuality as rights attach to the share/stake.
A solution to this tension appears in the idea of collective holding of rights, 
contained in George Deiser’s suggestion that property ownership can be 
either individual or collective (Deiser 1909a, 229–33). Therefore, the juristic 
person is symbolic and merely serves as an administrative device for collec-
tive property ownership. Interests in the property are not distinct, but exist 
for the purpose of common benefit. This recognises that the ultimate rights 
holders and beneficiaries of the juristic person are always natural persons. 
Rights existing only in the abstract and never engaging in the real world of 
natural persons have no content. As such, the rights attributed to the juristic 
person belong to the natural persons who constitute it, albeit in different 
capacities than would be the case if those rights were directly held (Deiser 
1909a, 229–33).
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The binary of juristic and natural persons originally departed from the 
premise that natural persons have inviolable rights by virtue of being 
human. However, this practical distinction was eroded over time, as juristic 
persons were granted rights by virtue of interpretation of what it meant to 
be persons for legal purposes endowed with the authority to act as a natural 
person would, to the extent possible (Dewey 1926, 669). The movement 
from the recognition of juristic persons as properly artificial entities, with 
no inherent rights, to persons in the equal sense as natural persons, has gen-
erated immortal persons (Chomsky 1999, 97). Furthermore, as the concept 
of distinct personality grew, specificity about purpose stated in the charter 
or memorandum of incorporation became less determinative (Chomsky 
1999, 97).
Dewey suggests that the aim of theories of juristic personality is to make 
sense of the recognition of an entity through which natural persons can act 
with limited liability for the consequences of their actions (Dewey 1926, 
673). This is in the context of an individualistic age concerned primarily with 
the right to private property. The fiction is employed as a way of deflecting 
accountability of natural persons that would be of moral character, while the 
concession theory grants legitimacy to the fiction. Due to the elasticity of the 
concept of a fiction, the company is able to derive benefits for natural persons 
while simultaneously shielding them from reproach. In this way, ‘persons’ 
may come to represent any content that the law attributes to the concept, 
including being a ‘right-and-duty bearing unit’ as classically described by 
Maitland (Maitland 1905, 193; see also Dewey 1926, 673).
On the other hand, Deiser suggests that the theory of juristic personal-
ity exists to establish a conceptual foundation for understanding and solving 
corporate problems, and not ‘to furnish the doctors of jurisprudence with 
a cadaver that might serve for dissecting purposes’ (Deiser 1909a, 305). As 
such, the nature of juristic personality is important only to the extent that it 
determines the parameters of the rights and obligations of the juristic person. 
The fiction generated around collective activity and the recognition of legal 
personality creates the illusion of a robust concept in the law (Deiser 1909b, 
308). This is however misleading, as the content of the fiction is dependent 
on the intricacies of the jurisdictions within which the fiction applies (Deiser 
1909b, 308). The absence of acknowledgement of this fact results in the elas-
ticity of the concept being used to mean what is beneficial for those who 
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employ the fiction at a given place and time. Ultimately ‘“[p]erson” signifies 
what the law makes it signify’ (Dewey 1926, 655).
Reading Dewey’s and Deiser’s suggestions together, we may conclude that 
the relevance of the nature of juristic personality can be situated in the pur-
pose that the construction enables. Fundamentally, whether the fictional 
theory, which the Dadoo case (Dadoo Case 1920) has shown to have taken 
precedence in our law in close association with the concession theory, or the 
collective rights theory is seen as the basis for the existence of a legal personal-
ity, a common thread can be drawn. This thread is the ownership of property 
for the end benefit of natural persons who are invested in the company, with 
no correlate risk in that property or in the activities associated therewith.
Not surprisingly, the converse of the limitation of liability of the natural 
persons who are invested in the juristic person is the displacement of liability 
that would ordinarily rest in those persons, were they to carry on business in 
their own name. This displaced liability is theoretically situated in the distinct 
juristic person. However, as this is a fictional person, the extent of its liability 
is limited against the assets it holds. The complexities of the interrelations 
between natural persons and any moral character of the potential impact of 
activities of the juristic person are, in essence, lost.
The Salamon case set the tone for recognition of instances where the dis-
tinction between the juristic person and the natural persons behind it could 
be disregarded, but this was limited to instances where the construct was 
employed to commit fraud. Consequently, there are very limited instances 
where the veil between the juristic person and its shareholders/members will 
be pierced. This is necessarily so, as we have established that limitation of 
liability is a fundament of the construct of the juristic person. The lack of 
accountability is exacerbated by the fact that a juristic person may comprise 
members or shareholders who are numerous and disparate in space and time, 
and may themselves be juristic persons. It becomes difficult to deconstruct 
the fragments of natural personality that constitute the juristic personality in 
order to secure accountability and limit harm (Deiser 1909a, 220). This may 
be conceded to as part of the objectives of the fiction, but must be recognised 
as problematic when it facilitates the subversion of duties that natural persons 
might have in relation to one another.
The theories of juristic personality do not provide very much content. 
Recognising the sustaining notion of the company as a ‘construct’ may not 
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provide universal content, but is useful in confronting the reality that cor-
porate personality is what the law allows it to be, and as such the law is 
empowered, if not compelled, to dictate the parameters of action and the 
means of attaching accountability to such action. Meaningful accountability 
would see those natural persons who benefit from the juristic person being 
accountable for the detriment to others that may be caused by the existence 
and power granted to that juristic person.
In confronting the elasticity of the concept of the fiction or construct of 
the juristic person, which veils the natural persons that animate it, it is nec-
essary to recognise that ‘[a] corporation cannot be for one purpose, so many 
men, for another purpose a person, and for another purpose a fiction’ (Deiser 
1908, 135). We may accept Deiser’s conclusion that central to the nature 
of the juristic person is the matter of property (1909b, 305). As such, the 
proposition that juristic persons are conduits for collective property holding 
becomes compelling.
SIMILARITY OF DESIGN AND PURPOSE: 
AN IDEOLOGICAL GOLDEN THREAD
Venkat Rao argues that the company as a juristic person emerged from the 
mercantilist approach to economic power (Rao 2011). This pivoted on impe-
rial expansion and control of landed property as the literal foundation of 
power. Conquest of South Africa is conventionally ascribed to the Dutch 
(Rao 2011), while in practice this was done through activities incidental to 
the commercial endeavours of the DEIC (Rao 2011). This demonstrates the 
inextricable symbiotic relationship between commercial and political expan-
sion endeavours that has occurred locally and globally (Callinicos 2009, 136). 
Companies have justified the appropriation of land in the furtherance of 
commercial pursuits in contexts ranging from unapologetic and theologically 
motivated conquest, to variations on the theme of a crusade for democracy in 
territories where barriers to entry by companies into markets were perceived 
to exist (Chomsky 1999, 65–68).
Philip Stern argues that the English East India Company (EEIC) and 
the DEIC (collectively EICs) were the originators of the modern multina-
tional (Stern 2016, 428). His argument is premised on their legal personality 
and corporate structure (separating ownership in joint transferrable stock/
shares and management control). Furthermore, he asserts that the EICs are 
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historical reference points for globalisation, capitalism and international trade 
law. Specifically, he sees these companies as the points at which medieval col-
lective commercial endeavours turned to more intricate capitalist principles 
and practices (Stern 2016, 429).
Stern criticises comparisons between the EICs and the modern company 
on the basis that instances of juristic persons do not follow a pattern of linear 
development, but are rather generated from the peculiarities of social and 
political contexts (Stern 2016, 431–32). A second reason for his opposition 
to this analogy has been the sovereign dimensions of the EICs (Stern 2016, 
433): both companies maintained armies and amassed territories, which fell 
ostensibly under their control. It may be contended, however, that variations 
in the configurations and exercise of power between the EICs and the modern 
company should not discount the purpose-made design of the control of land 
(and consequently labour) that applies in both cases.
Due to the anchoring of this chapter in South Africa, I will focus on the 
DEIC as a reference point. The philosophy of the jurist Hugo Grotius moti-
vated the DEIC’s stance in respect of both the entitlement to trade as well as 
that of conquest (Stern 2016, 436). Grotius specifically extended recognition 
of personhood to juristic persons when expounding on the right of persons 
to carry on war and assume dominium over conquered territories and peoples 
(Stern 2016, 437). He also influenced the proposition that the DEIC could 
legitimately be a sovereign and a subject simultaneously (Stern 2016, 438). 
This ideological context, Stern (2016, 444) notes, explains the mutually rein-
forcing character of the nation state and the company. The fact of both these 
institutions being juristic persons draws into focus the at times artificial dis-
tinction between public and private power (especially to the extent that the 
distinction is used to justify the absence of obligation to act in protection of 
the interests of disempowered natural persons).
The DEIC operated as a private company but was inherently a national 
enterprise (Geen 1946, 7). The Dutch government had substantial sharehold-
ing in it, and the steward of the early Dutch Republic was the chairman of the 
DEIC. Shareholding was limited to Dutch subjects, and small shareholders 
were encouraged. It was granted status as a legal person by a charter granted 
by the States General of Holland empowering the Council of XVII, which 
required a payment to the government over 21 years that was ostensibly rein-
vested into the operations of the DEIC. The Council of XVII was empowered 
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to conduct trade, amass colonial possessions, maintain an army and make 
treaties with foreign powers (Geen 1946, 7).
Colonial occupation of the Cape took place in 1652, led by Jan van 
Riebeeck who was the ship surgeon and commander of the DEIC mission to 
set up a refreshment station for Dutch ships bound for the East (Geen 1946, 
8–9). In 1660 he was promoted to the rank of governor, swearing obedience 
to the governor general at Batavia, and used his authority as commander 
of the DEIC and governor to constitute a Council of Policy. This Council 
notably included a law officer (who established a high court of justice), senior 
merchants, a chief salesman, bookkeeper, treasurer and two military officers 
(Geen 1946, 8–9). In effect, the DEIC had established itself as a monopoly 
and sovereign over the Cape.
The DEIC exercised control over the Cape, and introduced and main-
tained a deliberate social order consisting of four main groups: DEIC servants 
(employees), free burghers (employees who had been relieved of service and 
contracted to hold land in exchange to sustain farming operations), slaves and 
the Khoi (Lucas 2004, 32). Of these groups, the employees and free burghers 
were mostly white, with the exception of some employees and manumitted 
slaves who were referred to as ‘free blacks’, some of whom originated from 
other Dutch colonies. The DEIC also shaped the emerging society through 
the creation of a culture of materialism (Lucas 2004, 28). Some of the more 
superficial similarities between the DEIC in the Cape and modern corpora-
tions include the purchase carried by corporate identity and its signage and 
attendant symbols, including a company logo carried on all manner of objects 
ranging from packages to dinner plates (Lucas 2004, 28). As the DEIC oper-
ations in the Cape grew more self-sufficient they expanded territorially. Wars 
were instigated with indigenous communities to remove perceived threats to 
DEIC control (Lucas 2004, 72).
Notwithstanding the attainment of political independence, liberated col-
onies tend to nonetheless retain the residual economic, legal, political and 
cultural institutions of the colonial era – the normative underpinnings of 
which often go without interrogation (Sibanda 2011, 495). This is evidenced 
in the South African case. The significance of the shift in relationship of the 
indigenous persons to the DEIC, as a company, may be argued to be both 
physical and ontological; they shifted from being independent free agents to 
becoming dependent utilities whose occupation of space was now dictated 
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by European settlers through the instrument of a company. Of further sig-
nificance was the fact that the DEIC utilised this labour (without reward) on 
terms of its own making. Those terms, established by the DEIC, formed the 
foundation of mercantile law and labour relations in South Africa while over-
shadowing and reconstituting indigenous governance systems. To this effect 
the divine right of conquest utilised the law as an instrument for control 
(Ramose 2007, 313). This was the same law that was constitutive of and con-
stituted by the company as a juristic person.
COLONIALISM AND THE COMPANY’S 
PARTICIPATION IN ZONES OF BEING
This reflection on the DEIC and the beginning of colonial occupation of 
South Africa warrants the reassessment, prompted by Anibal Quijano, of the 
perception of history as a sequence of events where slavery and serfdom are 
presented as pre-capital occurrences (Quijano 2000, 550). Power relations 
set up by Europeans in the course of their conquest of the Global South, as 
seen in South Africa, were centrally based on racial classification and per-
ceptions of European superiority. Central to this project were the ideas that 
modernity and progress were linear and in the sole preserve of Europeans 
(Quijano 2000, 552–53). Processes such as modernisation, corporatisation 
and globalisation have been championed in the name of development, and 
have served to both legitimate themselves and to put themselves beyond 
question (Tully 2008, 478). This circular logic pervaded colonial institu-
tions, including companies used as instruments in various colonial contexts. 
Slavery was a deliberate commodification of human labour and was utilised 
to produce goods for consumption by the world market in the service of 
capitalism. Race was used as a social classification of the world’s popula-
tion and justified conquest, displacement and subjugation. The European 
Enlightenment brought with it conceptions of the identity of the European 
as central and superior, while others were essentialised into homogenised, 
inferior identities (Quijano 2000, 550–51).
The approach adopted by the DEIC in the Cape demonstrates that racial 
classification was strategic in facilitating the domination that justified 
exploitation. According to the Eurocentric conception of being, the body 
was the object of reason (Quijano 2000, 555). The distinction between body 
and reason (stemming from soul) enabled the theorisation of racial hierarchy. 
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Furthermore it allowed for the viewing of the bodies classified as certain races 
as mere objects, and thus inherently inferior to reasoned subjects.
Frantz Fanon refers to the recognition of the Hegelian ‘I and other’ that 
animated the conception of the Eurocentric (and patriarchal) conception of 
the human self (Fanon 1967, 82). He suggests that there is no black other, 
as the other, albeit distinct from the self, is still human. He thus presents 
blackness as existing in the zone of non-being, below the ‘other’ (Gordon 
2007, 11). People in the zone of being are recognised socially as human 
beings and thus reap the fruits of humanity, including rights and access to 
resources (Gordon 2007, 8). The sub-human or non-human exists in a zone 
of contested humanity or negation (Fanon 1967, 82). The zone of non-being 
is characterised by violence and inconsequentiality; it is a zone where social 
practices and convention normalise arbitrary death and the non-human sta-
tus of those who exist in this zone (Gordon 2007, 11). For the black person, 
any attempt to alter this condition is necessarily an act of violence. Gordon 
(2007, 11) explains that this is because change necessitates visibility, which is 
violent when that visibility is of an existence that is supposedly illegitimate.
To this effect Ramón Grosfoguel (2016, 10) propounds that racism is ‘a 
global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line of the human that 
have been politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced 
for centuries by the institutions of the “capitalist/patriarchal western-centric/
Christian-centric modern/colonial world-system”’. As such, racism, accord-
ing to Grosfoguel’s definition, is primarily but not necessarily reliant on race 
as a signifier. Therefore race is relevant to understanding the relationship 
between juristic persons and natural persons, especially in a context where 
some of the first companies (such as the DEIC) would relegate persons to the 
zone of non-being on the basis of race, as a justification for their dispossession 
and exploitation.
Race as a focal point is justified on the basis of the understanding of race 
as the dividing line between the zones of being and non-being (Grosfoguel 
2016, 11). It assumes that relations such as class, sexual orientation and gen-
der operate as factors within the zones, and therefore manifest as forms of 
oppression that are experienced differently in the zone of being than in the 
zone of non-being. According to Grosfoguel’s taxonomy, therefore, racism is 
a structural, hierarchy-related recognition of humanity. The racist violence of 
dispossession within colonialism, which would be unjustifiable if exercised 
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against human beings, is justified as it involves the dispossession of objects 
(Grosfoguel 2016, 14). In this way the company as a juristic person occupies 
the zone of being, while possessing the property of those that occupy the zone 
of non-being, as well their efforts. This is enabled by virtue of the company 
being recognised as a juristic person in the conceptualisation of natural per-
sons who inhabitant of the zone of being.
THE MODERN COMPANY: (POST)-COLONIAL 
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE CONSTITUTION
In South Africa, the common law definitions of natural and juristic persons 
prevail for the purposes of the contemporary Companies Act (No. 71 of 
2008), as the terms are not specifically defined there or in other South African 
legislation. Section 7 of the Companies Act does, however, make specific ref-
erence to the purpose of promoting the rights set out in the Bill of Rights 
that forms chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(Republic of South Africa 1996b) in the application of company law. While 
this may suggest an inclination towards a respect for human rights that would 
break from the conception of a company as being an instrument for exploita-
tion, as outlined above, further examination suggests that a commitment to 
rights may be more an inclination towards the preservation of privilege and 
subjugation.
The Constitution itself has been contested as being a product of unconvinc-
ing consent, given the nature of the compromise secured by the Convention 
for a Democratic South Africa negotiated settlement (More 2011, 170). 
James Tully argues that this is the nature of legal consent, as it is produced 
gradually through a shift from sanction for non-compliance to buy-in by 
habit and rules that appear natural in social, political and economic life (Tully 
2008, 472). Mabogo More (2011, 178) posits that the Constitution reaffirms 
the entitlement of the bearers of the fruits of the divine right of conquest. 
This is because of its resort to the language of South Africa belonging to 
all those who live in it, without tangible regard to the violence of displace-
ment that gave birth to the country; it therefore assists in perpetuating a 
convenient historical amnesia. More argues further that the latest transfer of 
political power, resulting from compromises secured in the negotiated set-
tlement, has maintained economic power in the hands of white people and 
secured the original project of white supremacy. This occurrence is not unique 
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to South Africa, as the situation of economic and military power outside the 
control of the sovereign states in the former colonies has made their political 
power appear tokenistic (Tully 2008, 477).
If this line of reasoning is adopted, then it is not surprising that Section 8 
(2) and Section 8 (4) of the Constitution, respectively, provide ‘[a] provision 
of the Bill of Rights [that] binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and 
the nature of any duty imposed by the right’ and that ‘a juristic person is 
entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature 
of the rights and the nature of that juristic person’ (Republic of South Africa 
1996a). This begs the question: what entitles a juristic person to rights gen-
erally regarded as ‘human rights’? (Interestingly, the only right in the Bill of 
Rights qualified as ‘human’ is dignity.)
Adopting the collective theory of juristic personality, it may be argued that 
the collective rights of the individuals that constitute a juristic person con-
verge into the rights of the juristic person. This is, however, problematic on 
several accounts. The first is that it assumes that there would not be com-
peting interests and rights of those within the juristic person, and that the 
exercise of a right to a specific end would be possible. Even if it did amount to 
a convergence of rights, this would be problematic as it would amount to the 
persons whose rights the juristic person is drawing from effectively receiving 
a duplicate set of rights in addition to their own right that contributes to the 
collective right (and effectively is no longer equal to others who do not possess 
the same). As I have noted, this is avoided by the argument that the juristic 
person is an entity distinct from its constituent natural persons. However, 
that takes us in circular fashion back to the question of why a juristic person 
would be entitled to rights.
Perhaps a more pertinent question would be what the purpose of confer-
ral of rights on juristic persons is. There we may conject that the answer, in 
terms of More’s (2011) reasoning about the Constitution being a compromise 
document, would be that the entitlement to property rights would secure 
the property of the juristic person amongst other rights, such as the right to 
privacy (which would secure the non-transparency of the juristic person) and 
the right to free speech (which would secure the right of the juristic person 
to influence policy). An example of this would be the financing of election 
campaigns (Brown 2015, 161).
200
Decolonising the Human
In this way, securing the property rights of the juristic person secures rights 
in land that entrench white control of most of the land in South Africa. This 
statement must be situated historically. We may depart from the point of the 
Natives’ Land Act (No. 27 of 1913). This Act facilitated legal displacement 
of the country’s black inhabitants, and thereby established a ‘captive labour 
force’ and set the tone for formal apartheid (More 2011, 179). It is relevant to 
note that this Act was repealed only in 1991. The Natives’ Land Act prohib-
ited natives (classed as all black peoples including ‘Africans’, ‘Coloureds’ and 
‘Indians’) from owning or buying land anywhere except in native reserves. 
Factually, even in these spaces title was generally granted in terms of long 
leases by the municipality.
Fanon describes colonialism as the combination of the conquest of territory 
and the oppression of people (Fanon 1967, 81–83). The politics of liberation 
was therefore necessarily a politics of land restitution (Fanon 1967, 82). Land 
is quite literally the foundation of life. It is material in the sense that it is the 
source of shelter and food, but it is also representative of dignity in the sense 
of the right to life and to agency (More 2011, 179). Colonialism created 
conditions for the majority of the colonised to be condemned to poverty and 
consequently death (More 2011, 179).
Lost land and lost sovereignty (in the form of displacement and depriva-
tion of freedom) for masses of indigenous peoples are a legacy of colonialism 
(More 2011, 179). The distinction between freedom and liberty is important 
to note for the purposes of understanding the manner in which the com-
pany is utilised to continue subordinating persons and restricting them to the 
zone of non-being (More 2011, 175). Although potentially free of constraints 
and physical bondage, liberated persons are not free to determine what a 
meaningful existence would amount to. Instead, for survival and literally for 
the entitlement to occupy space, someone else’s space, people must sell their 
labour on terms over which they have little or no power (Ramose 2007, 319).
The matter of survival of those who occupy the zone of non-being requires 
further scrutiny. Poverty is a function of the structure of economic relations 
and not a natural and inevitable phenomenon (O’Connell 2010, 205). What 
has been described as epistemic fundamentalism dressed in the garb of uni-
versality and neutrality perpetuates the thinking that solutions to problems 
will be found by addressing the symptoms rather than the cause of systemic 
inadequacies (Ndlovu and Makoni 2014, 505). The reality of the zero-sum 
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nature of the current economic system, which incorporates basic goods and 
services and forces them onto a global scale, make it natural, if not necessary, 
that some are deprived while others enjoy excess (O’Connell 2010, 204).
The limitations of regarding the world as (post-)colonial are evident 
when one examines the remaining institutions that operate on and perpet-
uate power relations that closely resemble those evident under colonial rule. 
Morgan Ndlovu and Eric Makoni refer to the emergence of the idea of colo-
niality as an understanding of the ways in which colonialisms have continued 
to exist, notwithstanding the dismantling of the overt political and judicial 
administrations of colonial governments (2013, 47–48). Coloniality, as the 
more nefarious and subtler operation of Western modernity and develop-
ment, maintains the zones of being and non-being (Mignolo 2009, 39). The 
role of structures and institutions in perpetuating colonial power dynamics 
does not always capture our attention to the extent that its potential conse-
quences should compel us to recognise.
The idea that juristic persons in their current form are essential for develop-
ment, and create employment, plays into notions of the trickle-down effect 
that have somehow not been deterred by evidence of increasing inequality 
and the absence of broad-based redistribution of wealth globally, and in 
South Africa in particular (Ndlovu and Makoni 2014, 506). Morgan Ndlovu 
and Eric Makoni draw attention to the way in which trickle-down thinking 
that idealises international investment and job creation simply perpetuates 
inequalities, as indigenous people generally operate as cheap labour depend-
ent on others who own the means of production (Ndlovu and Makoni 2014, 
511). To this end, globalisation is not an objective and organic process but 
rather a construct informed by a specific underpinning ideology (O’Connell 
2010, 204).
Ndlovu, reflecting on the Marikana massacre that took place in August 
2012, when 34 human beings employed as miners were killed in the course of 
demanding a living wage, questions whether state actors can fathom an eco-
nomic system different to that which enabled the conditions that facilitated 
the massacre (Ndlovu 2013, 56). He notes that for as long as exploitation 
continues, resistance to it make the occurrence of violent suppression inevi-
table. Part of the project of coloniality is the undermining of the rationality 
of the perspective of the oppressed, in the context of a reference point that 
is positioned as neutral but is nonetheless Eurocentric. The conditions 
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that prevail for the majority of black South Africans occupying the zone of 
non-being are violent and inhumane (Ndlovu 2013, 56–57). Most sectors of 
the economy remain dominated by white people (in the form of ownership 
or control) and black people are relegated to being cheap labour. Perhaps the 
most disturbing aspect of this dynamic is the purported neutrality with which 
poverty is viewed. The conduct of the state that facilitates and perpetuates 
inequality cannot be dismissed without, again, turning our attention to the 
historical context that informs the very formation of states in (post-)colonial 
countries. We are reminded that juristic persons with commercial interests 
were at the helm of the dissection of Africa into nation states at the 1884 
Berlin Conference (Ndlovu 2013, 57).
LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
SERVING THE ZONE OF BEING
The South African Constitution is heralded as the solution to the ills of injus-
tice and inequality; however, its abstract ideals are not reconciled with the 
concrete experiences of poverty (Modiri 2015, 224–5). The ways in which 
the law produces the subjects it seeks to protect, and the necessity of the 
adoption of that victim subjectivity in order to benefit from such protec-
tion, are co-constitutive (Brown 2000, 231). Those who do not have the 
means to enforce their rights must appeal to the benevolence of others to 
act on their behalf, or alternatively be satisfied with remaining in the zone of 
non-existence. The net effect is an attempt to mitigate the effects of poverty 
rather than to eradicate its causes or even envision a society where poverty is 
intolerable.
Joel Malesela Modiri exposes a contradiction in the recourse to rights as 
a remedy to end poverty (Modiri 2015, 255). Fundamentally, using these 
rights to secure the institutions and systems that generate poverty contradicts 
the effect of appeals to rights to create carve outs (specific instances in which 
transgressions are deemed unacceptable and for which symptomatic relief is 
provided) in respect of deviant conduct; these appeals are attempts to miti-
gate the harmful effects of institutions, rather than ways to call into question 
the legitimacy of those very institutions and of the power they have to cause 
harm. Appeals to these rights also frame harm as sensational instances that 
offend conceptions of what is permissible, but do not require accountability 
of actors in the scheme of social power dynamics and the ways in which 
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dynamics of subordination and control are maintained (Modiri 2015, 255). 
To this effect, Sanele Sibanda questions whether the liberal democratic con-
stitutional paradigm is conducive to bringing about the structural change 
that is necessary to free impoverished people from the status of dependent 
non-beings (Sibanda 2011, 497). Rights, in their current context, require an 
appeal to power without questioning the legitimacy of that power.
Tshepo Madlingozi also refers to the Marikana massacre of miners who 
were essentially contesting their location in the zone of non-being, where 
they were expected to accept the terms of an existence as objects to be acted 
upon, or as mere functionaries in a system (Madlingozi 2016, 138–39). He 
argues that colonial apartheid creates an ontology of being where being white, 
equated to being human, is greater than being black, which is equated to 
being sub-human (Madlingozi 2016, 124). He argues that the transition 
to a constitutional democracy represented merely a transition in phases of 
coloniality and not liberation in the sense of restored ontological and mate-
rial humanity (Madlingozi 2016, 129). Liberation is understood in terms 
of restored dignity and land, as well as agency over that land, including the 
conditions of subsistence on that land (Madlingozi 2016, 135). To this end 
he argues that human rights discourse extends the discourse of determination 
of who is human and who is not, and the pursuit of the recognition of human 
rights translates into the aspiration towards being white and Western, as a 
prerequisite for existence in the zone of being.
In the context of the company, this manifests as recourse to finding and 
enforcing human rights obligations of juristic persons in response to violations 
of the rights of natural persons. It involves balancing the rights of juristic per-
sons against those of human beings in a context that purports to make use of 
an even scale – as opposed to re-imagining the acceptable parameters of activ-
ity or even legitimate purposes of juristic persons in society, having recognised 
the fictional and at best artificial nature of corporates. Recourse to rights to 
mitigate the plight of those relegated to the zone of non-being neglects the 
manner in which rights entrench the system that created the conditions for 
relegation into that zone in the first instance. That is, the paradoxical opera-
tion of rights is neglected (Brown 2000, 234).
Rights are premised on a liberal individualism. They formulate power as a 
zero-sum game that requires, at best, a balancing act that maintains political 
and social order. Wendy Brown cautions that ‘[w]e must take into account 
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what rights discourse does not avow about itself ’ (2000, 237–38). She argues 
that we must be critical of an approach that incrementally solves or miti-
gates problems with a view to a later solution to the extent that our energies 
and attentions are occupied with alleviating the symptoms of injustice, rather 
than addressing its causes. One of the paradoxes of rights that she identifies 
is that they regulate by circumscribing the category that they serve to protect 
and simultaneously dismantle. They are presented as protections that persons 
simply ‘ cannot not want ’, notwithstanding their limiting effect on systemic 
solutions (Brown 2000, 237–38). This paradox stems from the resolvability 
of the challenge to a system that, in seeking to modify the system, appeals to 
that very system to be more accommodating, thereby necessarily legitimating 
it (Brown 2000, 238).
It has been argued that oppression is contextual, and as such the remedy for 
it must address its context. Brown (2004, 460) asks: ‘[y]es the abuse must be 
stopped but by whom, with what techniques, with what unintended effects, 
and above all unfolding what possible futures?’ Frustrations with human 
rights do not necessarily stem from a conceptual rejection of rights, but rather 
a rejection of the ways in which rights discourse is used to patronise those 
with lived experiences of poverty and injustice in the face of the rights-based 
protection of those institutions that perpetuate these experiences.
POSSIBILITIES OF THE FICTION/CONSTRUCT: POWER 
AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE TO GOVERN
It is prudent, finally, to contemplate the fundamental question of what the 
source of power of one person over another is. Deiser submits that control is 
ultimately a function of the power of the strong over the weak, and that inev-
itably some persons are able to exert force over others and as such influence 
those others to act in accordance with their own will and for their own ben-
efit (Deiser 1908, 135). While a detailed exposition and contestation of the 
operation of power is beyond the scope of this chapter, as are the implications 
of the juristic personality of the state itself, it may be argued that this author-
ity to enforce power operates centrally at the state level. The classic social 
contract theory suggests that the state’s authority to govern is derived from 
the consent of the governed (Deiser 1909a, 226–27). Theoretically, with this 
authority comes the expectation that the state will regulate relations between 
persons in a manner that is just, using the power and authority entrusted to it.
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Natural persons have utilised the construct of the juristic person and the 
amorality of profit-seeking to exert control without personal accountability 
(Stephens 2002, 46). This has been exacerbated by the potentially nebulous 
control structures that the fiction enables, which at times make identifica-
tion of the persons behind the fiction itself a nearly impossible task. This is 
evidenced by the manner in which persons have profited from the oppres-
sion enacted by companies in the form of dispossession, slavery and genocide 
(Stephens 2002, 46). The fiction of the juristic person has thus far been 
employed to effect the imposition of the interests of the strong over the per-
son of the weak or weakened, including the interest of maintaining a relative 
position of strength. The fiction has operated, largely unquestioned, within a 
colonial frame of reference.
In order to extend decolonisation beyond the tokenistic into the tangible 
transformation of power relations, the reality and consequences of disposses-
sion must be interrogated (Tuck and Yang 2012, 7). Therefore, the systemic 
nature of poverty and the manner in which the company operates as an 
instrument in this system are relevant. So too is the manner in which this 
construct has operated to obscure the racialised relations between natural 
persons and the dehumanising operation of coloniality. The golden thread 
of control of land is significant against the backdrop of the company’s role in 
historical and continuing dispossession. The occupation by the juristic person 
of the zone of being, at the expense of persons consigned thereby to the zone 
of non-being, is central in this process of questioning. The manner in which 
the construct of the juristic person empowers the inequitable control of land 
and the generation of captive labour is central to this.
The contention that coloniality imposes an epistemological paradigm that 
proclaims itself inevitable and absolute may explain the lack of interrogation 
of the role that juristic personality plays in maintaining colonial relations 
of power. A hesitation about re-imagining this paradigm supports Ramose’s 
argument that colonialism was not only genocidal but epistemicidal, in that 
indigenous epistemologies were discredited and replaced with a Eurocentric 
monopoly on reason (Ramose 2007, 313). This has extended to the purport-
edly neutral principles that have informed and animated institutions such as 
the company. The utility and desirability of the legal construct of the com-
pany as a juristic person can and must be interrogated by the state, which 
in theory confers upon the construct its very existence. In this process the 
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epistemic points of reference must be consciously situated when populating 
the construct of the company, bearing in mind the real consequences that the 
construct has had and continues to have on persons of flesh and blood.
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he business of cultural tourism naturally depends on the idea of cultural 
differences. However, in the context of the present modern/colonial 
world order, where being human is no longer a natural endowment but 
is affirmed or negated by a system that creates a hierarchy between ‘superior’ 
and ‘inferior’ beings, cultural tourism has also become a site of denying the 
common humanity of modern subjects. Thus, on the one hand, there are 
those whose humanity is affirmed by the presence of the cultural tourism 
business, and on the other hand, there are those whose humanity is negated 
by the same business. In such a situation, the business of cultural tourism 
becomes a microcosm of the very modern/colonial world order in which the 
subject of being human is characterised by a tussle between affirmation and 
negation, rather than being something taken for granted. In the case of South 
Africa, the staging of the cultural village tourism business is underpinned 
by a struggle between the experiences that affirm and those that negate the 
humanity of the subjects involved, along the lines of race, class, gender, sexu-
ality, religion and ethnic classification.
In this chapter, I develop a two-pronged approach to the idea of the ‘human’ 
in the staging of cultural villages in South Africa. The first is a genealogical 
approach that historicises the constraining structural conditions that per-
meate the idea of cultural villages in South Africa, and their conceptions of 
what constitutes being human or non-human. This is a situation that cannot 
be conceived of outside an understanding of the construction of the modern/ 
colonial world system – a system in which the global tourism industry in general 
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and cultural villages in particular are steeped. The second, phenomenological 
approach focuses on how the historically rooted structural conditions that still 
exist in South Africa produce particular ideas and practices about being human 
and not being human within the cultural village tourism industry. I will argue 
that while cultural village tourism in the country primarily seeks to maximise 
profit from the booming cultural tourism business, this happens at the expense 
of the humanity of the subjects who are on the dominated side of the colonial 
power differential. In combining these two approaches, I aim to address the 
limitations of both ‘present-ism’ and ‘historicism’ as ways of understanding the 
making of cultural villages and their idea of humanity.
THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM AND THE 
INVENTION OF THE SUB-HUMAN
The structure of cultural village tourism in South Africa is undeniably a hierar-
chically organised one, with the capitalist class that owns the cultural villages 
at the top, and at the bottom an impoverished working class that provides 
labour for the villages. However, what is quite intriguing about the manner 
in which this structure is constructed is the idea that it is sustained through 
the coerced participation of those at the bottom of the hierarchy, who are 
its victims. Thus, in her definition of what cultural villages are, Elizabeth 
Jansen van Veuren (2001, 139) describes them as ‘purpose-built complexes 
intended, with the help of cultural workers, as a simulation of aspects of 
the way of life of a cultural grouping, as it was at a specific period (or over 
several periods) of time’. This definition is quite perplexing, because apart 
from the idea it presents that these villages reproduce colonial myths about 
being a non-Western ‘Other’, the poor working-class people from indigenous 
communities who are employed there not only experience ‘harsh exploitation 
and [other] demeaning work situations’ (Jansen van Veuren 2001, 143) but 
are coerced to participate in staging the same cultural villages. This model of 
the relationship between superior and inferior beings in the cultural village is 
reflective of the normative relationship between superior and inferior beings 
in the whole modern/colonial world system, whose dehumanising structure is 
capable of inducing non-voluntary actions among subaltern communities in 
ways that may make these actions appear as though they are voluntary.
In general, the modern world system is predicated on the dominance 
and hegemony of a Western-centred modernity. This is a modernity/
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coloniality whose origins are traceable to Europe’s usurpation of world history 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013), beginning with the ‘voyages of discovery’ by figures 
such as Christopher Columbus and Vasco Da Gama in the fifteenth century. 
These voyagers ventured outside Europe to encounter the indigenous peoples 
of the non-Western world – peoples whose humanity they doubted on the 
basis of the fact that they practised traditions and cultures that were different 
from those of the Western subject.
These early encounters between Western and non-Western subjects are 
important to our understanding of the present conceptions of humanity that 
exist, even in cultural tourism projects such as that of the cultural village in 
South Africa, precisely because they marked the beginning of a system that 
would question the humanness of the non-Western subject and has contin-
ued to do so up to the present. Thus, for instance, as soon as Christopher 
Columbus stepped off the ship onto American soil in October 1492, the 
difference that he encountered in the cultures and religions of the indige-
nous peoples of the ‘New World’ made him preoccupied with the question 
of whether the non-Western subject had a soul. This question inaugurated 
the discourse of a ‘people without souls’ (Grosfoguel 2013) – a discourse that 
has justified the negation of the humanity of the non-Western subject ever 
since. However, the significance of the idea of a ‘soul-less’ people, a myth 
on which the modern/colonial world was founded, lies not only in the 
production of superior and inferior beings but also in the inauguration of a 
hierarchical world system within which modern/colonial subjects are classi-
fied. At the apex of the hierarchy is a Western subject and at the bottom is a 
non-Western, colonial one. In their locations at these two polar opposite posi-
tions, the modern/colonial subjects have contrasting tales of what it means 
to be human, precisely because being at the apex means that one’s humanity 
is excessively affirmed, while being at the bottom means that one struggles to 
be recognised as human.
In terms of the sequence of events that unfolded after Columbus’s ‘discovery’ 
of the Americas, the inauguration of the discourse of a ‘people without souls’ 
was followed by processes of dehumanisation that included the enslavement of 
indigenous peoples and direct and indirect forms of colonisation, all of which 
signified the radical nature of the doubt that existed about the humanity of 
the non-Western subject in the eyes of the imperial Western subject. This rad-
ical doubt was accompanied by what Ramón Grosfoguel describes as multiple 
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hierarchies of power or ‘heterarchies of power’ (Grosfoguel 2007, 217) that 
cannot be accommodated in the reductionist analyses of the Marxist political 
economy and cultural studies paradigms, since they had sexual, political, epis-
temic, economic, spiritual, linguistic and racial dimensions. In other words, 
the architecture of the modern world system that came into being after the 
voyages of discovery of 1492 resembles a ‘historical-structural heterogeneous 
totality’ of sexual, gender, spiritual, epistemic, economic, political, linguistic, 
aesthetic, pedagogical and racial/ethnic hierarchies (Grosfoguel 2007), many 
of which are visible in the cultural village tourism of South Africa. Thus, as I 
will elaborate later in this chapter, the dehumanised subject involved in cul-
tural village tourism experiences various forms of negation of humanity along 
the lines of race, gender, class and spirituality, to name but a few.
In general, the modern world system predicated on a Western-centred 
modernity is a synchronic, heterogeneous structural system that reproduces 
itself even in the face of anti-systemic movements and change. Thus, even 
though we live in a world that is ‘post-colonial’ in nature, there is no doubt 
that colonial tendencies and practices of the past are still present and intact, 
except for the juridical-administrative colonialism that collapsed with the 
demise of white settler governments across the non-Western world.
The answer to the question of why the modern world system remains, 
reproducing itself and reifying inequalities even in moments characterised as 
instances of change, lies in making sense of the difference between a ‘world 
system’ and a ‘world order’ (Ndlovu 2014). The former is more resistant to 
change, as it is sustained by the latter. Thus, in the face of anti-systemic move-
ments such as the anti-colonial liberation struggles, the world system produces 
a series of world orders for survival, concealment, reform and continuity. This 
means that the demise of juridical-administrative colonialism in formerly col-
onised regions such as Africa did not inaugurate a new world system, but 
only served to produce a new world order that concealed the synchrony of 
the continuing modern world system. In other words, world orders repre-
sent a series of diachronic movements within a singular synchronic structural 
modern world system that is resistant to change – a process that leads to 
‘repetition without change’ (Fanon 1963, 23) in liberation efforts to decolo-
nise the world. However, the modern world system’s ability to resist change 
is also derived from the failure by anti-systemic agencies to comprehend the 
historical-structural totality of the system, thereby waging isolated struggles 
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that focus on singular components of the entanglement in such a way that the 
idea of a concerted effort is negated. Thus, for instance, a feminist discourse 
that privileges the challenging of patriarchy within the modern world system 
at the expense of racism, xenophobia, tribalism and capitalism, to name but 
a few other hierarchies of oppression, negates the liberation struggle against 
colonial modernity as a whole.
The modern world system, from its very inception, has always been con-
stitutive of a modernity/coloniality project that produces beneficiaries of 
the structure on its ‘brighter side’, who are Western subjects, and victims 
of the structure, found on its ‘darker side’, who form the identity category 
of the non-Western subject (Mignolo 2011). In the context of understand-
ing meanings of humanness as projected in activities such as those of the 
cultural village tourism industry in South Africa, the interdependent parts 
of the modernity/coloniality project that sustains the modern world system 
can also be characterised in the Fanonian terms of the ‘zone of being’ and the 
‘zone of non-being’ (Fanon 1967, 10). The zone of being is in essence the 
brighter side of the modernity/coloniality project, and the zone of non-being 
is the darker side of this dichotomous system. This characterisation is useful 
in that it helps us to understand that, by its very nature, the structure of the 
modern world system produces subjects who are considered ‘human’, or the 
‘humanitas’, and those who languish at its bottom and fall into the category 
of the ‘non-human’ or the ‘anthropos’ (Mignolo 2009). In the cultural village 
tourism industry of South Africa, it is interesting to note that the anthropos is 
constituted by members of a racial, class, gender, ethnic, spiritual and sex cat-
egory. This therefore makes the idea of deracialisation different from that of 
decolonisation, as the former merely replaces white bodies with black bodies 
without changing the colonial logics of domination and subjugation of one 
group of people by another.
THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM AND 
THE POLITICS OF KNOWING
That the humanity of those in the zone of non-being, whose existence is 
equivalent to that of objects and sub-ontological beings, is negated cannot 
easily make sense to those in the zone of being, unless the subject who exists in 
this zone of being is able to ‘shift the geography of reason’ (Gordon 2011, 96) 
or jurisdiction and think from the position of being a dominated subject in 
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the scheme of the ‘colonial differential’ (Mignolo 2005, 381). This is simply 
because the modern world system as a structure sustains itself through a colonial 
politics of knowing that privileges the world views of the dominant subjects. 
Thus, even though there is always a pretence of neutrality, our knowledges 
are always situated (Grosfoguel 2007; Haraway 1988), hence we always speak 
from a particular epistemic location in the existing power structures. This 
means that ‘nobody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geo-
graphical and racial hierarchies of the modern/colonial/capitalist/patriarchal 
world-system’ (Grosfoguel 2007, 213) when producing knowledge about a 
particular phenomenon.
In the context of examining how and why the idea of humanness in the 
cultural village tourism industry in South Africa is produced in the man-
ner in which the villages have done, it is important to be open about one’s 
‘geo-politics’, ‘ego-politics’, ‘body-politics’ and ‘theo-politics of knowl-
edge’ (Grosfoguel 2007). Such openness about one’s epistemic standpoint 
is intended to undermine the common myth in Western philosophy that 
it is possible to produce objective and universal truths that are acceptable 
across different socio-historical experiences. This myth conceals the colonial-
ity present in knowledge production by attempting to deny the fact that all 
knowledges are partial, hence even those that assume to be a ‘god’s-eye-view’ 
(Castro-Gomez 2003, n.p.) are just points of view that pretend to be without 
points of view (Grosfoguel 2007). In this analysis of the idea of the human 
in the South African cultural village tourism industry, I speak from the epis-
temic position of a dehumanised subject in the power structure of the colonial 
differential, rather than from the position of a dominant subject such as the 
owner of a cultural village or a tourist.
While my approach is to present a perspective about how the cultural vil-
lages in South Africa produce particular meanings about humanness during 
the conduct of their tourism business, by attempting to write from a position 
of the oppressed subjects and not merely about the oppressed (Grosfoguel 
2007), thereby shifting the geography of reason (Gordon 2011), it is impor-
tant to highlight that social locations do not always correspond with the 
epistemic location of the subject that speaks. This is more pronounced in 
formerly colonised contexts, where the colonisation effect works at the epis-
temic level by successfully deploying the myths of objectivity and universal 
truths to make the subjects who are socially located on the dominated side of 
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the colonial power differential speak from the position of the dominant sub-
ject. This decoupling of epistemic location from social location has led to a 
situation where the oppressed are hoodwinked into participating even in pro-
jects that perpetuate their own oppression. Awareness of this arms a research 
exercise of this nature with a road map for understanding how technolo-
gies of subjection such as the colonisation of knowledge, power, subjectivity 
and imagination produce colonial subjects, even in the absence of a visible 
juridical-administrative colonial system. This can only be reversed through 
some form of ‘epistemic rebellion’ and ‘disobedience’ (Mignolo 2009, 159) 
that can open a door towards knowing that which was meant to be concealed 
and remain unknown.
THE ‘BRIGHTER SIDE’ AND ‘DARKER SIDE’ OF 
CULTURAL VILLAGE TOURISM IN SOUTH AFRICA
The cultural village tourism industry of South Africa, like the modern world 
system that it mirrors, is constituted by an interdependent hierarchical struc-
ture of modernity/coloniality. Thus, it is made up of participants who occupy 
the ‘brighter side’ of the cultural village tourism project and those who lan-
guish on its ‘darker side’. Those on the brighter side of the staging of the 
cultural villages include the owners of the villages, who reap the lion’s share 
of the tourism income (Jansen van Veuren 2003) and tourists who enjoy the 
gaze, while on the darker side of the enterprise are the exploited employ-
ees who provide cheap labour as well as the performers of culture, whose 
impoverished circumstances force them to re-enact negative myths and racial 
stereotypes about who they are (see Ndlovu 2014, 105).
In order to understand all the nuances of the interdependent structure of 
modernity/coloniality in the construction of cultural villages, as well as its 
effects on the idea of humanity, it is important to briefly examine their loca-
tion in time and space, the nature of their political economy, the profiles of 
their participants and the cultural content of their displays, all of which reveal 
their imbrication in and entanglement with the modernity/coloniality project 
of the modern world system. The first initiative to construct a cultural village 
in South Africa was undertaken in 1965 by a white entrepreneur (Jansen 
van Veuren 2003). This was at the height of the apartheid era in which the 
indigenous subject constituted by the black race was subjected to crude forms 
of colonial oppression and segregation. The timing of the construction of the 
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first cultural village in South Africa, by a subject whose race category was in 
the process expressing radical doubt about the humanity of the indigenous 
black subject, must thus be viewed with suspicion, as it could not then have 
been possible to deviate from the dominant discourse about what it means to 
be a black African, seen from the point of view of the coloniser. It is, there-
fore, not surprising that after the physical erection of this first cultural village 
by an individual white entrepreneur, the apartheid government through its 
provincial arm – the then Transvaal Provincial Administration – followed suit 
by constructing its own cultural villages, in 1975 and 1984. This was sim-
ply because the idea of a cultural village did not deviate from the broader 
apartheid project of denying co-humanness of white South Africans with 
the indigenous black people of South Africa; hence the idea was supported 
and promoted at state level. Thus, for instance, the idea of cultural villages 
dovetailed well with the apartheid regime’s divide-and-rule ideology, as these 
villages would fuel tribalism of the kind that was already being promoted 
through the adoption of ‘Bantustan’ policies.
After the demise of apartheid at the juridical-administrative level in 1994 
the construction of cultural villages continued, but under the control of 
various stakeholders such as white and black entrepreneurs, as well as the 
democratic government and community-based organisations. While this 
time around there were many stakeholders involved in these activities, the 
cultural content of the villages did not depart from the colonial script of 
what it meant to be an indigenous black African subject. Thus, for instance, 
because of their displays of what are supposedly the ‘cultures’ of indigenous 
black Africans, the villages continued to be accused of representing ‘myths 
instead of culture’ (Tomaselli and Wang 2001, 23); of presenting cultural 
practices in a romantic, superficial and ahistorical manner, frozen in time; 
of reproducing stereotypes, generated by the West’s desire for exoticism and 
imaginings of the primitive ‘Other’ (Craik 1997, 118; Jansen van Veuren 
2003, 150) and of treating tourists as if they were for the most part uncritical, 
passive consumers who enjoyed such representations because they confirmed 
their preconceived stereotypes (Marschall 2003, 110). This clearly shows that 
even though the idea of cultural villages later came to be implemented by 
different stakeholders, including victims of coloniality, they remained a dehu-
manising project that inferiorised the non-Western ‘Other’. It also shows that 
deracialisation of the structures of modernity/coloniality is not tantamount 
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to their decolonisation, since the aim of decolonisation is to dismantle the 
hierarchies of colonial oppression that reproduce these structures in terms of 
a differently ordered racial composition.
The criticisms levelled against the cultural content of the villages are not 
without merit, when one looks at what is on display during the performance 
of what is supposedly culture before the tourist audience. Thus, for instance, 
themes of primitivism, barbarism, female nudity and cannibalism, among 
other demeaning cultural displays, dominate the cultural content of many 
of the villages. At the cultural village of PheZulu Safari Park, bare-breasted 
women perform what one can interpret as ‘female nudity’ and as a sign of 
promiscuity, while the warrior images presented by male performers can be 
read as seeking to sustain the myth of black Africans as ‘bloodthirsty savages’ 
(Ndlovu 2014, 85−86). This is not to dispute the fact that the performers 
have their own positive interpretations of the performances, such as that of 
displaying ‘purity’ and ‘virginity’, or the celebration of heroic exploits by the 
Zulu king, Shaka Zulu; it is merely to emphasise that a counter-hegemonic 
discourse that is steeped in themes that were popularised by coloniality is in 
itself limited in its subversive content.
Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the notion of a savage, with 
its various connotations, had become a routine concept in descriptions of 
black Africans. According to Jan Pieterse (1992, 35), the nineteenth-century 
‘savage’ is characterised by absences such as clothing, and other attributes of 
lack of civilisation. Moreover, ‘savages’ are associated with raw nature, and ‘in 
addition to representations of Africans as animals there are representations 
of Africans and animals, brought together in a single picture’ (Pieterse 1992, 
43). At PheZulu Safari Park, the cultural village performances take place in a 
safari park, a nature reserve, alongside the viewing of wild animals, for exam-
ple crocodiles and snakes. This spectacle of ‘authenticity’ about being a black 
African or a Zulu is further amplified by a display of craft objects at the 
entrance to the cultural village that depict nude images of what are suppos-
edly typical African people, armed with traditional weapons and living in the 
midst of wild animals. This makes it clear that a cultural village such as that 
of PheZulu Safari Park is steeped in Eurocentric discourses that characterise 
Africans either as animals or as living together with animals – a development 
that is reminiscent of how the European iconography of the nineteenth cen-
tury depicted Africans and the peoples of the non-Western world in general.
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By and large, cultural villages such as PheZulu Safari Park are a mirror of 
the colonial exhibitions of the 1890s in Europe, where non-Western peoples 
were featured to rehearse what were supposedly their cultural identities before 
their European spectators. According to Annie Coombes (1994), almost all 
of the public displays of non-Western communities in exhibitionary narra-
tives between 1890 and 1930 were underlined by a rhetoric of ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘authenticity’, and as such, had a number of different implications for 
the construction of racial stereotypes. During this time, Zulu people fea-
tured in the drama Briton, Boer and Black, where they were inhabitants of 
the ‘Zulu Kraal’ and were validated by Henry Morgan Stanley as ‘real sav-
ages’ in this way: ‘Your “savages” are real African natives, their dresses and 
dances, equipment and actions are also very real and when I heard their songs 
I almost fancied myself among the Mazamboni near Lake Albert once again’ 
(Coombes 1994, 88).
Such evidence of the structure of the colonial discourse that informs the 
content of many of the cultural villages indicates that these villages continue 
to project the cultural identities of black Africans in a dehumanising manner, 
even in the age dubbed ‘post-apartheid’ in South Africa.
The themes of witchcraft and black magic in the cultural content of many of 
the villages such as PheZulu Safari Park represent a Christian-centric imagery 
about being a non-Western subject. According to Sabine Marschall, ‘a brief 
appearance of the Zulu traditional diviner or sangoma is also a standard at 
Phezulu (and at most other cultural villages), catering for those Westerners 
who are fascinated by “witchdoctors” and “black magic” in the dark conti-
nent’ (Marschall 2003, 113).
The figure of a traditional healer is found across almost all cultural villages 
and is used to sustain the myth of ‘witchdoctor’, but what needs to be noted 
is that in the idea of the witchdoctor there is a discourse of lack of civilisation 
and of the darkness of the continent that justifies the imposition of Western 
civilisation, which is assumed to be the bringer of a necessary light. This cele-
bration of Western civilisation as the source of light is projected through the 
theme of witchdoctors without noticing the contradiction in the term itself, 
as one cannot be a ‘witch’ and a ‘doctor’ at the same time.
The dehumanising effect of cultural villages is primarily enabled by a dis-
course and a process that colonise space and time. Firstly, all the cultural 
villages are situated outside urban centres such as Pretoria, Johannesburg and 
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Durban, among others. Lesedi cultural village is located just outside Pretoria, 
and PheZulu Safari Park is located in the proximity of Durban. This is not 
just a coincidence but is meant to project being an indigenous and authentic 
black African subject as being outside modernity in terms of the ‘here and 
now’. In the logic of the Western imaginary, cities and urban centres are signs 
of a flourishing modernity. This is in contrast to the rural and semi-rural set-
tings that are characterised as wilderness – a spatio-historical temporality that 
is associated with the original ‘dark continent’ of Africa and its ‘backward’ 
indigenous communities of the past. In other words, the urban represents 
the fullness of modernity, whereas the semi-urban or the rural is the antipode 
of this fullness. In this way, the cultural villages emerge as relics of the past, 
which existed in a state of backwardness; hence, by revealing an instance of a 
lack of human qualities they are a source of celebration of the triumphalism 
of Western civilisation.
The false salvationist rhetoric of modernity/coloniality is also discernible 
in the political economy of the cultural villages. Thus, despite the fact that 
they are presented as pro-poor projects, these villages are generally sites of 
economic exploitation and, in some instances, racial subjugation. For exam-
ple, in the typical instance of a white-owned cultural village, the stereotypical 
colonial racial roles of the black people as workers and entertainers, and the 
white people as managers, owners of the means of production and spectators 
are perpetuated. There is not yet a single instance of a cultural village in which 
these roles are reversed. Instead, even in instances where black people are 
the managers, owners and spectators, the workers and performers are always 
black. This is a development that one can characterise in Etienne Balibar’s 
terms as ‘racism without races’ (Balibar 2007, 85) – a development that rein-
forces the myth of whiteness as the normal state of humanity and blackness as 
an antipode and a sign of the lack of humanity.
In general, the idea that the cultural villages of South Africa are neither 
a salvationist intervention to address the plight of the oppressed, nor inno-
cent of colonial matrices of power within the spatio-historical temporality 
dubbed ‘post-apartheid’, means that we need to redefine their significance. 
This cannot be achieved merely by focusing on what these villages are, based 
on their physical appearance, but must involve seeking an answer to the ques-
tion of what they fundamentally stand for within the structure of modernity/ 
coloniality. This is a question that requires a decolonial observer to analyse 
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how the concept of the ‘cultural village’ was coined in the first place. Thus, for 
instance, what can be deduced in the idea of a cultural village is that it is made 
complete by linking two concepts that, in their totality, question the human-
ity of the indigenous subject. The first concept is that of ‘culture’, which 
develops out of the ontological question of being a non-Western subject. The 
second concept is that of a ‘village’, which emanates from the developmental 
question that doubts the modernity of the indigenous subject. The totality of 
the meanings of the two nouns ‘culture’ and ‘village’ results in a rhetoric that 
mirrors the ‘backwardness’ of indigenous people.
Cultural villages as a dehumanising project can also be characterised as 
aimed at revealing more about the achievement of the project of modernity/
coloniality than about the backwardness of the indigenous subject. As Walter 
Mignolo (2007, 470) observes, ‘the colonization of time and the institution 
of the temporal colonial difference were crucial for the narratives of moder-
nity as salvation, emancipation and progress’. After observing the staging of the 
cultural village, an observer is meant to be convinced that the triumphalism 
of Western civilisation was, indeed, a justified project which brought ‘devel-
opment’ to the indigenous people, as the indigenous subject was in a state of 
‘pre-modern’ stagnation. The concepts of development and under-development 
are deliberately evoked, albeit indirectly, because these concepts serve as ‘new 
versions of the rhetoric of modernity insofar as both concepts were invented to 
re-organize the temporal and spatial colonial difference’ (Mignolo 2007, 472). 
The cultural village is, therefore, a site where the anthropological discourse of 
being and the development discourse of linear development meet each other to 
define the ‘authenticity’ of an indigenous subject as being backward and out-
side of modernity. This is why cultural villages are staged outside spaces where 
modernity flourishes, so as to pronounce eloquently that the authenticity of 
the indigenous people of South Africa lies in being part of the wilderness – a 
representation of temporal and spatial colonial difference.
Cultural villages can also be characterised as a sign of racial and colonial 
woundedness. They are a social space where the colonial subaltern that car-
ries the burden of colonial difference faces a crisis of lack of options to avoid 
the threat of suffering a racialised colonial wound. This colonial subaltern 
is the black subject whom Fanon (1963) describes as the wretched of the 
earth, who not only suffers damnation, but is also coerced to legitimise their 
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oppression by feigning voluntary participation in the restructuration of the 
structure of modernity/coloniality. In the whole of the non-Western world, 
the pain of colonial wounds varies across time and space, but cultural vil-
lages rank among the sources of the deepest wounds, since, in addition to the 
already visible pain of losing valuable resources such as land, the oppressed are 
required to mock themselves to appease the very powers that are a source of 
their misery. In other words, cultural villages represent misery within misery, 
as those who are the object of the project of epistemic death under the aus-
pices of modernity/coloniality are not only forced to carry the cross on which 
they are being crucified, but are also required to entertain the crucifier as they 
suffer the pains of death.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it needs to be emphasised that the problem with the idea of 
the human today is a challenge produced by a dehumanising global structure. 
This means that projects such as cultural villages are not dehumanising in their 
own right, but merely reflect what is wrong with the modern world system 
and the world order in which we find ourselves today. In other words, there is 
no way that projects such as the cultural village can be transformed, or have 
a transformative effect on society, without a restructuring and re-ordering of 
the world which they merely reflect. In the context of a post-colonial world 
order, the cultural villages are a sign of its myth; hence they need to be read 
as a phenomenon that reveals rather than hides the dehumanising project of 
modernity/coloniality.
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A FRAGMENTED HUMANITY AND 





uilt on the dark underbelly of slavery and colonial imperialism, 
 modernity required the drawing of a line between one part of humanity, 
considered by the colonial powers to be a superior race, and another part 
considered as inferior, thus making human co-existence impossible. But, as 
Aimé Césaire (1972, 2) shows, this division of humanity into ideal mod-
ern humans and ‘the Negro’, haunted by contradictory and unreconciled 
ideas, did not just brutalise the conquered, who remain dominated in many 
ways, but also dehumanised the conquerors, the dominant race to this day. 
This led W.E.B. Du Bois ([1903] 2012) to conclude that the problem of 
the twentieth century (and of the modern world generally) was the colour 
line, a line that sustains deep-seated wounds by perpetuating global racism 
and its ramifications for the humanity of those viewed as the ‘other’. To deal 
with the challenges faced by Africa and other regions on the periphery of the 
modern world system, society first needs to recognise the fact of this division 
of humanity.
The colour line is of principal significance in considering what happened 
to the constitution of the human, the humanity of peoples. But it is only 
one of many lines on which Western modernity as a civilisation is based, 
including the line between Western culture as superior and other cultures as 
inferior, the gender line that places the male above the female in a globalised 
patriarchy, the line between Christianity and other religions, the line between 
Eurocentrism as the source of rationality and other ways of knowing as mere 
traditions and cultures, the line between rich and poor on a global scale, 
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and so forth. This chapter critically meditates upon the subject of humanism 
today and how it impacts on the quality of global dialogues, in order to pro-
pose where we might begin to shift understanding of the concept towards a 
decolonial humanism so that diversal global dialogues become possible. I use 
the term diversal in this chapter to imply an ontological, epistemological and 
political position that is contrary to the hegemonic idea of the universal. This 
is because while the universal enabled an imposed homogeneity of phenom-
ena, a diversal position enables heterogeneity to thrive.
THE HUMAN LINE AND HUMANISM 
OF A COLONIAL NATURE
The lines of division that run through Western modernity militate against the 
ideal of a common humanity based on shared human values, ethics, interests 
and pursuits. The human line, which often takes the form of the myth of 
race, leaves a large part of humanity with no true self-consciousness until they 
rebel against the norm of modernity. It leaves ‘the Negro’ and others – the 
indigenous people, the poor and the oppressed – with a double consciousness 
by forcing them to see themselves through what W.E.B. Du Bois refers to as 
the veil of racism (Du Bois [1903] 2012), placing them in a condition where 
they see themselves through the gaze of others. They end up with conflicting 
ideals, dreams, identities and personas, and are thus unable to say definitively 
what it means to be human and how to ‘do human’ in their circumstances. 
In these conditions, they are left with the burden of having to shout that they 
too are human, and that they need to breathe, claiming back that very basic 
human activity. This is what campaigns like #BlackLivesMatter in the USA in 
2016 symbolise (Lebron 2017). The Black Lives Matter movement emerged, 
like the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall movements in South Africa 
(Ndlovu 2017), out of the cries of ‘I can’t breathe’ by the black poor, and are 
a reminder that modernity, its capitalist world system and its omnipresent 
imperial man suffocate others, threatening to cast them into a zone of social 
death so that they become dead while alive. They become a death-bound peo-
ple, living with the constant possibility of their arbitrary deaths as a necessary 
part of the world system (JanMohamed 2005).
The idea of humans and how they are organised is a major underlying prob-
lem here. The paradigm of humanism, upon which the modern world system 
is founded, organises all aspects of society on the basis of hierarchies of beings 
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and non-beings rather than circles of human beings. Hierarchies define who 
is below and who is above, whereas circles define whom we relate to in the 
journey of life. The hierarchy creates competition among people, cultures, 
civilisations, races and families for a spot at the top as a necessary logic of 
success. This logic creates conditions that lead Du Bois ([1903] 2012) to 
decry being black as being like the seventh-born child in the human family – 
born behind the veil, made obscure as if one represents a shame in the midst 
of other members of this family. In fact, colonial or imperialist versions of 
humanism advance the humanity of the people of modern Europe and its 
diaspora at the expense of other peoples, leading to what Frantz Fanon (1963) 
describes as a zone of being and a hellish zone of non-being. This results in 
what Lewis Gordon (2007, 7) terms ‘people hidden in plain sight’; these are 
‘people who are submerged’ and, as a consequence, supposedly ‘do not exist’. 
This fact of invisible people leads to their dispensability; they are subject to 
everything from the questioning of their humanity to demonisation, exploita-
tion, enslavement, colonisation, epistemicides, cultural death and genocides. 
Such people exist as a problem, a conundrum, an inconvenience, as Du Bois 
([1903] 2012) concluded.
In the paradigm of colonial humanism, progress is understood as moving 
from a low stage of being to a higher stage, where the latter is defined in rela-
tion to whiteness. As a result, those who are at the lower stage are thought to 
be unsuccessful. While there is room for solidarity in this kind of civilisation, 
the overwhelmingly dominant view is that one must first climb up to a posi-
tion of having achieved success, and then pull others up from below or who 
were moving in the opposite direction to oneself. This is why philanthropy 
is largely the work of the rich who have a kind heart: they give a little out of 
the plenty they have towards relief for those struggling below them. The poor 
receive gratefully the crumbs that the rich gracefully allow to fall from their 
table of abundance.
In the capitalist world system, economic progress among countries is 
thought to be about moving through successive phases from low to higher 
forms of production, so that feudal societies are classified as backward and 
capitalist ones as advanced; in the case of socialist systems, the socialist phase 
is deemed the most advanced phase of society, one still to come (Mignolo 
and Escobar 2010). Both capitalist and socialist paradigms see economic 
development in terms influenced by the logic of hierarchies, in essence taking 
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the European experience as universal and also justifying its universalisation 
through means that have included brutal processes of enslavement and slave 
trade, imperialist expansion of the European nation state, colonial conquest 
and rule, and neocolonial arrangements introduced in the post-1945 period 
that continue up to the present day. In their rise from a low state to a higher 
one, countries might have to undertake crude exploitation of the environ-
ment and of the poor, using the latter as a labour force with which to leapfrog 
over other states. The necessity of competition means that each country must 
think about how to grow at the lowest possible cost, and even at the expense 
of others. This capitalist logic, born from the colonial version of humanism of 
the post-European Enlightenment period, reinforces the division of humans 
into zones of being and non-being, indispensable and dispensable peoples, 
people who live in affluence through the labour of other people who must 
live in squalor, near or on dump sites, collecting garbage thrown away by the 
affluent to whom they sell their labour for a minimal wage. Super-exploitation 
is the experience of people in the zone of non-being.
This is a humanism that makes the will to power, the desire to climb up 
above others, critical for progress, at the expense of the will to co-exist with 
others in conditions of peace, love and justice (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2016). 
Countries as political entities are organised in terms of the same principle 
of hierarchy. The logic of international politics is therefore that countries 
must acquire more of the currency of political power than other countries if 
they want to have greater influence over decisions made in the international 
arena that will affect them (Bull 1977). This made possible the colonial enter-
prise that helped give European countries an advantage in relation to other 
countries, one which continues today. It has enabled them to exert greater 
influence in regard to international negotiations about the global economy, 
the natural environment and climate change, energy resources, commodity 
prices, intellectual property rights and other major issues that are currently 
subject to international negotiations and decision-making.
In the experiences of the peoples of the Global South (hereafter referred to 
as the South), the powerful and dominant countries in the international sys-
tem have paid lip service to the need for securing the common good, pursuing 
shared human aspirations and finding universal purposes of being, shared 
norms and values, and therefore common legality and legitimacy for all in the 
world (Chimni 2006). As far as their experiences go, the dominant powers 
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do everything to frustrate fundamental transformations that must happen in 
order to produce a more equal human society and an equitable distribution 
of global power. They resist giving all countries equal access to world mar-
kets. They undermine the fight against the destruction of the environment in 
order to protect their multinationals so that these entities can maximise their 
profits. They shirk the responsibility to reverse the scourges of climate change 
and poverty. They claim that they want to do much, but not that which could 
equalise their societies with those of poorer countries. There is plenty of evi-
dence of such roles and positions taken by the so-called developed countries 
(which are mainly the former colonial powers, with the USA and Japan join-
ing this group in the twentieth century) on matters that are critical for the 
prosperity of developing countries, including access to markets, levelling the 
playing field of international trade, ample space to develop their own policies 
free of outside interference, eradication of heavy external debt burdens on 
poorer countries, reparations for past exploitation and oppression, and other 
such issues (Acharya 2014).
At the very base of all these problems, I suggest, is the form of humanism 
that was born in processes involving imperialism, slavery and colonialism 
as the dark underbelly of the modern world. This was a humanism that is 
under-theorised and neglected in discussions about the making of the modern 
world, especially in the literature on international relations and world history. 
It is a humanism that was necessary for the construction of what James Blaut 
calls a coloniser’s model of the world (Blaut 1993). It is an understanding of 
human order that accepts the drawing of lines between some humans and 
other humans based on the assumption of a naturally unequal distribution 
of power, an acceptance of unequal power relations (Quijano 2007). In this 
configuration of power, human architecture and the intersubjective space of 
thought, the conditions of unequal status, opportunities and power among 
humans that follow class, race, gender and other divisive lines, are made to 
seem natural. This is a humanism that permits the dehumanisation of portions 
of human society whose humanity is presented as a disaster, an anomaly, an 
aberration and a series of questions (Gordon 2007). It is a form of humanism 
that, while masquerading as recognition of the humanity of many, permits 
the violation of the humanity of others. It is natural, in this orientation of 
humanism, that violence, theft of others’ land and resources, the destruction 
of the cultures of indigenous peoples outside the West and the silencing of 
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their voices, and the denigration and erasure of the history of others should 
be justified as part of the project of making humanity better – the so-called 
civilising mission (Césaire 1972). So, for Euro-North American modernity’s 
construction of the human to thrive, the existence of monsters who would 
export violence and racism to the whole world is necessary, as a threat to be 
used to defend its imposition of a global humanism of its own making. This 
is a humanism that is rooted in a Euro-North American consciousness of 
itself, perceived as beginning with the abandonment of the terrible period of 
the Dark Ages and the entry into the era of rationality and secular modernity. 
Seen from the underside of modernity, it becomes obvious that the birth of 
this humanism coincided with the inception of the colonial project, so that 
Europe’s discovery of itself became simultaneously the ‘discovery of the other’ 
(Scott 2000, 119). The enlightenment of Europe and its view of humanity 
required the invention of the darker other, in order for this other to be subject 
to methods designed to eliminate it as an option for how to be human. This is 
why this humanism emerging out of the European Renaissance was a rebirth 
of a sense of being human for Europeans, and a violent end to other ways and 
styles of being human. It was a humanism experienced in the South as what 
Fanon (1963, 312) calls a ‘succession of negations of man and an avalanche 
of murders’.
Today, the inequality that exists between the nations of the West and other 
nations is not limited to unequal economic development but extends to other 
areas of human society. Western knowledge has been exalted to the point 
where it is hegemonic in the world. But we know that the enslavement and 
colonisation processes entailed the destruction of other knowledges indige-
nous to colonised territories, almost two thirds of the world in land area. The 
actually provincial Western culture has been made global to the point where 
it seems naturally so, when in fact the process of imposing it on others was 
accompanied by genocides and other forms of violence. Western technologies 
have been made hegemonic to the point that we can hardly remember that 
there are many civilisations and different cultures that created various tech-
nologies for human progress over a long period of time (Grosfoguel 2013). 
Western civilisation, like all other major civilisations before it, has given 
much to the world that could have transformed the world for the better, had 
it allowed the plethora of other civilisations and cultures to contribute to the 
diversity of human society and its progress. If it were not based on the logic of 
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hierarchy which makes domination necessary, Western civilisation would not 
have wasted so much energy on dominating and destroying other civilisations 
in its search for complete control over the whole world.
As I have said above, fundamental to the construction of modernity in 
all its appearances and hidden forms is the construction of the human in 
terms of hierarchies and dichotomies. These have made it possible for forces 
of modernity to naturalise the domination of specific humans by a specific, 
generally self-conscious group of other humans. On this basis, space and time 
were reorganised in order to produce the modern world and the category 
of the modern human from which others were excluded, thus making per-
manent the invented categories of race, class, gender, religion and so forth 
(Quijano 2007). The resultant paradigm of the human is haunted by the fact 
of the questioned legitimacy of others in the construction of the world for 
the West, the Euro-North American modern world, the world of the whites, 
the rich, the male and heterosexual Christian. It is a co-existence of humans 
with inhumanity, for while some appropriate the privilege of being human, 
others are consigned to exist in conditions of bare life, living with questioned 
legitimacy in naturalised zones of non-being, in damnation and with disas-
ter (Sithole 2016). ‘Such people,’ Gordon (2011, 97) argues, ‘are treated by 
dominant organizations of knowledge as problems instead of people who face 
problems. Their problem status is a function of the presupposed legitimacy of 
the systems that generate them.’
This condition leads to false dialogues between categories of the human fam-
ily, because the lines of ontological distinction drawn elevate some into what 
Sylvia Wynter (1976, 82) calls the ‘omnipotent imperial men’. True dialogue 
happens among human beings or human communities, but under the spell 
of the colonial model of the world, dialogue turns into a monologue where 
the European man speaks and others have to mimic; he exists while others 
survive. According to the narrative of Euro-North American modernity, the 
European man invented everything, including the very names of others, the 
names of the places they live in, world history, and even the modern world 
itself. Jack Goody’s point (Goody 2006) is precisely this, that the making of 
the modern entails the theft of the history of others and the installation of the 
European narrative as the master story in, of and about the world. It is a mon-
ologue of a stolen history. This obviously leads to a monologue about the past, 
the present and the future. As John Headley (2007) shows, the Euro-North 
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American modern’s story is that all key modern ideas, systems and regimes on 
which the world today is founded are European. There is no question about 
the existence of these creations, but only about how they can be managed and 
improved. So, in this view, there is no fundamental debate about the story 
of the modern world. This means that if the global dialogues today are about 
the challenges and prospects of democracy, the state of human rights and 
freedoms, the questions of natural resources and wealth, the environment and 
human disasters, the global economic crises and so forth, this is not global 
dialogue in the true sense of the word, but a series of monologues in which 
Africans, Asians, Arabs, Latin Americans, peoples of the Pacific and so forth 
participate in mimicry rather than as sovereign voices. The discourse, the con-
cepts and the language are Euro-North American, so Euro-North Americans 
speak, and others speak through the veil of Euro-North American rationality.
Today’s big global dialogues about shared sovereignty, world peace, 
international justice, the world economy, global cosmopolitanism, global 
commons, international obligations and the diffusion of norms and val-
ues in the twenty-first century come across as just such monologues. As 
Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) shows, global dialogues are conducted on 
the assumption that there is a clash of cultures, a clash of civilisations, often 
because of the resistance of what must be backward cultures to the necessary 
spread of the superior Western culture to other cultural zones.
AN ALTERNATIVE HUMANISM IS POSSIBLE: 
THE WILL TO CO-EXIST IS NECESSARY
I have said that the first thing we need to do is to discuss the problem frankly 
and understand where we are as the world of humanity, and why. The second 
task we need to undertake is to develop a new basis for the construction of 
an alternative humanism in order to make possible the equal recognition of 
human beings and diversal dialogues among equals, so that no part of the 
human family feels the need to assert and defend the legitimacy of its claim 
to humanity and to demand recognition as humans. A diversal dialogue is 
horizontal, vertical and inclusive – in essence, a conversation among equals – 
in which diversity, even if this includes fundamental differences, is not only 
tolerated and understood, but welcomed and encouraged as a necessary part 
of being human. This project entails the destruction of the pillars on which 
colonial humanism is built, at least in two areas.
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The first is the line of distinction by means of which human beings have 
been divided into categories that are assumed to be superior and inferior. This 
human line leads to death for a large part of the human family, what Orlando 
Patterson (1982, 105) calls ‘social death’, and pushes the human project on a 
world scale to a dead-end. It also renders the world civilisation being imposed 
on all humans as decadent, in that it produces and reproduces permanent 
problems (such as wars, poverty, inequality, racism and sexism) that it cannot 
solve, to paraphrase Césaire (1972). If this process ‘de-civilises’ the dominant 
while brutalising the dominated, then it is a civilisation unto death that we 
are talking about, one which must be transcended through the making of a 
decolonial humanism on the basis of conversations or diversal dialogues across 
cultures and civilisations, with a view to bringing about a pluriversal world, 
a world for all. While colonial humanism led to a universal world, a world 
where others have to die to themselves, their cultures, their context and their 
aspirations in order to fit in, what is desirable is a pluriversal world where the 
presence of a diversity of cultures, civilisations, ways of knowing, models and 
modes of powers is necessary. To this end we must develop, encourage and 
entrench new ethics of life, ethics of peace and justice. These ethics must be 
designed to decommission the basis of colonial humanism. The new human-
ism will be premised on a decolonial understanding of humanism in which 
all humans are assumed to be equal.
The second necessary measure is to acccept that the new humanism has 
to be anti-bourgeois, anti-colonial, anti-imperial and anti-globalisation as 
we know it. This is not to argue for a mere response to these tendencies 
within the existing framework of global humanism, but for transcending 
them in the process of transforming human relations in fundamental ways. 
This involves a transformation of the very notions and models of power 
and space, which have so far been conceived according to the Cartesian 
principles of hierarchy and lines of distinction whereby the global village is 
the footstool for Western powers. It must be fashioned on the basis of what 
Ngũgı̃  wa Thiong’o (2012) describes as ‘globalectics’: the ability to view 
and conceive of things from equally different, unique and diverse perspec-
tives, thus collapsing the hierarchies of beings, of cultures, of languages, of 
knowledges and powers. It is about levelling the playing field so that differ-
ence does not equal inequality, and diversity does not imply inferiority and 
superiority.
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There are three related organising concepts that have come from various 
parts of the dominated world which I want to propose as essential for the 
fashioning of a new paradigm of humanity, the paradigm of equality, shared 
dignity and solidarity. The first of these relates to the will that drives humans 
towards peaceful and mutually enriching co-existence rather than domina-
tion. Enrique Dussel (2008, 13) puts forward the idea of the ‘will to live’ as 
an alternative to the ‘will to power’ that epitomises the coloniality of power 
in the modern. Friederich Nietzsche ([1906] 2017) coined the latter phrase 
to describe what is believed to be the main driving force of humans, the 
force behind the pursuit of the highest position in life. It takes as granted 
that the human wants to rise above others to occupy the apex of a hierarchy, 
which also makes necessary the domination of some by others. Thus, this will 
to power underpins the colonial logic of dominating others to prove one’s 
worth, exploiting others to amass one’s wealth, subordinating others to estab-
lish one’s power. On the other hand, for Dussel, the will to live is premised on 
the fact that the originary desire of humans is to live rather than to dominate. 
It is the desire to avoid death and extinction. This makes humans collec-
tive beings by virtue of their origin. The will to live is the positive force and 
capacity to move, to restrain and to promote. At its most basic level, this will 
drives humans to avoid death, to postpone it and to remain within human 
life. It leads to the constitution of political power as obedience of leaders to 
the collective will of the community, the consensus of the people based on 
their shared will to live.
This means that at the global level, achieving consensus must involve rec-
onciling the will to live of the small island society of Fiji with that of the 
bigger society of the United Kingdom, rather than being based on the current 
reality where the former is expected to make sacrifices in the interest of the 
latter, because the dominant always have their way. Lasting and true consen-
sus cannot be imposed by violence or other acts of domination driven by the 
will to power over others. This can only create a momentary quietness as the 
oppressed think about how next to express their will to live – by revolutionary 
violence, subversion or other, subtler ways of fighting.
The second, related concept involves a paradigm of wholeness and equality 
that gives rise to another view of ways of doing globalisation, described in 
terms of Wa Thiong’o’s (2012) globalectics. The concept is derived from the 
shape of the globe and the interface between various points on its surface, as 
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an alternative conception to that of the global world in Eurocentric thinking, 
in which various points on the surface all intersect with one crucial centre, 
forming the shape of a hub and spokes. The single centre point produces 
homogenising forces, universalising impulses and centralising tendencies, 
so that globalisation fundamentally entails being centred in the ways of the 
West, which have now been defined as universal when they are in fact merely 
Western. In globalectics, the surface has no one centre; any point is equally a 
centre with a significance of its own (Wa Thiong’o 2012). Globalectics sug-
gests a dialectical interface between many centres mutually enriching one 
another; this describes a model of humanism, power and knowledge that sup-
ports mutually affecting dialogue, or multi-logue. It embraces the phenomena 
of nature and nurture in a global space that is rapidly transcending that of 
the artificially bounded spaces defined as nations and regions. Wa Thiong’o 
(2012, 15) says that the global is that which humans in spaceships or on the 
international space station see: the dialectical is the internal dynamics that 
they do not see. Globalectics emerges as a dynamic embedded in wholeness, 
interconnectedness, equality of potentiality of parts, tension and motion. It 
is a way of thinking and relating to the world, particularly in the era of glo-
balism and globalisation, that promises to transcend the monologues and 
crises that underpin the global village, with their Eurocentric way of thinking 
and colonial ways of relating.
Having many centres of knowledge, of human civilisation, of cultural 
expression, of managing global power and of interaction means that we 
might soon have ways of solving the intractable problems of humanity, using 
many real options that a single centre cannot offer. The world we can envisage 
through globalectics has many equal centres of global economic activity, forc-
ing the whole world into serious dialogue in order to advance to greater levels 
of mutual happiness. It has many centres of culture instead of only one – the 
one that now dominates, whose tendency to produce terrible levels of vio-
lence through its movie and media industries cannot be reset by any society 
other than the one that controls these industries. Even if that one dominant 
power was benign and gracious, it would still be wrong that global culture 
should be centred in it, rather than in many centres.
The third concept is one I have already mentioned above, namely a dia-
logic conception of humanity, affirming the need for different civilisations, 
cultures, ways of believing or spirituality, human groups, and the earth and 
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humans together to be in continuous, mutually affecting dialogue. We there-
fore need to rediscover how to enter into genuine dialogues such that the 
ways of living of different human groups are mutually enriched, without one 
way of living disappearing in the face of another. We need to aim to become 
better without causing some people to lose their essence and difference in 
order to be like others. We need to make it possible, therefore, for diver-
sity to be strengthened for the good of all humanity. The logic of being, of 
knowing, of power relations must be to enrich differences while growing sol-
idarity. Diversity is our strength as a human society; it increases options and 
choices. This is especially true as the globalised world runs into problems that 
it cannot solve without changing its foundational, hierarchised logics, such 
as environmental degradation, water and air pollution, deforestation, climate 
change, the rise of lifestyle diseases, deep levels of poverty, inequality and 
exploration. The growing social anger everywhere in the world, with ordinary 
people saying, ‘here and no further!’ cannot be solved until we rethink how 
humanity is organised and what it means to enter into genuinely diversal 
dialogue so as to find new ways of being and doing human.
IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA
Africa’s condition today is a function of the modern world in which it exists 
and for whose service it was reinvented a few centuries ago. The invention of 
this modern Africa was based on what Valentin Mudimbe (1998) calls the 
paradigm of difference that authorised the colonial production of marginal 
societies, cultures and human beings. It was imagined as an Africa of cheap 
labour and raw materials that the makers of the modern world wanted, and 
indeed, Africa has become just that. It has the heaviest concentration of min-
erals and other natural resources in the world and it exports them mainly to 
the West for processing into profit-making items of trade and commerce. It 
was seen as an Africa of stagnation, reliant on the creativity of the West in 
order to survive, on the fact that the Western man wanted its resources in 
order to enable the expansion of Western civilisation. And thus Africa has lost 
all of its own motive forces of progress – knowledge, indigenous civilisations, 
technologies of its own and so forth – and now depends on Western artefacts 
to succeed.
Within this paradigm of difference, Africa was imagined as a place that 
would consume the knowledge that the West produced and which it needed; 
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hence through various forms of domination Africa today is a consumer not 
just of goods and services made in the West but also of knowledge, con-
cepts, theories and philosophies from the West. Africa is said to import 95 
per cent of the knowledge it uses, and exports next to nothing, because the 
post-colonial Africa exists after the destruction and discrediting of all its indig-
enous knowledges.1 All its universities are replicas of European universities, 
producing and reproducing knowledge from Europe lock, stock and barrel. 
African students learn about the human sciences – sociology, history, poli-
tics, anthropology, linguistics, geography, theology – as made and presented 
by Europeans, so that their education makes it necessary for them to think 
of Europeans as superior. They learn natural and applied sciences – biology, 
engineering, physics, chemistry, astronomy, architecture and nanotechnol-
ogy – as Westerners present these.
The implication of all of this is to make it seem natural that Africa and 
Africans cannot bring anything to the modern world, and the West can do 
so. It produces a humanity of unequals, in which it seems as if Africans are 
unequal to other humans because Africa itself is unable to become equal with 
the West. This is the product of a paradigm of human society that is premised 
on the domination of the many by the few, a hierarchy of unequals. It is the 
product of a decadent civilisation that promotes values and ethics of decay: 
racism, classism, patriarchy, homophobia, sexism, domination, exploitation.
The decolonisation of humanism on a global scale is therefore in the best 
interests of Africa. As the most debased part of the modern world system, it is 
in Africa’s interest to have the logic of the will to power that keeps it under the 
control of the West and others replaced with the logic of the will to live – the 
logic of human co-existence. It is in its interest to have the mono-humanist 
liberal conception of the globe as a single space dominated by a single centre 
replaced with a globalectics in which all parts of the world have the making 
of centres in them. It is also in the interest of Africa to end the monologue of 
what the West thinks, what it has done and what it can do, and replace this 
with a multi-logue of civilisations and cultures bringing together their shared 
will to live, to make good living possible for all.
It has been Africa’s dream all along to take control of its destiny and be 
the master of its own narrative. It has been Africa’s age-old desire to live, 
because to live is not merely to exist but also to have dignity and meaningful 
lives among others and with others. It has been Africa’s struggle, after all, to 
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reclaim its membership of human society as equals with others, shouting: 
‘We are human beings, not victims, aid recipients, terrorists or monsters. We 
are humans but suffocated, dying because of the domineering presence of 
the imperial man; we want to breathe and become beings again.’ It has been 
Africa’s aspiration to play a part in the multifarious conversation of civilisa-
tions and cultures, contributing to the fashioning of a new world civilisation 
made up of the diversity of humanity.
PRACTICALLY SPEAKING: AN ALTERNATIVE HUMANISM
The question is, how do we enact this decolonial move away from the colonial 
mono-humanism towards alternative humanisms in practice? In making the 
conceptual arguments above, I am also suggesting that this enactment begins 
with consciousness. This means that a new mind and new consciousness are 
an important precondition for bringing about this alternative way of being 
and doing human. The colonial model of being human is also a product of 
thought, ideology and theory. Therefore, as we contemplate practices that 
would enable decolonial ways of being and doing human, we should not be 
creating a binary between consciousness and action, thinking and doing, and 
theory and practice. In making the suggestions I set out below, I also do not 
want to be seen to be prescribing or foreclosing the opportunities for human 
beings to invent their own different ways of bringing about that which they 
have been persuaded is worth doing.
The first practical consideration is to embrace in earnest and in practice the 
ways of being long provided for in indigenous paradigms of being, such as 
ubuntu. This implies starting new forms of dialogues among humans, ones 
that are horizontal rather than vertical; conversations that are designed to 
revive mutual recognition and interdependence among humans as well as to 
rekindle the spirit of commonality and mutuality (Ogude 2019). Dialogue 
in the form that might be called multilogue, in the sense that it comes from 
all directions, is crucial for the revival of indigenous ways of being and doing 
human. This spells an end to vertical dialogues that engender inequality, 
domination and subordination of some by others.
The second practice is mutual recognition of the humanity of others 
(Cornell and Van Marle 2005). This entails being and doing human as a pro-
cess of restoring, enriching and reinforcing the humanity of others, through 
our speech, the ways we relate to others, and the design of human systems 
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and institutions. It makes it a duty for the new human to make humans of 
others, in order to earn their own humanity. This refers to human relation-
ships at familial, communal, and national and international levels. It is about 
the ethics of mutual recognition, put into practice in how people relate to one 
another. It is also about infusing in one another, including in children, the 
value of mutual recognition. It discourages thoughts, spoken words, gestures 
and actions that diminish the humanity of others, the practices of putting 
others down.
The third practice is communalism, understood principally as a way of liv-
ing, of co-existing and working with others. It requires conscious efforts to 
function in ways that build communities and communal practices instead of 
perpetuating esoteric individualism that breaks human bonds. Human activi-
ties are designed to enrich rights, responsibilities and benefits for communities 
of human beings rather than just for individuals, thereby strengthening the 
community and communal bonds enough to support endeavours that will 
make themselves and others more human. These endeavours may relate 
to developmental, security, political and intellectual goals. A communalist 
approach to achieving these goals breaks the bonds of patriarchy, enabling 
the full energies of men and women to be released for the common good. 
Gender roles become dynamic rather than rigidly tied to assumptions about 
the biological features of human beings (Ngunjiri 2016). Decolonising gen-
der becomes a reality that delivers men from complicity with colonial systems 
of power, to the detriment of women (Lugones 2010).
The fourth practice involves endeavouring to achieve human excellence 
with humaneness. As James Ogude puts it, the aim of ubuntu, as one name 
for a variety of ways of being and doing human in indigenous thought, ‘is 
to urge that, when deliberating within oneself or intervening between com-
munities, one ought to bring out the best characteristics, such as the careful 
use of reason, especially in matters that require recognizing the humanity of 
others’ (Ogude 2019, 5). Excelling in everything human requires conscious 
efforts to be an excellent human being, as the basis for being an excellent 
worker, leader, manager and so on. Excellence in sociality of personhood, 
as Kwasi Wiredu (2009) puts it, is a basic condition for excelling in every 
occupation and role in society. This differs from the ethics of excessive indi-
vidualism that engenders the spirit of competition, the idea of succeeding at 
the expense of others.
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The fifth consideration is that in the area of knowledge, the task of humans 
goes beyond knowledge production. Knowledge production as a concept lik-
ens the relationship of humans to knowledge to that of workers in a capitalist 
factory, where a privileged few inventors stand outside the community to 
invent, and the community works to carry out what has been invented. As a 
result, people of the South emerge as recipients of knowledge invented in the 
West. In this sense, knowledge comes about through what Paulin Hountondji 
(1997) calls extraversion, which sees the people of the South only as sup-
pliers of raw data, and as importers of theories and methods, the insights 
generated by Western knowledge. This is enabled by the coloniality of being 
that dichotomises humans into beings in the North and non-beings in the 
South, for only the beings have the ability to produce knowledge. An alterna-
tive humanism engenders the culture of collective cultivation of knowledge, 
which mirrors the culture of communal production of food for collective 
self-reliance. In this way, all are beings and persons, capable of and obligated 
to cultivate knowledge for common and collective good; principal among 
their objectives is the bettering of common humanity, including overcom-
ing threats to this humanity. There are no researchers and informants, only 
human beings in mutual recognition of one another as humans obligated to 
cultivate new knowledge, playing different but complementary roles. This 
implies a complete rethinking of Western research methodologies and ped-
agogies, in ways that Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) describes in detail. Smith 
provides a critique of Western paradigms of research and knowledge from the 
vantage point of an ‘indigenous’ Māori, and sets a new agenda for indigenous 
research as a contribution to the decolonisaton of ways of knowing.
CONCLUSION
The shift towards a truly diversal global dialogue, the conversation among 
cultures and civilisations that will enrich the diversity of the world, requires 
that the constitution of the human being should be renewed. This entails the 
liberation of humans from the coloniality of being whereby humanity came 
to be categorised, divided and confused through the notions of race, gender 
and other acquired categories that were central to the making of coloniality 
and its modernity. This condition explains to a great extent the dialogues 
of the deaf – or monologues – that characterise global conversations, both 
in formal negotiations and in other forms of discussion at the global level. 
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In these discussions, the West is speaking and others are listening, speaking 
back mostly in the form of mimicry, elucidation, contextualisation and appli-
cation of  Western ideas to their own situations. This chapter has shown that the 
fragmentation of humanity as a result of coloniality of being, produced 
through colonial humanism on a global scale, is a major stumbling block 
to the creation of diversal global dialogue, because it perpetuates such mon-
ologues. It prevents the coming into being of a shared humanity because it 
causes a portion of humanity, recognisable as the victims of genocides and 
an avalanche of other forms of murder, to continually have its legitimacy as 
full humans questioned. The vertical dialogue between those in the zone of 
being and the rest of us in the zone of non-being is a non-dialogue; it is a 
monologue designed to reinforce global coloniality and its manifestation in 
racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia and a colonial model of the world 
and humanism. Promoting indigenous ways of being and knowing without 
altering the human paradigm that suffocates anything non-Western is to slice 
at shadows. Critical to being and doing human is the responsibility to work 
towards a decolonial humanism, a shared inclusive humanity in diversal con-
versation with the plurality of voices that exist in the world. In doing so, we 
can enable an orientation towards human relations, community building and 
knowledge cultivation that draws from alternative traditions of being and 
doing human that exist in the world beyond the West.
NOTE
 1 Personal communication, African Union Commission official, Addis Ababa, 22 May 2013.
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